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This dissertation is about the conceptual problems and existential tensions that animate 
theories of political economy. I argue that most theories of political economy adopt an 
ontological stance that Charles Taylor calls the “double focus,” that is, a view of society 
that attempts to unite ideas about impersonal social processes with an understanding of the 
context and powers of human agency. Thus political economists have often seen the 
economy as both an objective historical force and as a potential site of human freedom and 
creativity. I claim that this stance is inherently unstable, that it tends to vacillate between a 
sense of historical fatalism, an anxious longing for freedom and mastery, and a utopian 
affirmation of impersonal orders. Major theories of political economy have been motivated, 
in part, by an urge to reconcile these competing existential demands. The first three 
chapters analyze unsatisfactory attempts to reconcile the competing imperatives of the 
double focus. Chapter 1 examines Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality. I argue that Rousseau’s sense of economic history as a tale of arbitrary injustice 
and inequality pushes him towards a dangerous version of philosophical nihilism.  Chapter 
2 looks at Adam Smith and explores his attempt to redeem commercial society by showing 
that impersonal orders of exchange can help foster individual virtue. I argue that Smith’s 
optimistic account cannot be sustained, largely because it depends on a flawed conception 
of subjectivity, but also because the institutional structure of market economies has mutated 
in ways that make Smith’s vision less tenable. In Chapter 3, I explore the work of F.A. 
Hayek and show that it represents a utopian radicalization of liberal thought. I claim that 
Hayek’s turn to evolutionary theory eviscerates much that was valuable in the ethical 




Polanyi. I argue that Polanyi’s work offers a promising alternative because he explicates a 
tragic vision of the human predicament, crafting a sensibility that avoids dangerous utopian 
aspirations and instead embraces an uncertain freedom in an imperfect world. Polanyi’s 
tragic ethos attempts to avoid the most destructive consequences of the double focus: the 
vacillation between a false utopianism and a misguided fatalism that has plagued the 
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Introduction: The Double Focus of Political Economy 
 
"Science, separated from philosophy, is the opiate of the suburbs."1 - Yeats 
 
1. The Double Focus 
 
 This dissertation argues that theorists of political economy face a common dilemma, 
namely, the need to reconcile an understanding of the human predicament with a notion of 
impersonal processes. How can one give an account of the world that simultaneously describes 
the economic patterns that we observe over the longue durée but also takes account of human 
agency and the problems that surround it, including the longing for freedom and the avoidance 
of suffering? There seems to be a fundamental disjuncture between the broad movement of 
social change and the choices, ethical and otherwise, individuals must make at any given 
moment. Keynes gestured towards this problem when he quipped, "In the long run, we are all 
dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task, if in tempestuous seasons they 
can only tell us, that when the storm is past, the ocean is flat again."2 But, as Keynes knew, 
whether the seas look rough or smooth depends on the vessel in which one is traveling, just as 
our understanding of economic processes is inseparable from some conception of the limits 
and exigencies of the human predicament. That is my claim, at least. 
 I take my cue, in part, from the work of Charles Taylor. In Modern Social Imaginaries, 
Taylor observes that a split between the perspective of the agent and theories of impersonal 
order constitutes the "double focus of modern consciousness of society," a sort of horizon that 
modern thought continually retraces.3 He points out that the new modes of political thought 
                                                   
1 Yeats, W. B., Yeats's Poetry, Drama, and Prose: Authoritative Texts, Contexts, Criticism, Norton, 2000, 257. 
2 Keynes, John Maynard, A Tract on Monetary Reform, Macmillan, 1971, 65. 




that emerge in early European modernity — ideas about the economy, the public sphere, the 
nation, and democracy  — each attempt to unite some understanding of agency or freedom 
with a notion of an ordered process.4  This split perspective is part of the background context 
that makes complex society intelligible and therefore livable.5 It also helps us to make sense 
of ourselves as agents who, to some uncertain degree, shape and are shaped by a series of 
ongoing processes, ranging from politics to economics to ecology. As a way of understanding 
the human predicament, the double focus is part of the "tone" or feel of our lived experience, 
since much of the urgency of contemporary life stems from just this consciousness of being an 
agent entangled in a variety of impersonal processes.  
However, there is a kind of dissatisfaction or anxiety latent within the split perspective. 
Taylor suggests that, because ideas of agency and impersonal order seldom co-exist without 
tension, attempted resolutions and reconfigurations of the double focus are typical of the 
human sciences that take shape after the 16th century.6 There is a continual urge to render these 
two polarities compatible, to grasp the whole, to see harmony in a world that seems fractured 
by the split perspective. From this angle, political economy can be seen as one species of a 
broader genus of modern social thought, one mode of a loose set of theories and intuitions that 
continually brushes up against a similar set of problems. One such problem, to which Taylor 
alludes with his concept of a double focus, is the apparent incompatibility between ideal 
pairings that have been variously labeled agency and structure, freedom and order, autonomy 
                                                   
4 Ibid., 69. 
5 "By ‘context of understanding’ here, I mean both matters that will probably have been explicitly formulated by 
almost everyone...and some which form the implicit, largely unfocused background of this experience…its 'pre-
ontology,' to use a Heideggerian term." Taylor, Charles, A Secular Age, Harvard, 2007, 3. 




and heteronomy, familiar oppositions that might be characterized in more general terms as the 
tension between impersonal process and human predicament. 
In what follows, I build on the insights of Taylor and others by reading four major 
theorists of political economy (Rousseau, Adam Smith, F.A. Hayek, and Karl Polanyi) with an 
eye towards the way that each writer approaches the double focus of modern social thought.7 
I argue that each theorist has a unique conception of the human predicament and its 
involvement in complex economic, historical, and ecological processes. For each, ideas about 
the extent of human agency and frailty combine with (often incompatible) notions of change 
and structure to define the parameters of politics. I claim that each thinker attempts to reconcile 
the two perspectives of the double focus within a theory of political economy, thereby creating 
a vision of the world in which agency/freedom and order/impersonal process can co-exist. I try 
to show why, more often than not, such attempts have been unsuccessful and have led in 
unproductive or destructive directions.  
Such a reconciliation might be sought in many different ways, but two tendencies are 
particularly pronounced. On the one hand, a theorist may focus on the idea of impersonal order 
in the hope that an objective understanding of social processes will allow us to adjust human 
action, bringing it into a proper alignment with the world. This desire is evident, for example, 
when Adam Smith speaks of "the beauty of a systematical arrangement...connected by a few 
common principles."8 He seems to suggest that once we understand the beautiful principles at 
                                                   
7 In addition to Taylor, several other thinkers have shaped my understanding of the tensions within modern 
thought. The works of William E. Connolly have been important in alerting me to the existential aspects of 
political economy (see especially Connolly, William E. Capitalism and Christianity, American Style, Duke, 2008; 
and Connolly, William E., The Fragility of Things, Duke, 2013). Michel Foucault's The Birth of BioPolitics taught 
me to look for the political underpinning of economic thought (see Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics, 
Palgrave, 2008). I learned from Robert Pippin about the dialectical ambiguities of the modern quest for autonomy 
(see Pippin, Robert B., Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations, Cambridge, 1997).   




work in markets and networks of exchange, it will be that much easier to make our own lives 
beautiful. From his perspective, it is much easier to go with the grain of the world, and as such 
the operations of impersonal historical and economic processes help give context and meaning 
to the actions of human agents. But Smith, who began his career as a moral philosopher, also 
allows us to see how aesthetic and ethical concerns are from the very start intertwined with his 
research into political economy, to the point where it is often difficult to demarcate the moment 
when one set of concerns ends and another begins.  The search for an impersonal order is itself 
motivated by a diffuse set of thoughts, anxieties, and intimations, many of which remain 
unarticulated. Bringing to light some of these unarticulated concerns is one major task of this 
dissertation. At this point, however, I would simply like to note that the desire to grasp the true 
workings of an impersonal economic order is widespread and crosses ideological boundaries. 
For example, it is an important source of motivation in some varieties of Marxism and in much 
contemporary neoliberalism.9 
On the other hand, a thinker may begin from the opposite direction and ask how 
impersonal processes can be resisted or brought into alignment with the demands of human 
moral agency. Rousseau's republican call for freedom under a law that one provides to oneself 
                                                   
9 As Roberto Unger has noted, “The ideas about social structures we have inherited from classical social theories 
like Marxism remain entangled in…necessitarian assumptions.” For Unger, traditional Marxism and 
neoliberalism are alike to the extent that both views tend to see political and intellectual change as driven primarily 
by factors “internal” to the economic process. See Unger, Roberto, The Left Alternative, Verso, 2009, 12-15. 
 
Furthermore, I would add that this economistic strain in Marx’s thought is present throughout much of his writing 
and is not confined to a single set or period of works. Consider the following passage from his late essay The 
Critique of the Gotha Programme: “In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of 
the individual to the division of labor, and there with also to the antithesis between mental and physical labor has 
vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have 
also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow 
more abundantly, only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe 
on its banners: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” Marx speaks as if the division 
of labor and distribution of property were the primary determinants of the human predicament. Marx, Karl, 




is one well-known example, but, once again, this approach reoccurs.10 For instance, Karl 
Polanyi, the Hungarian social theorist and economic historian, asks: 
How can we be free, in spite of the fact of society? And not in our imagination only, 
not by abstracting ourselves from society, denying the fact of our being interwoven 
with the lives of others, being committed to them, but in reality, by aiming at making 
society as transparent as a family’s life is, so that I may achieve a state of things in 
which I have done my duty towards all men, and so be free again, in decency, with a 
good conscience.11 
 
In this passage, with its Rousseauian overtones, Polanyi gives voice to the desire that society 
be made "transparent." He speaks as if the goal is to grasp the whole set of complex social 
processes as an extension of his own actions and moral intuitions so that imperatives of duty 
and conscience can be satisfied. Again, we witness the dense intertwining of motives that 
animates the search for a reconciliation of two dissonant perspectives on the world. What each 
of these examples — Smith's search for beautiful, impersonal principles and Polanyi's plea for 
human agency — illustrate is that the split consciousness of the double focus is not simply a 
theoretical problem or epistemological puzzle. Rather, it is folded into the experience and 
conditions of everyday life, a self-understanding that generates its own tensions and problems. 
 To put it simply, I argue that political economy is a style of thought driven, at least in 
part, by an existential need to justify the world, to reconcile us to its imperfections, and to 
explain how to obtain the good things in life. Addressing these existential questions requires a 
theorist to craft a vision in which human predicament and impersonal process coexist. As a 
result, writers from Max Weber to Polanyi to Taylor have observed that political economy 
frequently encroaches on questions whose answers were once sought in the religious sphere. 
                                                   
10 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, Ed. Victor Gourevitch, 
Cambridge, 1997, 54. 




If this claim sounds grandiose, I can only ask readers to suspend judgment for a time. Besides, 
the idea is not really so strange. As Peter Berger reminds us, one of the traditional tasks of a 
religious theodicy is to make sense of worldly suffering, to answer the question "Why does 
God permit some men to eat and others to go hungry?"12 "Theodicies," he points out, "provide 
the poor with a meaning for their poverty, but may also provide the rich with a meaning for 
their wealth."13 To the extent that political economy seeks to cope with a similar set of 
questions — to explain who suffers, who prospers, and why — it tends to internalize the sorts 
of existential concerns previously tied to theodicy. I attempt to show that, as with theodicy 
proper, a kind of anxiety and a utopian hope are the twin poles toward which economic 
discourse is continually pulled. All of this will, I hope, become clear once we examine the 
texts. 
The urge to reconcile process and predicament, and the repeated failure of such 
attempts, provides a lens through which to read political economy since Rousseau; it provides 
one way to understand the continuing impact of economic ideas as a form of political discourse. 
I will discuss well-known ideas such as Rousseau's critique of inequality and Adam Smith's 
defense of commerce; but I will also attempt to show that their meaning and origin can be 
traced to attempts to reconcile the double focus of modern social theory.  
2. The Problem with Capitalism  
Ironically, my project also has its roots in a kind of twin failure, at once personal and 
systemic. In 2008, capitalism failed, and I failed to understand it. Like so many others 
struggling to come to terms with the political scene that emerged from the wreckage of the 
                                                   
12 Berger, Peter L, The Sacred Canopy, Doubleday, 1967, 59. 




financial crisis, I felt the need for some framework that might help me understand both the 
fragile state of global capitalism and its surprising resilience. At that time I was reading a good 
deal of Marx. As a result, my first instinct was to take a comparative look at various theories 
of the historical foundations of capitalism, running the gamut from Adam Smith to 
reconstructed Marxists such as Wallerstein and Arrighi. My goal was to place them alongside 
one another, to line up their theoretical worlds, the better to see which hypotheses "got it right" 
and came closest to capturing the essential dynamics of really existing capitalism. I was 
basically satisfied with the outcome, until a friend put to me an innocent question —  "What is 
capitalism?" — that made me go red in the face. That sense of embarrassment became the most 
valuable lesson to emerge from that earlier enterprise, because, of course, I saw at once that I 
did not understand exactly what capitalism was, or even how to begin parsing the mass of 
unarticulated assumptions, moral attitudes, and empirical observations that congregate around 
the term.  
If I were still in a Marxist mood, I might say that this new project emerges as the 
negation of that earlier failure. This is because I would now like to try to think about theories 
of political economy while minimizing the importance of capitalism, at least as it is typically 
understood. Perhaps, as an experiment, we should try not to speak quite so much about 
capitalism, and pause to take a closer look at the ideas and debates that may be obscured by 
overreliance on such a conceptual shorthand. In making this suggestion, I certainly do not want 
to imply that the various issues we usually subsume under the idea of capitalism (economic 
growth, inequality, ecological degradation, exploitation, market self-regulation, unprecedented 




these issues acquire different meanings and different political valences as part of a larger, often 
unarticulated, stance on the relationship between humans and impersonal processes.  
This interpretive task is important because the unarticulated background tends to have 
a major impact on what ideas actually mean in the day-to-day world of real political 
contestation. And this is especially evident if we want to think about not just what particular 
ideas are widely held or politically effectual, but how these ideas are deployed and believed. 
To take just one example, although Hayek and Adam Smith both advocate a version of 
individual liberty, the intensity that this concept acquires in their work is completely different. 
While Smith tends to depict liberty as one good among others, for Hayek, whose theoretical 
work incorporates ideas about human evolution and long-term historical processes, liberty 
becomes a foundational right that the modern world constantly endangers. Liberty thus comes 
to function for Hayek (and many of his contemporary followers) as the cornerstone of a radical 
denunciation of contemporary politics. Paradoxically, then, the manner in which Hayek 
expounds his ideas and the sort of radicalism they bring to the public sphere has more in 
common with Rousseau’s pessimistic indictment of modernity than it does with Smith’s 
temperate liberal humanism. The crusading neoliberal and the radical champion of the popular 
will, both of whom can charge that “the system is broken” and in need of a fundamental 
transformation, have a great deal in common because they share a similar mode of belief, a 
similar passionate intensity. To understand these sorts of dynamics and the way they show up 
in contemporary debates and ideologies, we have to probe below the surface, and this requires 
the sort of hermeneutic effort that I engage in here.  
Along these lines, I would like to emphasize something of which most of us are already 




philosophers and economists that we typically recognize as the most perceptive observers of 
the economic world do not have all that much to say about "capitalism," a 19th century word 
that was coined with pejorative intent for use in a particular series of political battles.14 (In fact, 
according to Braudel, Marx himself never uses the word Kapitalismus.)15 Like all language, 
but especially political language, the word capitalism carries distinctive traces of meaning and 
primes us for particular expectations and experiences. It shades into notions of exploitation 
and decay on the one hand, and points toward grand possibilities of future abundance and 
individual liberty on the other. The word capitalism inflects political thought in advance.    
Thus, it should not surprise us that keen observers have sought after novel designations 
of economic phenomena almost as long as people have been writing about economics, or that 
capitalism has seldom been a favored term of art. In the 18th century, Rousseau and Adam 
Smith focus their very different examinations of political economy on an idea of "commercial 
society."16 In the 20th century, Karl Polanyi speaks of "market society."17 And in his 
revitalization of the classical liberal vision, F.A. Hayek talks about the spontaneous social 
order of "catallaxy."18 To assume that beneath these diverse labels rests a depiction of the same, 
relatively stable and transparent institutional/historical configuration, to call it "capitalism," 
and then to read these theorists as if, despite what they wrote, what they really meant to give 
us was a set of different evaluations of what is basically the same thing — this seems like a 
sloppy way to pursue a theory.  
                                                   
14 Heilbroner, Robert L., The Nature and Logic of Capitalism, Norton, 1985, Ch. 1. 
15 Braudel, Fernand, The Wheels of Commerce, Harper & Row, 1982. 237. 
16  Hont, Istvan, Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, Ed. Bela Kapossy, 
Harvard, 2015. 
17 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon, 2001.  




Instead, I propose that we take each of these writers at their word, and assume that they 
had related but distinct visions of economic life. Without the grounding assumption of a single 
historical or institutional context to which these theories refer, the task becomes that of nuanced 
interpretation, of paying closer attention to the unique aspects of what a particular thinker is 
trying to describe, the better to learn how that description functions politically as a frame for 
our day to day experience of economic life.  
This alternative approach, however, appears to raise a question even more thorny than 
the one it seeks to avoid: namely, if we assume that Rousseau and Hayek might not be talking 
about the same thing, how can they enter into conversation at all? If capitalism or some other 
ostensibly empirical historical/institutional idea can't serve as a common denominator, then 
what is the alternative?  
3. Process and Predicament 
 
It should not be controversial to suggest that the modern discipline of economics as we 
know it emerges, in part, after the notion of nature as a process comes into wide circulation.19 
It becomes a prominent way of understanding social order when, from Mandeville to the 
Physiocrats to Malthus, a number of thinkers conclude that nature is a self-regulating process; 
that it moves in an intelligible direction through linear time, that it possesses its own immanent 
laws and criteria of selection that determine this movement, and that this regularity allows 
humans to understand and either control or adjust ourselves to the process of nature.20 It is their 
stance on this governing image of a self-regulating process (an image that begins to appear 
prior to both capitalism and the industrial revolution) that can serve as a red thread linking 
                                                   
19 Foucault, Michel, The Birth of Biopolitics, Palgrave, 2008. 




economic thinkers. My hope is that this image will allow us to read the classic texts with fresh 
eyes for new possibilities.  
Of course, there is another side to this story. Among political economists, Karl Marx 
(at least on some readings) and Karl Polanyi stress that the modern view of natural processes 
has its roots in a deeper philosophical and theological shift, and that this conceptual history 
leaves political economy with a kind of cultural residue.21 More precisely, they argue that a 
philosophical reconception of humanity's place in the universe is one precondition for the 
emergence of the idea of self-regulating natural processes. New ideas about social processes 
and the human predicament go together.  
As Taylor tells the story in Sources of the Self, we might be able to trace part of the 
groundwork for this new understanding back to a series of theological debates in the 16th and 
17th centuries between voluntarists (exemplified by Ockham but including Locke) and a group 
of philosophers known as the Cambridge Platonists (among whose numbers Taylor places 
Francis Hutcheson, the mentor of Adam Smith).22 For the voluntarists, the world God has 
created lacks a purpose until He intervenes through divine decree, subject to no rational or 
natural law beyond His own sovereignty. As Taylor indicates, this type of thinking is not far 
removed from some versions of modern materialism, because, in the absence of God, nature 
lacks intrinsic purpose or significance. The world becomes, in Max Weber's famous phrase, 
disenchanted.23  
                                                   
21 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon, 2001, 87-
9. 
22 Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Harvard, 1989, Ch. 15. 





For the Cambridge Platonists, the sense of God as separate and coldly sovereign is not 
only morally abhorrent, but it seems to raise the possibility that we live in an unpredictable 
world that is subject to divine revision at any moment. Instead, they argue that God continually 
sustains all creation through His love in an underlying, beneficent order.24 He is therefore not 
fully separate from His creations, which are originally imbued with purpose and intelligible 
movement. This school will later shade into Deism as God recedes from the picture and a 
"clock work" nature begins to run according to its own mechanisms.25  
In this theological debate, we can see the conceptual space for something like the 
modern notion of a self-regulating process slowly emerging: the voluntarists make possible the 
thought that God is not present in nature, and the Cambridge Platonists attune thinkers to the 
idea that nature might have regularities of its own. In the last half of the 18th century, both 
conceptions make their way into economic thought, so that the economy can be seen as an 
impersonal order composed of countless individuals, each pursuing their own interests, shaping 
and being shaped by the larger process of exchange.26  
Although the idea is now commonplace, it is essential to understand the radical 
departure made possible by the conception of the economy as an impersonal order. The easiest 
way to see the break is by way of a comparison with Aristotle, whose treatment of political 
economy is representative of the traditional view. For Aristotle, the picture is reversed: the 
economy is defined by the self-sufficient household and trade is condemned as disorderly and 
excessive.27 There is no awareness of a separate economic order beyond the personal 
                                                   
24 Ibid., 250.  
25 Ibid., 251. See also  Taylor, Charles, A Secular Age, Harvard, 2007, 293-6. 
26 Taylor, Charles, Modern Social Imaginaries, Duke, 2004, Ch. 5 “ The Economy as Objectified Reality.” 




relationships that compose the polis, and therefore no need for a split-level theory that 
differentiates between agency and impersonal structure. Moreover, according to this older 
view, a theory of commercial exchange can only play a modest role in any understanding of 
political life, since the real sources of order and change are located elsewhere, e.g. in human 
nature (Aristotle), divine providence (Augustine), or martial virtue (Machiavelli). When this 
older picture is revised, so that economic activity itself can be seen as a source of impersonal 
order, economics becomes a major mode of thinking and speaking about politics. Answers to 
political questions must now be consistent with an economic theory that differentiates between 
individuals and impersonal order, giving rise to the existential tensions of the double focus. 
According to Polanyi, the new vision hopes to discover "an economic sphere in society that 
might become the source of moral law and political obligation."28 Again, two perspectives are 
linked: the discovery of economic order alters the sense of moral obligation, and both changes 
push the understanding of politics in new directions.  
Each of these conceptual shifts takes place before the arrival of scientific 
understandings of natural processes. Thus Hayek can say that "a nineteenth century social 
theorist who needed Darwin to teach him the idea of social-evolution was not worth his salt."29 
The conceptual groundwork had already been laid. More importantly, I want to suggest that 
this shift in theological and ontological conceptions is as fundamental to what will become 
economics as the well known ethical revaluation of avarice and self-interest away from 
traditional Christian condemnation and toward the favorable view Mandeville made famous in 
                                                   
28 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon, 2001, 
117. 




The Fable of the Bees (1714), because only in the context of the new ontology could the new 
ethics make sense. 
This brief detour through theology and philosophy is not tangential.30 Taylor's brand of 
historical reconstruction is pertinent because it helps us to see that the concept of a natural 
process is not an obvious way to understand the world, that it is perhaps never going to be 
purely empirical, and that it is closely bound up with the way we conceive nature and 
experience.  
Many of the best economists have been perfectly forthright about the imaginative labor 
involved in economic theory. Schumpeter, for example, writes: 
The economic life of a non-socialist society consists of millions of relations of 
flows between individual firms and households. We can establish certain 
theorems about them, but never observe them all.31 
 
When observation fails, theory and imagination fill in the gaps. Hayek puts the same idea in a 
more cryptic (and Kantian) idiom when he says, "Though we cannot see in the dark, we must 
be able to trace the limits of the dark areas."32 These dark areas are sites of an economic 
imaginary that does much of the work connecting innumerable observations and ideas that 
circulate in our thinking. The idea of an impersonal process is a particular way of bringing 
functional unity to a diverse set of observations and beliefs; it cannot be  directly inferred from 
a series of observations, however much the data comes to support it. Moreover, the idea of a 
process is ambiguous. Smith's "invisible hand" and Marx's "M-C-M'" may both invoke this 
                                                   
30 "The form in which the nascent reality came to our consciousness was political economy. Its amazing 
regularities and stunning contradictions had to be fitted into the scheme of philosophy and theology in order to be 
assimilated to human meanings." Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of Our Time, Beacon, 2001, 88. 
31 Schumpeter, Joseph, History of Economic Analysis, Oxford, 1994, 231. 




image of process, but the imagination can be doing wildly different sorts of work in each case. 
In turn, the meaning of economic ideas as they emerge in political discourse often depends on 
the imaginary aspects they acquire.  
4. Looking Ahead 
 
 In the following pages, I examine four possible responses to the double focus of 
political economy. I will argue that each thinker proposes a set of economic ideas that are, in 
part, a response to the apparent split between the problems of the human predicament and the 
demands imposed by self-regulating processes. I also attempt to show why most of these 
proposed resolutions are unsatisfactory and often lead to destructive calls for utopian political 
responses.  
I certainly do not claim that the authors I examine are the only thinkers of importance, 
merely that they have proven instructive for my own understanding. Perhaps the most notable 
absence is a detailed examination of Karl Marx. There are a few reasons for this. To some 
degree, I felt that the ideas I would have addressed in a chapter on Marx, such as his conception 
of history or ideas about capitalism and inequality, were already prefigured in the two chapters 
on Rousseau and Smith. Moreover, Marx remains a divisive figure, even (or especially) among 
Marxists, and getting involved in Marxist exegetical debates would distract from the focus of 
the dissertation. Consequently, although Marx will make several appearances, he remains a 
minor voice in this study.   
In Chapter 1, I analyze the split between human nature and history as it appears in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. I argue that Rousseau sees 
inequality as constitutive of human identity after humanity's exit into history from Edenic 




pessimistic historical vision, which threatens to culminate in despair, represents one extreme 
response to the disjuncture between process and predicament. Thus, Rousseau oscillates 
between a nihilistic withdrawal from politics and a longing for a miraculous reconstruction of 
society.  
In Chapter 2, I look at the philosophy of Adam Smith. I claim that Smith's thought has 
roots in the political concerns of Thomas Hobbes, and that he advocates commercial society 
because it appears to restrain prideful self-interest without requiring a Hobbesian turn to 
authoritarian government. Smith presents readers with an optimistic vision of a society in 
which affluence and virtue are mutually reinforcing.33 I find Smith's vision fascinating and 
attractive. In the end, however, I argue that Smith's optimistic account of commercial society 
depends on a flawed theory of intersubjectivity and a narrow view of the passions, and that 
institutional changes have made his version of economic optimism much less plausible than it 
was in the 18th century.  
In Chapter 3, I examine the philosophy of F.A. Hayek and argue that it represents a 
radicalization of an older tradition of moderate liberalism. I claim that Hayek felt compelled 
to turn liberalism into a romantic, utopian philosophy in order to legitimate it during a period 
in which free-markets were becoming increasingly volatile and unpopular in Western 
democracies. Thus, despite his considerable achievements as an economist and social theorist, 
the political program of Hayekian neoliberalism contains aspects of authoritarianism that 
emerge in moments of crisis.   
                                                   





Finally, in Chapter 4, I explore the work of Karl Polanyi. Within the context of the 
dissertation, Polanyi's approach to political economy is unique, because he refuses to seek a 
unified theory that promises to resolve the split between the ethical dilemmas of the human 
condition and the reality of social processes. Instead, Polanyi offers us a genealogy of political 
economy as a field of study that helps explain its continued temptation to reach for utopian 
solutions. He also presents ways for thinking about human life that engender more constructive 
forms of political engagement than those he witnessed in the violent 20th century. 
This is an opportune moment to be writing about Polanyi, and not just because his work 
appears newly relevant after the crisis of neoliberalism. The Karl Polanyi Digital Archive at 
Concordia University, as well as a new collection of previously unpublished writings, For a 
New West, has recently made it easier to grasp the full range of Polanyi’s thinking, especially 
where issues of human existence and religion are concerned.34 I have learned much from these 
sources. Drawing on his reading of Hamlet and his heterodox Christian humanism, I argue that 
Polanyi's seminal economic work The Great Transformation is based on a tragic understanding 
of the human predicament. As he makes clear in the final passages of his great book, the best 
protection against the lure of destructive calls for utopia is the open acceptance of suffering, 
mortality, and finitude as essential elements of human life. Polanyi calls instead for a cautious 
activism that embraces the world in all its uncertainty, without seeking a full reconciliation of 
human agency and social process. I suggest that his tragic understanding of life may be the 
least destructive ethos available today.  
In the end, we are left with four archetypes or “images” of thinking about political 
economy (Rousseau’s indictment of modernity, Smith’s humanistic liberalism, Hayek’s 
                                                   




utopian libertarianism, and Polanyi’s tragic vision) each of which captures something vital 
about the present state of thinking about the relationships between politics, ethics, and 
economics.   
As a motto for reading these difficult and often controversial texts, I find myself 
persuaded by a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics:  
Now some of these views have been held by many men, and men of old, others by 
a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely 
mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect, or even in 
most respects.35 
 
Like Aristotle, I try to begin from the assumption that ideas and opinions that have an enduring 
influence are likely to be right about something, or at least capture something important about 
human experience. This means that, although I have favorite authors and do not shy away from 
critique, I do not expect any of the writers I examine to give us "the right theory" or a fully 
realistic portrayal of the economic realm. Indeed, it is part of my argument that some degree 
of imagination and ambiguity are aspects of any politico-economic theory. To my mind, the 
interpretation of political ideas is akin to viewing Monet's series of paintings of the Rouen 
Cathedral: each picture captures something essential about the thing in question, and each 
elicits new ideas and dispositions from us, yet no single image represents the correct picture 
or captures all the essential features. While each of us might have a favorite picture, we need 
the full series in order to recognize all the different shades and tones. It is not likely that any 
picture is entirely mistaken. 
 
                                                   




Chapter 1: Jean-Jacques Rousseau: History, Nature, and the Soul1 
 
“Discontented with your present state, for reasons that herald even greater 
discontents for your unhappy Posterity, you might perhaps wish to be able to 
go backward; And this sentiment must serve as the Praise of your earliest 
forbears, the criticism of your contemporaries, and the dread of those who will 
have the misfortune to live after you.”  
- Rousseau2 
 
“The soul soars, the heart catches fire in the contemplation of these divine 
models; by meditating on them at length we try to become like them, and can 
no longer suffer anything mediocre without disgust.”  
- Julie d’Etange3 
 
1. Why Rousseau? 
  
If it seems at all strange to begin a discussion of economic thought with the enigmatic 
figure of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to read him alongside “proper” economists like Adam Smith 
or Friedrich Hayek, it can only be because Rousseau has been so central to the way that we 
approach and experience economics, for such a long time, that he is sometimes taken for 
granted. Rousseau was one of the earliest and most astute critics of modern, market-oriented 
society, more than a century before “capitalism” became a term of art. His depiction of growing 
inequality produced by a dehumanizing historical process, along with the idea that society 
should be understood as a collective moral subject and the primary site of justice, continue to 
resonate today. Champion of “the people,” Rousseau was one of the first moderns to seriously 
ask the question: Does becoming wealthier make us happier? Better? More humane? In 
answering the negative, Rousseau shows us what is at stake in economic thought. After The 
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Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, the question “What may I hope?” becomes tied to an 
understanding of the possibilities and limitations inherent in economic change.  
In this chapter, I explore the insight and influence of Rousseau’s philosophy of political 
economy. My central claim is that his importance goes beyond any particular arguments about, 
say, the way that inequality corrupts virtue or divides society into hostile camps. Instead, I 
focus largely on his reading of history in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (also 
referred to as the Second Discourse), especially his portrayal of the tensions that exist between 
the state of nature and the processes of historical and cultural evolution. I argue that, unlike 
many other modern philosophers who adopt a similar dichotomy, Rousseau refuses to fully 
privilege one side of this nature/history distinction. For him, neither human nature, nor history, 
nor any conceivable combination of the two, can finally solve the complicated political 
problems that arise when the two realms interact. Humankind is pulled out of Edenic nature 
into the maelstrom of historical decay. A return to the prelapsarian bliss of nature is impossible, 
yet the human soul retains the imprint of its first beginnings in ways that make it ill suited to 
life in swiftly changing historical societies.  
Rousseau’s recognition of the tensions that characterize modernity allows him to 
diagnose problems that we still confront today. He brings problems surrounding temporality, 
hope, anxiety, and the constitution of the self into view – and links each of these issues to a 
narrative of economic development. He also shows how deeply inequality has become 
embedded in the self. Ultimately, however, I argue that Rousseau creates the basis for a deeply 







2. Three Problems with Current Readings of Rousseau  
It should be said at the outset that my reading of Rousseau cuts against the grain of 
several popular approaches to his political economy. Thankfully, the days of the Cold War are 
long gone and the anachronistic depiction of Rousseau as the forerunner of 20th century 
totalitarianism has largely fallen out of fashion.4 Nevertheless, our appreciation of his thought 
remains tied to present academic trends in ways that obscure rather than reveal.  
First, as part of the running debate on the moral status of capitalism and markets, too 
many contemporary commentators on Rousseau have taken a piecemeal approach to 
understanding his critical stance on contemporary social life. They begin by breaking down his 
various, often paradoxical, claims into an itemized list of assertions, compare them to counter 
arguments in favor of modern society, and attempt to arbitrate between them. Dennis 
Rasmussen relies heavily on this approach in his otherwise insightful comparison of Rousseau 
and Adam Smith.5 The problem is that Rousseau is hardly the only philosopher to display 
hostility toward commerce or the division of labor (this may actually be the least unusual 
feature of his philosophy). Indeed, there may be some small grain of truth in Madame de 
Staël’s quip that Rousseau “had nothing new, but set the world on fire.”6 Yet we need to 
understand not the individual elements, but the strange alloy that Rousseau forges with his fire.  
Second, other interpreters have read Rousseau almost exclusively as a social reformer, 
as if the sole concern of his vast body of work – which includes everything from opera to 
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autobiography to writings on botany– was to design a blueprint of the perfect constitution, one 
that existing societies could enact posthaste. His value as a thinker then stands or falls with the 
plausibility of his answers to immediate problems of governance. On this approach, The Social 
Contract is taken as the capstone of Rousseau’s body of work, and the reflections it provides 
on the requirements of a just society are understood to disclose Rousseau’s “solutions” to the 
problems outlined in his earlier works, especially the Second Discourse. Interpretations of this 
stripe tend to emerge from analytic philosophy. Amartya Sen nicely labels this project 
“transcendental institutionalism” (although I think he is too quick to attribute it to Rousseau).7 
Transcendental institutionalism concentrates on establishing a rational ideal of justice, and then 
attempts to discover what sorts of real-world institutions would embody it.  
If the very idea of a transcendental institutionalism sounds vaguely Rawlsian, it is 
because this style of thinking has gained prominence since Rawls’ own reworking of the social 
contract tradition in A Theory of Justice. Furthermore, in his Lectures on the History of 
Political Philosophy, Rawls portrays the quest for an institutional embodiment of ideal justice 
as Rousseau’s major concern.8 But Rawls appears not to recognize that Rousseau traces many 
problems, not to flawed political institutions, but to the nature of the soul or self under all 
conceivable social conditions.9 At the very least, we should remember that the exhaustive 
moral education Rousseau describes in Emile, which he believed to be his best book, is the 
essential supplement of the republican institutions of the Social Contract.10 More to the point, 
it is not at all clear whether Rousseau believed a free and just republic could actually be 
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established today, given his diagnosis of the decrepit foundations of modern society. After all, 
he claimed that it would require gods, and not an especially rigorous political philosopher, to 
give men laws.11 The a priori assumption that Rousseau simply must have left to posterity a 
workable solution to the problems he raises prevents us from appreciating the depth and 
radicalism of his ideas.  
Finally, in libertarian circles, it has become increasingly common to encounter 
interpretations of Rousseau that rely heavily on a critique first popularized by F.A. Hayek. In 
brief, Hayek argues that modern philosophy is characterized primarily by two orientations 
toward epistemology. One view, which stems from Descartes, mistakenly believes that all true 
knowledge is both “clear and distinct” and capable of being explicitly articulated, preferably 
in mathematical form.12 Consequently, he argues that Cartesians have a tendency to believe 
that all relevant knowledge can be collected and comprehended by a single human mind. The 
contrary and, for Hayek, the correct view, is that of Adam Smith and the other philosophers of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, who understood that much human knowledge is tacit and incapable 
of rising to the level of conscious reflection or full articulation. Knowledge instead remains 
dispersed in traditions, practical skills, and the like.13 Hayek situates Rousseau within the 
tradition of Cartesian rationalists who overlook the spontaneous and unpredictable elements of 
social order; the corollary to this epistemological stance, he argues, is a political disposition 
that fails to appreciate the value of individual liberty, choice, and experimentation.14 In brief, 
Hayek’s claim is that Rousseau’s naïvely rationalist epistemology accounts for his hostility 
                                                   
11 Rousseau, The Social Contract, 69.  
12 Hayek, Friedrich, “Individualism: True and False,” in Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago, 1948, 9-
10. 
13 Ibid., 14-16. 




toward the individualism of bourgeois society. More recently, this critique has found a wider 
audience through popular books like Timothy Ferris’ The Science of Liberty and Thomas 
Sowell’s A Conflict of Visions.15  
Although Hayek’s epistemological critique of political thought is often instructive, it 
tends to mislead when applied to Rousseau. For one thing, this critique implicitly depends, 
usually without support, on reading Rousseau as a radical seeking to impose a rational blueprint 
of the just society. On the other hand, the Hayekian criticism oversimplifies Rousseau’s 
position on the existence of complex processes. Rousseau read deeply in the skeptical 
empiricist psychology of his day, and he agreed with much of it.16 More to the point, Rousseau 
does in fact understand history, at least in its beginning stages, as a spontaneous process, driven 
forward by its own internal dynamics (indeed he is far more astute on this point than some of 
Hayek’s choice figures such as, say, Locke). But Rousseau also believes that historical 
spontaneity interacts with other processes and realms of experience, including what he calls 
the soul, and that this interaction has led to the moral crisis of contemporary society.  
In what follows, I resist each of these popular styles of interpretation and argue that 
Rousseau should be approached through an examination of the basic framework that structures 
his thought. His particular assertions about the economy, his hopes for a possible reformation 
of society, his epistemology, each of these is contingent on Rousseau’s understanding of the 
contradictions between nature and history.   
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3. States of Nature: the Original Human Predicament 
Nearly anyone who has encountered Rousseau is likely to be familiar with the 
legendary opening remarks of Emile and The Social Contract: “Everything is good as it leaves 
the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man;”17 “Man is born 
free, and everywhere he is in chains.”18 These two sentences, as captivating as anything in the 
annals of political philosophy, display the fundamental intuition that motivates Rousseau’s 
animus toward existing societies, namely, the idea that modern civilization is a sort of fall from 
a dimly remembered state of grace. Casual readers are also likely to be familiar with the 
description in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality of the way that injustice and oppression 
emerge out of a primordial state of natural equality. Yet the impact of the Second Discourse 
extends far beyond such generalizations, and as a result the text calls for a close reading, 
especially because the more specific arguments I want to make about Rousseau will depend on 
having it fresh in mind. 
Rousseau first achieved public notoriety as a thinker in 1750 when he responded to an 
essay contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon. The topic at hand was “Whether the 
restoration of the sciences and arts has contributed to the purification of morals.” With the 
French Enlightenment in full swing, this must have seemed like a loaded question.19 
Nevertheless, Rousseau argued the negative and won. In an essay titled Discourse on the 
Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau claims that “our souls have been corrupted in proportion as 
our Sciences and our Arts have advanced towards perfection.”20 Progress in the arts and 
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sciences, he insists, breeds pointless luxury, which in turn generates vice and the decline of 
civic virtue. Public life is characterize  by aggressive self-interest and the elaborate systems of 
modern philosophy serve mainly to cast a thin veneer of legitimacy over the evils of social 
decay. 
If it is possible to call Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts Rousseau’s first 
recognition of the symptoms of a generalized social illness, then the Discourse on the Origins 
of Inequality represents his considered diagnosis. In 1753 Rousseau responded to a second 
essay contest sponsored by the same Academy of Dijon on the broad topic, “What is the Origin 
of Inequality Among Men, and is it Authorized by Natural Law?” The resulting Discourse on 
the Origin of Inequality gave Rousseau an opportunity to revisit the question of social 
corruption and respond to critics of the First Discourse who claimed that he exaggerated the 
effects of luxury and that his rhetorical condemnation of society failed to provide a plausible 
demonstration of how such moral degeneration actually occurs.21  
Criticisms of the First Discourse helped push Rousseau into a more deliberate 
reflection on history and economics. In what he later describes as a “genealogy” of 
deterioration, 22 Rousseau engages in a reconstructive history designed to illustrate the course 
of events that has led humankind to its present condition.  To do this, he turns to the idea of an 
original “state of nature,” as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke had done in the 17th century. 
Rousseau, then, appropriates a common philosophical device, but in his hands it becomes 
something new and different. (This is a move that Rousseau will often make, adopting an older 
vocabulary or style of thinking but quietly radicalizing it.)  
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In Leviathan, Hobbes had envisioned a state of nature in which isolated individuals 
struggle for survival in a war of all against all. In his famous phrase, life in the state of nature 
is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.”23 The exigencies of this situation push individuals, 
in light of their fear of violent death, to contract with a powerful Sovereign capable of enforcing 
law and putting an end to incessant violence. The legitimacy of the state is thus premised upon 
the danger of a return to the state of nature: because collapse of order is an ever present 
possibility, obedience to the Sovereign is a continuing necessity.   
On Hobbes’ account, the state of nature appears to point toward the emergence of a 
fully formed political society because, through the adoption of a rational social contract, 
humans are able to opt out of the state of nature, with all its violence and suffering.24 Regardless 
of whether Hobbes thought the contractual transition from nature to society described a real 
historical event or simply intended it as a thought experiment that might disclose the basic 
problems of political order, the upshot of his argument is that society can be founded and/or 
supported by rational and consensual agreement. In his view, humans are primarily passionate, 
violent, and prideful creatures; nonetheless, rationality finds a foothold in the universal fear of 
violent death, so that, under a strong sovereign, self-interest manages to more or less contain 
the passions within a precarious social structure. Desire is at once consolidated and, to the 
extent possible, defanged. One can see here the outlines of the idea that self-interest restrains 
the passions, an idea that later develops into the explicitly utilitarian justification for a 
commercial economy.25 Except for the continued existence of what he calls “vain-glory,” a 
disruptive longing after power, honor, and status, Hobbes suggests that humanity can be 
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successfully reconciled with a robust and mutually beneficial social order; that is, as long as 
the Sovereign secures the requisite obedience.  
John Locke’s later presentation of the state of nature is similar in its broad outlines, 
even if his political loyalties differ. According to Locke, natural man is primarily engaged in 
work on the earth, “mixing” his labor with the natural world in order to produce property.26 
Locke’s state of nature is not one of constant warfare, but is nevertheless characterized by a 
high degree of insecurity stemming from the lack of an impartial judge capable of resolving 
disputes that inevitably arise between individuals.27 Without a common judge, interaction 
threatens to tip back into an unbridled state of war. Individuals come to recognize this danger, 
and contract with each other to nominate what Locke calls a “fiduciary power,” a sort of trustee 
government designed to protect each person’s original rights to self-preservation and 
property.28 Legitimacy depends on the ability of the government to guard these original rights, 
rather than, as in Hobbes, simply the power to eliminate personalized violence. 
The conventional way of understanding the different state of nature theories expounded 
by Hobbes and Locke is to see them as engaged in a foundational argument over first 
principles. On this reading, Hobbes represents the archetypical statist, insisting on the 
individual’s obligation to the state and the monopolization of legitimate violence. Locke is the 
proto-liberal, holding fast to the absolute status of individual rights as a bulwark against the 
state. However, Rousseau short-circuits this rather superficial reading and sends it in an 
unexpected direction. In effect, he argues that the dispute between Hobbes and Locke is closer 
to a family quarrel, because the two share a series of unarticulated assumptions that restrict in 
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advance the boundaries of political argument. By extension, Rousseau calls into question the 
notion that the parameters of politics are exclusively defined by a battle between the state and 
the individual. For him, the hard questions have simply been overlooked.29  
The earlier state of nature theorists make three moves that Rousseau will contest. First, 
both Hobbes and Locke suggest that individuals in the state of nature are rational, to the extent 
that they are capable of reflecting upon the conditions most likely to fulfill their interests and 
desires.30 Moreover, the fundamental desires that animate rational pursuits appear to be 
unaffected by variables like geographic location, status, or historical circumstance. Thus, even 
in the most remote state of nature, humans engage in specialized spheres of action like abstract 
thought and the production of private property. For these reasons, Hobbes and Locke tend to 
assume that the foundational contours of human experience are basically the same regardless 
of time and place, at least insofar as experience is relevant to politics.   
Second, for both Hobbes and Locke, this original kernel of rationality implies that 
civilized society (shorthand for literate, wealth accumulating collectives with institutionalized 
rules of conduct) should be the normal form of human existence because all normal individuals 
should be able to agree that it serves their primary interests better than the available 
alternatives. They focus relatively little on the question of how society acquires the basic 
features that it does, and therefore underplay problems of development.31 The crux of this 
stance is that there is less need to be troubled about time and history.  
Finally, at its most basic level, for both Hobbes and Locke the project of describing the 
state of nature involves the search for a legitimating device and a kind of reassurance. In their 
                                                   
29 Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 158. 
30 Lemos, Ramon, Hobbes and Locke, Georgia, 1978, 17-18. 




hands, the idea of nature provides an overview of the conditions that make civil life justifiable, 
given that a meditation upon the state of nature illustrates how properly functioning societies 
meet vital needs that go unfulfilled in other scenarios. For each, an examination of the state of 
nature produces clear conditions of legitimacy for contemporary societies. As such, the state 
of nature also functions as a kind of existential reassurance, because it establishes a firm 
baseline as to what the past – the basic shape of the human predicament – looks like, and at the 
same time it explains why we can rationally affirm existing polities. After the violent 17th 
century, the possibility that anything as benign as rational interest could function as a source 
of social order was seized upon, in the words of Albert O. Hirschman, “as a veritable message 
of salvation.”32 Rousseau upends each of these three assumptions, and in the process the 
concept of nature becomes the centerpiece of his skeptical critique. 
The Academy of Dijon had asked whether natural law provides justification for 
inequality, and Rousseau accordingly begins the Discourse on Inequality with a short review 
and critique of common ideas about the state of nature and natural law. His basic contention is 
twofold. First, he argues that most previous philosophers have tried to delineate natural law 
and natural right without seriously thinking about the natural world, without examining how 
nature functions or the various ways that it impinges on human beings. “One begins by looking 
for the rules about which it would be appropriate for men to agree among themselves for the 
sake of the common utility; and then gives the name natural Law to the collection of these 
rules.”33 Not only is nature thereby cast in the image of man, but the authority of nature is 
invoked for purely contingent, utilitarian ends.  
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The failure to think seriously about nature leads to Rousseau’s second argument, to wit, 
that when philosophers like Hobbes or Locke describe humans in the state of nature as lucidly 
rational, or as concerned to protect private property, they project backwards in time the 
attributes of modern Europeans.34 In other words, an image of the normal individual (rational, 
self-interested, and hard working) is read back into nature as part of the justification for 
universalizing that same image. As a result of this circular reasoning, questions about humanity 
and its relationship to the processes that drive historical change are stunted before inquiry 
begins.  
Thus nature and natural man first appear to Rousseau in the shape of a problem. How 
can one begin to describe a pure state of nature from the contemporary vantage point, given 
the vast separation between the two? To appreciate nature, one must first recognize, according 
to Rousseau, that: 
[L]ike the statue of Glaucus which time, sea, and storms had so disfigured that 
it less resembled a God than a ferocious Beast, the human soul altered in the lap 
of society by a thousand forever recurring causes, by the acquisition of a mass 
of knowledge and errors, by the changes that have taken place in the 
constitution of Bodies, and by the continual impact of the passions, has, so to 
speak, changed in appearance almost to the point of being unrecognizable.35 
 
The starting assumption must be that natural man was radically, almost impossibly, different 
from ourselves. History is a veil, nature an abyss. We are separated not just by countless 
millennia, but by completely different modes of experience, such that the human soul itself has 
been altered. Rousseau’s thought here is both profoundly modern in its historical sensitivity 
and deeply suspicious of the contemporary social order. For Hobbes and Locke, society was 
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an outgrowth of self-interest, a natural motivation of the human soul, and both philosophers, 
despite their considerable differences, tend to see society and the soul as basically consonant 
and mutually reinforcing. Rousseau objects to this easy coincidence between the self and the 
social order. We cannot assume, he argues, that society, with its overwhelming political and 
economic structures, its social roles and obligations, is a normal outgrowth of human nature. 
It is just as likely that soul and society are extremely ill suited for each other, that they must be 
sutured together artificially in a way that inflicts an irrevocable harm on humanity; indeed, this 
is precisely the argument that Rousseau proceeds to make.  
To truly encounter natural man, Rousseau believes that we must sweep away in our 
mind’s eye the accumulated debris of habit, tradition, and prejudice. His project calls on us to 
reimagine human nature and requires, he says, a single guiding principle: “for it to be natural, 
it must speak immediately with the voice of Nature.”36 Nature is the experience of the 
immediate. Nature is “majestic simplicity,”37 a world in which “everything proceeds in… a 
uniform fashion.”38 The implication is that humanity has a deep-seated need for stability and 
continuity. 
Rousseau does accept the assumption of Hobbes that natural man is a solitary being 
seeking self-preservation.39 Nevertheless, in combination with his insistence on the immediacy 
and simplicity of nature, the isolated character of natural man takes on a new significance. 
When read together, immediacy, simplicity, and atomism imply that whatever the natural 
attributes of early man are, they cannot have developed as the product of human interaction 
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over time. This means that whatever is truly natural does not have a history.40 Rousseau’s 
vision of nature, at least in this sense, owes much to the classical philosophers. As Hannah 
Arendt memorably describes it, for the main current of ancient Greek philosophy the concept 
of nature “comprehend[s] all things that come into being without assistance from men or 
gods…through the recurrent cycle of life, nature assures the same kind of being forever to 
things that are born and die as to things that do not change.”41  
Individuals who exist within the cycle of repetition that is the state of nature spend their 
time alone, couple only briefly, and live “with no idea of the future”42 or of death. They lack 
the anxiety that drives Hobbesian man into society, as well as any semblance of language and 
its corollary, rational thought. The lack of historical development and institutionalized 
identities mean that inequality can never take root, because any differences between 
individuals that happen to exist are fleeting. Death comes soon and the cycle begins again.43  
Rousseau’s answer to his initial question – Does natural law justify inequality? – is a 
resounding no, for the simple reason that when we examine the state of nature without 
prejudice, we find that inequality is conspicuous only by its absence. Rousseau reaches this 
conclusion in the early stages of the Discourse on Inequality. The rest of his substantial essay 
is devoted to tracing what inequality means, how it emerges, why it is central to who we have 
become, and why contemporary societies go to such lengths to justify it. 
 
 
                                                   
40 Rousseau is not always consistent on this point. In other works, he sometimes hints at an understanding of 
nature that is more prone to volatility and change. See, for example, his reflections on the interplay between 
melody, geography, and the passions in his account of language. See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Essay on the Origin 
of Languages, In The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, Cambridge, 1997, 247-299. 
41 Arendt, Hannah, “The Concept of History,” In Between Past and Future, Meridian Books, 1961, 42. 
42 Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 143. 




4. Out of Nature: The Origins of Inequality 
Although he takes great pains to show what natural man is not, Rousseau does not 
intend his reflections on nature as a pure via negativa, a void without positive content. 
However, the sheer ambiguity of distant history forces the philosopher to seek additional 
sources of knowledge, and, in a sense, his meditation on history serves only to reveal the 
essential inadequacies of historical knowledge itself.44 Thus,“[s]etting aside all the facts,”45 
Rousseau turns inward and attempts again to understand human nature, this time by isolating 
the most basic experiences of his own soul. Prior to language or reason, Rousseau believes that 
he can detect two natural, immediate elements of human experience. First, like the other 
animals, man has an inarticulate desire for self-preservation.46 Second, all creatures in nature 
show a deep and instinctive sense of compassion for the suffering of other beings.47 Self-
preservation and compassion: these are what speak to the soul immediately through the voice 
of nature. 
 Like nature itself, the soul of natural man is relatively simple. “To will and not to will, 
to desire and to fear, will be the first and almost the only operations of his soul until new 
circumstances cause new developments for it.”48 Moreover, because nature generally supplies 
in abundance all that human need requires, there is a ready congruence between the steady 
rhythm of nature and the shape of the soul. Desire extends to nothing that cannot be readily 
obtained. Contra Hobbes, natural man is not malevolent or miserable, but easily satiated.  
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For Rousseau, then, man’s exit from the state of nature into civilization constitutes the 
really hard problem, because, on his account, the original abundance of nature does not provide 
the complex circumstances that could call forth new forms of social organization.49 The 
corollary is that there is no strictly “rational” reason to leave the state of nature, especially for 
a creature that does not show any signs of discursive reason to begin with, and this in turn 
implies that a social contract cannot be responsible for the formation of societies. The first 
instances of social change were spontaneous and took place behind the back of humankind.50  
If one accepts Rousseau’s conclusion on this point, a cascade of related arguments 
follow. Above all, the state of nature and the exit from it no longer provide clear moral 
guidance for existing societies. It is not that the idea of nature is less relevant for Rousseau 
than it had been for his predecessors, but rather that it no longer provides obvious principles 
that can legislate norms of social order. The more Rousseau accentuates the abyss that 
separates nature from existing societies, the more the guardrail that had kept political and 
economic thought within circumscribed limits vanishes. A new and indeterminate world is 
opened up, at once terrifying and exhilarating. In the preface to Julie, Rousseau’s immensely 
popular novel, one of the interlocutors, conspicuously named “R.”, embodies this sentiment, 
asking, “Who is daring enough to assign exact limits…and assert: Here is as far as Man can 
go, and no further?”51  
Rousseau may have been the most eminent early modern philosopher to link the 
ontological question posed by the earlier contract theorists (“What is man?”) to the historical 
question (“How has he come to be?”).  Hobbes had asked what man is, and discovered that he 
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is defined by rationality, susceptibility to violence, and self-interest. Rousseau adds that man 
is a different kind of being depending on the sequence in which these traits are acquired. With 
this recognition, Rousseau shifts the basic meaning of history because it can no longer be a 
mere chronology of facts or a transparent recognition of universal patterns: “The Mankind of 
one age is not the Mankind of another.”52 Thucydides, whose History of the Peloponnesian 
War Hobbes had translated, turned to history in order to discover rules and political maxims 
valid for all times and places.53 In Genesis, which Locke had taken great pains to interpret in 
the First Treatise on Government, Adam appears on the earth with his capacities fully formed, 
the archetype of a universal man.54 In Rousseau’s hands, however, history is a story of radical 
change and incompatibility in the most profound sense, a story whose beginning is as obscure 
as its end.  
Yet, Rousseau cannot end at this point. He must also explain humanity’s exit from 
Edenic nature and trace the forces that shape its development. In addition to the desire for self-
preservation and simple compassion, Rousseau finds that natural man possesses a third 
attribute that differentiates him from other animals, a special trait that makes him unique in 
nature and especially vulnerable to changes in the environment. Rousseau calls this trait 
“perfectibility.”55 Perfectibility is best understood as the element of indeterminacy in 
humankind. It can be observed, he says, in the ability of natural man to imitate other animals 
or to react in novel ways to environmental changes.56   
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On the social level, perfectibility is similar to a kind of latent potential for cultural 
evolution.57 On the individual level, this space of indeterminacy is closely connected with 
Rousseau’s conception of human freedom. “Nature commands every animal, and the Beast 
obeys. Man experiences the same impression, but he recognizes himself free to acquiesce or 
to resist; and it is mainly in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul 
exhibits itself.”58 Unlike other animals, humans have some degree of choice in resisting 
impulses. This ability to freely choose is what defines humanity, giving humans the ability to 
adopt or adapt their own moral standards.59  
Rousseau then complicates an already difficult picture by adding the confusing claim 
that the two levels of perfectibility do not always move in perfect harmony.60 Somehow, the 
perfectibility latent within the individual can conflict with the perfectibility in the species, and 
vice-versa. This is because, although freedom allows for experimentation and the emergence 
of novelty, it also sets in motion cultural and historical trends that can become rigid over time, 
so that freedom itself is eventually undermined or distorted. Rousseau therefore calls our 
attention to the inescapable ambiguities of freedom, as well as tensions between freedom and 
order. 
Thus we should not be misled by his terminology. Perfectibility is not teleological in 
any strong sense. It is almost pure potentiality, implying grave dangers and no development in 
any particular direction, and certainly it does not mean that humans tend to become more 
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perfect over time. What perfectibility does mean, however, is that human responses to new 
situations can be unpredictable, and, more importantly, that humankind has the potential for 
the cumulative acquisition of new habits and abilities not heretofore present in nature.  
For Rousseau, habits that are acquired in the course of history cannot strictly be called 
natural, because they are complex modes of behavior that supervene upon the original 
capacities of the soul.61 Yet neither are such modes of behavior “unnatural,” in the sense that 
they stem from some transcendent source or break with physical or moral laws; indeed, these 
emergent abilities are only possible given humanity’s natural yet indeterminate capacity for 
development.62 The acquired practices and modes of experience that emerge in this cultural 
gray zone do not receive the sanction of natural law, and that is exactly why inequality is not 
justified by natural law.  
The most important consequence of perfectibility is that cumulative learning is possible 
over the course of generations, although the typically uniform conditions of nature generally 
prevent this process from getting off the ground. As an “almost unlimited faculty,”63 
perfectibility creates a sort of open space in Rousseau’s tightly-knit natural world. If there is 
one place where inequality can make inroads against the original condition of natural equality, 
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it will involve perfectibility. Ironically, then, the most distinctive mark of humankind can 
become the tragic source of its degeneration.64 This sad fact, that the human potential for 
growth and experimentation is what makes injustice unavoidable, becomes a major source of 
anxiety for Rousseau.  
The descent from nature to inequality and tyranny proceeds along two distinct tracks 
that drive each other forward in a vicious cycle. First, Rousseau charts a material course that 
leads from the emergence of social relations and the family to private property and inequalities 
of wealth. Alongside the material history runs a parallel story that one might call a spiritual 
history. As George Armstrong Kelly notes, “It is scarcely too much to say that Rousseau 
attempted the first methodical liaison between the sense of world process and individual 
psychological tensions.”65 In essence, Rousseau argues that the soul undergoes a series of 
changes as it moves out of nature and into society, until it learns to actually desire and depend 
upon inequality and signs of rank, so that the very desire for status perpetuates the unjust social 
structure that gave rise to corrupt desire in the first place. To put the matter somewhat 
differently, I am arguing that the historical and the ontological perspectives are again 
interconnected for Rousseau: inequality is a material condition of social stratification that 
intensifies over time, something that we can observe and measure with statistics, but he also 
shows that it has to be understood as something that we are, something that constitutes us.  
An understanding of the constitutive effects of inequality has recently become more 
widespread in a way Rousseau could appreciate. For instance, medical research increasingly 
shows that the stress and anxiety of poverty leads the brain to produce large amounts of the 
stress hormone cortisol, resulting in inhibited neurological development, especially in 
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children.66 The old Spencerian view that the poor are inherently less intelligent has been 
thoroughly undermined, although it still circulates quietly on the fringes of pro-market 
thought.67 Inequality literally changes the types of people we become, right down to the ways 
that our brains and bodies operate. However, Rousseau takes this argument considerably 
farther and shows that inequality is fundamental to the way that each of us comes to be an 
individual in the first place, acquiring a distinctive identity and a place within a complex 
society. The process of individuation is linked to the exit from the state of nature and is 
therefore linked to the structures of inequality that this transition produces.  
How does this process get started? Rousseau speculates that some contingency must 
have acted upon natural man’s dormant potential for perfectibility such that the need for 
sustained cooperation became more common.68 Perhaps population increases pushed isolated 
individuals into more regular relations, straining scarce resources, demanding new modes of 
cooperation and competition. Or, he suggests, a similar effect might have been achieved by 
climactic or environmental shifts.69 Rousseau is admirably attuned to what he calls “the 
astonishing power of very slight causes.”70 In the end, the precise cause is less important than 
the result: isolated individuals with irregular relations slowly form more stable ties; at the same 
time, they begin to invent new ways of coping with material change, such as special hunting 
techniques or new types of clothing for colder climates. Rudimentary specialization thus 
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emerges. Previously intermittent sexual relationships slowly stabilize into a recognizable 
family structure.71  
This last development is crucial. Not only does the family imply distinct roles – the 
first step toward distinct individual identities and economic stratification – but it also creates 
the type of steady, intense social interaction that serves as an incubation chamber for the 
development of language.72 In turn, language makes possible the use of conceptual thought 
and discursive reason. Each one of these heterogeneous changes builds upon and reinforces 
the others. Every shift in material conditions coincides with an irreversible alteration in the 
soul.  
After proto-society begins to stabilize, Rousseau speculates that humans come to 
understand that they share distinctive qualities that mark them off from the animals on which 
they prey: 
This is how his first look at himself aroused the first movement of pride in him; 
this is how, while as yet scarcely able to discriminate ranks, and considering 
himself in the first rank as a species, he was from afar preparing to claim first 
rank as an individual.73 
 
A false pride comes to be bound up with a privileged view of humanity’s place in nature, and 
the human/animal distinction becomes the first moment of a new mode of spiritual inequality, 
since it is the first time that identity crystallizes through comparisons with another being. On 
Rousseau’s account, which I find persuasive, the emergence of self-identity is already tied to 
orders of rank. Through its supposed superiority to the animal, humanity discovers itself. The 
change is a radical one. In the state of nature, the sense of self had been characterized by what 
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Rousseau calls amour de soi,74 a feeling of pure self affirmation without regard to rank or 
recognition. But with the advent of social life and the emergence of the distinction between 
human and non-human, the first signs of a new mode of experience that Rousseau calls amour-
propre become visible.75  
In contrast to the unthinking self-affirmation of amour de soi, amour-propre is 
premised on having one’s worth recognized by others and is therefore founded upon cognition 
and concepts of relative value. In the most detailed recent examination of this concept, 
Frederick Neuhouser claims that amore-propre inaugurates a new, non-natural “protean 
human need to count as someone for others.”76 The result is that the soul acquires a perverse 
relationship to social interaction: it enters into relationships of dependence that it craves, but 
which put it at the mercy of other humans and impersonal social systems. Some commentators 
have rightly noticed the masochistic aspects of this situation, in which the self seems to desire 
its own submission.77 
Neuhouser goes further: he observes that Rousseau appears to suggest that individual 
identity proper – a narrative or autobiographical self with its own point of subjectivity – may 
only be possible after amour-propre becomes operative, because only amour-propre, with its 
desire for distinction, provides the drive and attention required to create a sharply differentiated 
individual identity.78 In one sense, then, the individual in society is one aspect of a more 
fundamental inequality, and the processes that lead to inequality are the same ones that help to 
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shape the self. Humans feel pride in their various forms of distinction, first from the animals 
and then from other humans. “Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked 
at himself.”79 Society is like a house of mirrors, with each person attempting to navigate an 
array of reflections and distortions, until the characteristics of the soul as it existed in the state 
of nature, with its comfortable amour de soi and its instinctive compassion, are nearly 
extinguished. Individuals learn to crave the material signs of distinctiveness and the 
accoutrements of wealth, but, as Rousseau allows us to see, simple material acquisitiveness is 
not really what drives inequality. Above all, people desire to see their superiority recognized 
and reaffirmed. Secretly, he claims, we all make the impossible demand that others care for us 
more than they care for themselves.80  
 Language exacerbates this process of distinction-seeking. As Robert Wokler explains, 
language allows the original distinction between man and animal to become the cornerstone of 
a systematic hierarchy of values, a symbolic world that comes to define the human 
predicament.81 Language inscribes the world within a web of specific meanings and 
evaluations, including, for example, Human/Animal, Good/Evil, Rational/Irrational, 
Masculine/Feminine, Rich/Poor. Rousseau understood that language does not merely describe 
a sharply defined empirical world, but is instead what Ernest Gellner calls “multi-stranded,” 
that is, it simultaneously describes, creates values, and indicates the procedures for social 
cohesion.82 In doing so, language recreates the world itself. In Wokler’s words, civilized 
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humanity in Rousseau’s anthropology is no longer Homo faber, man the maker, but Homo 
fabulator, the human that tells fables, the being that dwells in an imaginary world.83 
Once this stage has been reached, with nascent material stratification and an identity 
founded upon the desire for inequality, the path that history is to chart is largely determined.84 
The latent division of labor inherent in the family structure eventually spreads to other 
activities, making them more efficient, but also proliferating new roles and inequalities. 
Metallurgy and agriculture are invented and allow for the production, for the first time in 
history, of a true surplus of wealth. After this surplus is generated, says Rousseau, “equality 
disappeared, property appeared, work became necessary.”85 Some become wealthy and direct 
or coerce the labor of social inferiors, while others become poor and feel themselves at the 
discretion of superiors, and began to dream of revenge.86  
It is worth noting that, despite his condemnation of the new social relations that come 
into play with the rise of private property, Rousseau does not think that the earliest forms of 
surplus mostly arise from exploitation. His account should not be conflated with the use of 
naked force to appropriate an initial economic surplus, what Marx calls “primitive 
accumulation.”87 Surprisingly, Rousseau freely admits to the advocates of commercial society 
that it was often the superior effort or inventiveness of especially talented individuals working 
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in a spontaneous way that first allowed them to reap larger gains or invent an innovative 
technique.88 In time, however, this surplus enables them to buy the labor of others. As Adam 
Smith will observe in the early pages of the Wealth of Nations: “Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, 
is power.”89 Rousseau’s point is that these gains would have been temporary and fleeting 
without the stability provided by social institutions like language, defined family structures, 
and enforceable property rights.90 Without institutions, economic surplus dissipates like vapor. 
As such, he believes that the claims of society always have a kind of priority over property 
rights, and this remains true even when production is entirely “just” and no exploitation is 
involved.  
But Rousseau insists that even if the earliest surplus was generated by personal merit, 
the legacy of bequests means that over time wealth tends to concentrate into hereditary 
fortunes, separate from any connection with merit. During the final stages of social 
degradation, wealth becomes a substitute for virtue, purchasing the semblance of beauty, talent, 
and goodness. Ultimately, then, growing economic (inter)dependence creates the basis for a 
façade of deception because survival depends upon managing the perceptions of others.   
 “To be and to appear became two entirely different things,” Rousseau observes, “and 
from this distinction arose ostentatious display, deceitful and cunning.”91 Intrinsic to the 
imaginary world in which humanity now dwells, the separation of being from seeming has far-
ranging consequences.92 Above all, it implies that the classical conception of virtue as the sort 
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of character we desire “for its own sake”93 has become an unworkable project, not only because 
true virtue and its semblance have become largely indistinguishable, but because individuals 
are compelled by necessity to prefer the semblance. This lusting after appearance produces a 
fractured sense of self as life becomes a series of occasional attempts to mimic virtue for 
instrumental purposes. Eventually, the habit of deception undermines the consistency of 
character itself, and the very uncertainty of this situation exacerbates the desire of amour-
propre for recognition, leading to renewed deceptions and thwarted projects, and so on. Such 
is life under regimes of inequality. 
Rousseau notes that four main types of distinct inequalities exist: wealth, nobility or 
rank, power over others, and personal merit or talent.94 Individuals compete for relative 
superiority in every one of these categories, and each major axis of inequality becomes the 
potential focal point for a latent sense of grievance or resentment. Over time, as new roles and 
categorical identities emerge, forms of disaffection become increasingly complex and volatile, 
and society resembles a perpetual balancing act, struggling to contain failed demands for status.  
The sociologist Richard Sennett describes his surprise at the intensity of the resentment 
he discovered during field-interviews in American businesses in late 20th century Boston:  
At the time I first interviewed the Boston bakers, while the bakery had an Italian 
name and made Italian breads, most of the bakers were Greek…For these 
Greek-Americans, “black” was a synonym for “poor,” and “poor,” via the 
alchemy which translated objective social standing into personal character, a 
cognate for “degraded.” It enraged the people I interviewed at the time that the 
elite – that is, doctors, lawyers, professors, and other privileged whites – felt 
more for these supposedly lazy, dependent blacks than for the struggles of 
hardworking, independent-minded Americans in the middle. Racial hatred thus 
betrayed a class consciousness of sorts.95  
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Such a dismal situation would not have surprised Rousseau, who argued that inequality makes 
“all men competitors, rivals, or rather enemies” by undermining and reconfiguring the shared 
bonds that hold communities together and focusing anger on the vulnerable.96 The dynamic 
described in the preceding passage is inherently unstable because it easily acquires an 
unbridled, zero-sum quality.97 This situation spawns a resentment that “corrupts at once both 
the rich and poor, the rich by possession and the poor by covetousness.”98 As the philosopher 
G.A. Cohen has observed, inequality can undermine the mutual understanding on which 
democratic societies depend as divergent lifestyles become increasingly narrow and class-
bound.99 A pervasive hostility is often the result. Rousseau understood this situation well. Thus, 
in the end, he believes that a condition resembling Hobbes’ dark vision of the state of nature 
comes to pass in the heart of the modern world, not from human nature, but from the debris of 
cultural evolution and economic stratification.  
In the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau captures something about the pathos and 
anxiety of modern life that has often resonated intuitively with a large audience, and it is easy 
to understand why. It still seems as if the unjust prosper at the expense of the public good, that 
virtue goes unrecognized while vice and corruption parade on the stage as entertainment.100 
The contemporary rich possess a material abundance that would have been unimaginable when 
Rousseau wrote, while the poor, even in the developed world, often continue to have barely 
enough to survive.101 Worse still, it is unclear whether Rousseau believes any political remedy 
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can be found for this impasse. True, he never seems willing to close the door on the possibility 
of a collective redemption – the “perfectibility” of humankind is wonderfully open ended. But 
his political works, especially The Social Contract, have always divided readers into two 
camps, those who see it as a rational blueprint for a just reconstruction of society, a “realistic 
utopia” in Rawls’ words, and those who read its rigid strictures and lofty aspirations as just 
one more illustration of how impossible it truly is to achieve Rousseau’s brand of justice. In 
the end, then, Rousseau leaves readers with a gnawing sense of unease. We are certain that 
society as it exists is very, very bad, but unsure whether it can be made better.   
5. Between Nature and History: Rousseau’s Anxiety  
The Second Discourse is a pivotal document of Rousseau’s thought because it 
reconcieves the essential dilemma of modernity as the inescapable tension between nature and 
history, between human agency and social systems. This conflict has often been misunderstood 
as a question about the value of reason, when it is better understood as a question about the 
status of humanity in a changing world. From Voltaire onward, readers have claimed, surely 
incorrectly, that Rousseau is little more than an irrational reactionary.102 On the other hand, 
Kant and his disciples, up to and including Rawls, have credited Rousseau with showing that 
deliberate, rational moral norms must be based on a foundation of human equality and 
freedom.103  
Both of these interpretations miss the point. Rousseau’s evaluation of reason is more 
nuanced than they recognized. As Allan Bloom observes, “Their [i.e. the French philosophes] 
rationalism presupposed that the maxims of morality could be made clear to all men on the 
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basis of unaided reason. Rousseau appears to deny this.”104 Voltaire mistakes Rousseau’s 
suspicion about the power of reason in politics for a crude irrationalism. Kant, on the other 
hand, seems to forget the suspicion.   
In the end, the best way to understand Rousseau is to remain focused on the break 
between nature and history that structures his thought. And once we do this, we notice 
something strange: unlike many early modern philosophers, Rousseau is uncomfortable with 
both sides of this distinction. He cannot embrace nature, or call simply for a regime based on 
natural rights, because he believes that original nature has been overlaid by convention. This 
means that society will have to legislate its own morality, giving law to itself, especially 
regarding institutions like property that do not exist in the natural state.105 There is an 
emancipated view of human agency here, and even Rousseau occasionally finds this new 
situation exhilarating. At the same time, because he lacks both the revolutionary’s faith in the 
future and the conservative’s confidence in traditional institutions, he is deeply pessimistic 
about the course of history. Humankind is torn, unable to be more fully at home in the world.  
This situation evokes an intense anxiety in Rousseau. In his most radical moments, he 
appears to call for a single solution to diverse problems that plague modern polities – from 
resentment and the internal fissures of the soul to inequality and exploitation – via the 
construction of a political order based on emancipated human agency, resisting emergent 
historical trends, creating a space of stability in which the human personality can be at home 
in the world.106 By thus embracing the rhetoric of ruptures and breaks in history and the dream 
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of radical political renewal, Rousseau prefigures one of the major – and, I would argue, highly 
problematic – aspirations of modern political thought.  These ideas take fuller shape throughout 
the 19th and 20th centuries in the writings of Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. 
There are also some manifestations of this trend that have yet to be fully appreciated. In 
Chapter 3, I will argue that Friedrich Hayek alters the course of 20th century liberalism by 
incorporating just this imagery of rupture and renewal into a different paradigm.    
More often, however, Rousseau openly despairs of the possibility of a lasting 
solution.107 This reading of our current predicament, vacillating between radical hope and utter 
despair, in which the prospects of the individual are entirely dependent on a flawed social 
order, is perhaps his most profound legacy. Much later political thought, including a good deal 
of work in the social sciences and political economy, which sometimes likes to portray 
themselves as a purely descriptive social science, can be read as an attempt to navigate that 
modern Scylla and Charybdis of hope and despair that Rousseau explored in detail.  
In fact, I argue that this sort of anxiety is intimately related to historical thought as such, 
to the extent that the two motivate each other in a kind of dialectic or spiral, with anxiety 
prompting a search to ground knowledge in historical foundations, and the ambiguity of history 
resulting in heightened anxiety. Astute observers of anxiety like Kierkegaard have long been 
aware of this dynamic. Writing in the middle of the 19th century, in a running critique of Hegel 
published just a few years before the revolutions of 1848 would inspire Marx and Engels to 
write The Communist Manifesto, Kierkegaard traced anxiety to the experience of apparently 
groundless freedom:  
Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down 
into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just 
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as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. 
Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom…In anxiety there is a selfish infinity 
of possibility, which does not tempt like a choice but ensnaringly disquiets…108 
 
Like Kierkegaard’s eye glancing over the edge, the turn toward a theory of history can readily 
evoke the very anxiety it discovers. This is because the concept of a history – especially the 
idea of a single, cumulative, longue durée history unfolding in the Discourse on Inequality – 
has a paradoxical effect: it tends to enable new hopes for increased understanding and mastery 
of social processes, thereby intensifying a particularly demanding image of human agency, 
even as it continually discloses limits, threats, and inevitable constraints on the human action 
pursued. If men make their own history, not as they please, but under circumstances given and 
transmitted from the past, then the recognition that agency – and with it responsibility for the 
future – is at once inescapable and strangely limited can be deeply disquieting. “Anxiety,” 
Kierkegaard elaborates, “is neither a category of necessity nor a category of freedom; it is 
entangled freedom, where freedom is not free in itself but entangled…”109 Perhaps freedom 
only assumes meaning against a background of its own potential limitations and ensnarements. 
The entangled nature of human freedom, caught up in ambiguous circumstances, vulnerable to 
contingencies, its limits and powers uncertain, is a persistent problem that Rousseau’s thought 
poses and fails to overcome.  
As such, the mere fact that Rousseau founds his political economy on an historical 
narrative is important, because this move ties political economy to the whole array of 
subsidiary emotions and desires that historical thought makes possible. Moreover, as I hope to 
show in later chapters, because political economists from Adam Smith to Marx and Hayek 
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engage in similar sorts of historical speculation, they tend to reencounter the same anxieties 
surrounding the status of human agency that Rousseau first explores, even as they invent novel 
solutions or methods of coping. 
That Rousseau turned toward history is not particularly unique or surprising in itself. 
In his classic survey of the Enlightenment, Ernst Cassirer reminds us that the 18th century sees 
the emergence of recognizably modern historical speculation in several disciplines.110 The 
nascent historical mode of thought can be seen in the popularity of stadial theories of social 
development, as we find in Adam Smith or Condorcet, and in the first glimmer of a theory of 
evolution in Buffon’s Natural History, a work that Rousseau read with great care.111  Across 
the board, in the natural and human sciences, Cassirer points to the “transition to a conception 
of nature which no longer seeks to derive becoming from being, but being from becoming.”112 
Thinkers become increasingly concerned to trace the immanent principles that guide 
development or determine the structure of an area of study, to understand how the actions of 
basic elements create an ordered whole. Cassirer contrasts this move to immanence with the 
search for foundational principles, a hallmark of the “geometrical” style of much 17th century 
thought, on display in the likes of Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, etc.113   
Although we should be wary of oversimplification, the contrast that Cassirer draws 
between two opposed styles of thought in the 17th and 18th centuries is useful because it helps 
highlight what is unusual about Rousseau’s presentation of history. As is so often the case, he 
attempts to combine two senses of temporality, the static and the developmental, without 
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reconciling the differences. Indeed, none other than Adam Smith quickly pinpointed this 
tension in Rousseau’s work when he reviewed the Second Discourse for the Edinburgh 
Review.114  
With a considerable degree of approval, Smith claims that Rousseau’s basic goal is to 
reconcile the naturalistic/historical principles of Mandeville with the sublime moral vision of 
Plato.115 Unfortunately, Smith does not devote much attention to whether such a tenuous 
reconciliation is really possible. In truth, an unproblematic synthesis hardly seems feasible, 
largely because Mandeville and Plato espouse two conflicting ideas about nature, and therefore 
about time and history as well. Plato’s nature is the nature of everlasting perfection that Arendt 
so vividly describes,116 whereas Mandeville’s notion of nature is closer to that of modern 
natural science: a structured and self-regulating pattern that develops from the struggle of 
creatures seeking self-preservation. Rousseau insists on the presence of each of these dynamics 
in human life – the timeless soul and the historical struggle – but does so without any attempt 
to produce a coherent understanding of nature that brings them together. Instead, Rousseau 
retains Plato’s everlasting nature in his own image of the pure state of nature, and insists, in 
effect, that Mandeville’s struggle for existence is not natural at all, but the result of a wrong 
turn in history.  
What a true union of Mandeville and Plato would produce is a worldly process with 
immanent structuring principles (Mandeville) that leads toward an outcome of lasting moral 
significance (Plato). Only if history were aligned with moral growth would such a 
reconciliation be possible, and it is no coincidence that many of Rousseau’s successors, 
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including Kant, Hegel, and even Smith himself, did attempt to produce versions of just such a 
reconciliation. Popular forms of liberalism and Marxism recapitulate this desire for a morally 
progressive history. Yet Rousseau appears to deny this possibility. For him, Mandeville and 
Plato remain at odds.117  
Smith appears to believe that Rousseau intended the Second Discourse primarily as a 
corrective to simplistic accounts of economic self-interest. He objects only that Rousseau’s 
hyperbolic tone was “the spirit of a true republican carried a little too far.”118 But Smith fails 
to understand that Rousseau’s hyperbolic energy was not simply a coincidence of 
temperament; it also results from the very attempt to fuse such disparate elements into a stable 
compound.  
For our purposes, the importance of Rousseau’s project can be summarized as follows. 
First, at the most general level, he endeavors to think history and nature at the same time, never 
allowing one pole of the opposition to supersede the other. On the one hand, the cumulative 
movement of history means that humanity can never return to natural bliss and equality. Once 
activated, the natural human capacity for perfectibility opens the way for the historical forces 
of cultural evolution that carry humanity away from the simplicity of the state of nature. Now 
humanity must accept and cope with flux and decay. “All that human wisdom can do,” he says, 
“is to forestall changes, to arrest from afar all that brings them on.”119 This sense that the world 
is a place of dubious hospitality distinguishes Rousseau’s ambivalent understanding of politics 
from the stance of the various 18th century radicals who built their hopes upon the utopian 
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promise of a philosophy of nature. When Paine wrote that “We have it in our power to begin 
the world over again,” he meant that existing societies could recur directly to the original 
principles of nature, not just as a source of vitalizing power, but also as a kind of real 
knowledge to deploy against the taint of historical oppression.120 This route is closed to 
Rousseau.  
On the other hand, he does not believe that nature can be completely superseded or 
overcome. Through the soul, nature retains a residual force that constantly resists historical 
processes. As a consequence, he also cannot adopt the stance of the convinced historicist, 
embracing and working with the opportunities available in his culture or moment in time, in 
either its conservative (à la Burke or Oakeshott) or radical (Jacobin or Marxist) varieties. Some 
inscrutable remainder always prevents humans from assimilating to collective life and 
affirming movement into the future. Nature is, for example, still present in each individual’s 
instinctual love of independence and sense of compassion. History can disfigure nature, but 
never destroy it. In this sense, Cassirer is correct to say that Rousseau believes “Everyone 
carries the true archetype within himself.”121 The archetypical self is the barest outlines of the 
natural self, or what Rousseau frequently refers to as the soul. The permanent disjunction 
between nature (the soul) and history (society) means that collective life will always inflict 
wounds.  
Original equality remains a standing condemnation of everything upon which society 
is founded, from property and self-love to the struggle for recognition that Rousseau calls 
amour-propre. It is as if, through a kind of anamnesis, the soul lives a dual life: the inarticulate 
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memory of an original freedom strains under the injustices of the existing social order. This 
dual experience is also apparent in the dialectic of inequality, outlined in my reading of the 
Second Discourse. The individual simultaneously abhors and desires inequality, without quite 
knowing why. Consequently, the real paradox of amour-propre is not that it is zero-sum (in 
the sense that whoever wins recognition does so at the expense of others who lose status),122 
but that its demands are inexhaustible, necessary for the development of human cognitive 
capacities, yet unavoidably painful for everyone involved. Inequality cuts against the natural 
grain of the soul, but the selfish desire for recognition means that we nevertheless crave marks 
of distinction because, once inside the social order, these markers provide the solid conditions 
of an identity and a self. At this point we reach the basic impasse of Rousseau’s thought: the 
contradictions of the social order are founded in the contradictions of human desire itself. 
Second, Rousseau creates a compelling image of the accidental and irrational character 
of the historical process. At unexpected and purely contingent moments, history can and does 
acquire its own immanent principles of development, distinct from those that govern nature or 
that stem from reason. Population increase and shifts in climate lead to private property, which 
in turn ripples out to produce an endless series of aftereffects. This sober recognition of 
historical contingency not only makes Rousseau unusual compared to most thinkers in the 
broad span that runs from the 16th through the 19th centuries. It also reinforces his suspicious 
attitude toward change and longing for ordered stability.123  
In her essay “The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern,” Hannah Arendt claims 
that modern historical thinking as a genre was a reaction to the skepticism that plagued early 
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modern philosophies. Philosophers like Descartes and Hume put the individual and the 
particular in doubt, and one typical response, she argues, was to look for meaning in the whole 
and the universal, i.e. in the process of human history.124 Some authors were remarkably self-
conscious about the supposed psychological benefits of history. Condorcet, for instance, wrote 
that faith in the progressive view of history would help guard against the twin dangers of a 
corrosive skepticism and religious dogmatism.125 Conversely, Rousseau was one of the earliest 
philosophers of history to insist on its aporetic and non-teleological character, which is to say 
that he refused to use historical knowledge as a hedge against skepticism. But because he 
envisions history as unpredictable and irrational at its core, Rousseau acquires yet another 
reason to fear the process of change. “[S]uch is the nothingness of things human” he writes, 
“that, except for the Being which exists self-created, there is nothing beautiful except that 
which does not exist.”126 Creation automatically assumes a negative valence. Thus, change can 
be managed, but never fully affirmed. 
Third, unlike Condorcet and most optimistic 18th century writers, Rousseau describes 
history as a tale of moral degeneration.127 History moves us ever farther from the origin and 
anxiety is thereby reinforced, since the passing of time threatens to diminish our distance from 
original fullness.  
Finally, Rousseau’s philosophy produces a heightened sense of urgency through the 
way that its rhetoric plays upon notions of fragility and power/durability. Human freedom is 
entangled more and more in circumstances that exceed control because, as Rousseau tells it, 
the most valuable aspects of human life are also the most fragile, whereas the corruption that 
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stems from history and society appears virtually indomitable. The result of this combination is 
that Rousseau’s responses to the dilemma he describes frequently take the form of what are in 
effect “exits from history” of varying degrees of plausibility (often buttressed by rigid forms 
of social discipline). Thus he recommends that Corsica remain an agricultural, autarkic 
economy, removed from European historical trends and united by a firm nationalism.128 Emile 
describes a program of “negative education” administered at the hands of a manipulative and 
omnipresent tutor, designed largely to insulate Emile from the vicissitudes of society. 
Rousseau even attempts to remove himself from history, in a sense, when he leaves Paris and 
becomes, first an exile, then a solitary wanderer. Rousseau’s task is so often negative – to resist 
historical trends, to find a space apart – because the forces in which he finds value (nature, 
morality, religion, human reason properly understood) lack the power of the forces he fears 
(history, commerce, society). As a result, he largely abandons faith in the world. This 
fascination, not to say obsession, with human fragility is both the lure of Rousseau’s thought 
and the source of its danger. 
6. Philosophical Radicalism and Nihilism 
The reading of Rousseau that I have given accentuates the paradoxical elements of the 
Second Discourse but seeks to find their common source in the conflict that arises from his 
views of nature and history. This interpretation will, of course, have its critics, especially 
because the usual conception of Rousseau as a radical political reformer seems relegated to 
second place. What of the Rousseau of The Social Contract, “the great book of the French 
Revolution,” which went through thirty-two French editions from 1789-99?129 What of justice 
and the general will? 
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It cannot be denied that Rousseau’s ideas helped fan the flames of 1789, or that he 
sincerely detested the injustices of the ancien régime, but discontent alone does not a radical 
make. For every apparently revolutionary phrase that he pens, a mitigating condition or 
conservative rejoinder on the importance of stability can be found. “Nothing,” he claims in the 
Discourse on Political Economy, “is more fatal to morals and to the republic than continual 
changes of stations and fortune among the citizens; changes that are both proof and the source 
of a thousand disorders, that overwhelm and confuse everything.”130 The fifth chapter of The 
Government of Poland, which urges Poles to respect tradition and to display caution in the face 
of change and against international enemies, is actually titled “The Radical Vice.”131 So the 
image of Rousseau as an unadulterated political firebrand is too one-dimensional to stand much 
scrutiny. 
The really interesting question is why Rousseau has been so radicalizing without 
himself being what we normally understand as a political radical. I believe that the answer 
again has to do with the subtext of Rousseau’s thought. His philosophy of history draws 
together all the forces of decay and corruption into a single, tension-ridden system. This vision 
has a radicalizing effect because it implies that, if any meaningful reform is to take place, it 
would need to alter the total social system. “Inequality” and “the economy” in Rousseau’s 
philosophy are not specific problems that can be addressed through nuanced public policy, but 
only the most visible components of a moral decay that affects each person since birth. On this 
view, meaningful reform would require society itself to become a “moral person,” a collective 
subject of justice.132 Nevertheless, the perversities of amour-propre make it immensely 
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difficult to achieve a systemic transformation thoroughgoing enough to reintegrate individuals 
into a shared public life, hence Rousseau’s tireless investigation of civic practices and 
disciplinary techniques designed to smooth the process.133 Rousseau is not a true political 
radical, because he has serious doubts about whether such a social reincarnation is possible or 
even worth pursuing in contemporary polities, but I argue that he is a philosophical radical 
because his thinking necessarily moves toward extreme dilemmas and impossible responses.  
The result is that many who are persuaded by Rousseau’s manner of thinking about 
society – in the terms of rupture and renewal, of ingrained historical injustice that requires a 
kind of moral reformation – are led toward a profound radicalism, often with unexpected 
manifestations. Rousseau raises the stakes by his mere description of the problem, since 
political and economic problems are major existential dilemmas at root. Robespierre may be 
the most famous, but he is, I think, neither the most instructive nor the most interesting example 
of this Rousseauian influence.134  
For example, it seems clear to me that even so measured and liberal a philosopher as 
John Rawls slides uncharacteristically toward a strange extremism when he interprets the 
philosophy of Rousseau. The centrality of Rousseau for Rawls’ political thought is no secret. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that his political project continues the task of Kant, who 
“sought to give a philosophical foundation to Rousseau’s idea of the general will.”135 By briefly 
observing Rawls’ engagement with Rousseau, we gain a better understanding of the way that 
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Rousseau’s thought can heighten existential anxieties and open the way for destructive 
responses.  
In his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Rawls recognizes that, if amour-
propre is as devastating as it appears in the Second Discourse, that is, if self-interest is 
inevitably perverse, then meaningful social justice is not feasible. Individuals will always seek 
to exploit others, free-ride, and dominate. Consequently, Rawls gives what he calls a “wide 
reading” of amour-propre.136 On this reading, amour-propre does not lead to permanent 
divisions within the soul or between individuals; it somehow contains within itself the 
conditions for a more beneficent form of self-love. Amour-propre must provide the foundation 
for a humane and stable society, and, for Rawls, the task of the political philosopher is to 
understand the kind of institutions that moderate and constrain amour-propre.  
Why does Rawls believe that this “wide” reading of Rousseau is correct and that a 
reconciliation of prideful self-interest with the larger society is possible? He gives two reasons. 
First, he says, “Kant endorses the wide view” in his writings on religion.137 More importantly, 
Rawls goes on to say that “the solution of the human predicament Rousseau offers in the Social 
Contract only coheres with the Second Discourse when we adopt the wide view.”138 
Alternatively, if we were to suspend judgment about the possibility of redeeming amour-
propre, Rawls notes that we are left with a vision of the world that is “darkly pessimistic.”139 
Here Rawls recognizes the tragic either/or that Rousseau presents to his readers. Either some 
total justification and redemption of society as a whole must exist, or we are left with no 
alternative to a dark pessimism.  
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In other words, Rawls sees that Rousseau’s philosophy is, at its heart, a demand for a 
kind of theodicy, that is, a justification of the world that explains or demonstrates the necessity 
of evil. On his reading, Rousseau shows how the perverse self-love of the Second Discourse 
can be molded by just institutions until it is transformed into enlightened self interest; he takes 
this to be the task of the Social Contract. Rawls sees the importance of such a resolution 
because he too feels the lure of theodicy and is tempted by the call for a total justification of 
society. He is also frightened by the prospect that the theodicy might fail, that a remainder of 
selfishness or evil might prove ineradicable. “If a reasonably just society that subordinates 
power to its aims is not possible and people are largely amoral,” he muses at the beginning of 
Political Liberalism, “one might ask with Kant whether it is worth-while for human beings to 
live on the earth.”140 This statement, calling into question the value of human life as such, is 
shocking in its breadth. There is in it very little middle-ground between redemption and 
despair. 
The potential failure of theodicy raises the specter of what Nietzsche calls nihilism, the 
rejection of the value of the world itself.141 If a revolutionary impulse can legitimately be found 
in Rousseau, it stems from the massive demands of the existential dilemma that he describes. 
Rawls walks right up to the edge of nihilism and backs off with the help of his “wide-reading” 
of amour-propre. Nevertheless, even if Rawls and Kant are able to craft their own theodicies 
that, generally speaking, satisfy them that justice is possible and help to pull them out of the 
pessimistic currents of nihilism, it is not clear to me that Rousseau is able to do the same. His 
theodicy remains tenuous, his political projects often unworkable according to his own 
account, his faith in change doubtful. His hope for social justice threatens to tip back into a 
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dark reaction. This is precisely why Nietzsche, the great psychologist of nihilism, caustically 
refers to Rousseau as “that moral tarantula.”142 Nietzsche’s point is that, if he is read without 
caution and awareness, Rousseau can transmit a kind of intellectual venom in the form of 
hostility toward constructive engagement with the world because he demands more from the 
social world than it can dispense.143 
The leitmotif of failure and suffering runs through all Rousseau’s writing, punctuated 
by moments of relative optimism about a possible political reformation of society. A sense of 
stoic futility comes fully to the forefront only at the end of his philosophical career. “I have 
never really been suited to civil society,” he writes in Reveries of a Solitary Walker, “where 
this is nothing but irritation, obligation, and duty….my independent nature always made me 
incapable of the constraints required of anyone who wants to live with men.”144 Thus, although 
Rousseau is remembered as the author of some of the most invigorating lines in political 
philosophy, he also – for reasons intimately related to his thinking – penned one of the saddest: 
“in order to avoid hating [men], I had to flee them.”145 
7. Political Economy after Rousseau 
One of the several paradoxes that surround Rousseau is that he wrote comparatively 
little on explicitly economic issues outside of the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and 
the related Discourse on Political Economy. Nowhere does he undertake lengthy analyses of 
economic processes. Yet he stands as a watershed in the history of political economy. The 
scale of his impact is partly due to the powerful rhetoric in which his critique is encased and 
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partly to the subtlety of his psychological analysis of amour-propre. Rousseau’s tropes and 
turns of phrase work their way into much writing that follows in his wake, creating a reservoir 
of concepts and notions that give form to latent economic discontent.   
More importantly, the tensions and fissures that Rousseau uncovered raised the stakes 
of thinking about modern economic life to such a degree that certain difficult issues could no 
longer be avoided. At the broadest and most general level, the result of Rousseau’s self-
confessed (philosophical) radicalism – his desire to, as he put it, “dig to the root”146 – was that 
the interrelationship between a vision of the human predicament and a theory of impersonal 











                                                   




Chapter 2: Adam Smith and the Dream of a Commercial 
Humanism 
"All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being 
thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of 
natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord." 
       - Adam Smith1 
 
       "Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power." 
        - Adam Smith2 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the genesis of Adam Smith's defense of 
commercial society out of his engagement with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and to probe some of 
the shortcomings of Smith's "system of natural liberty" as a device for understanding 
contemporary politics. Needless to say, because Smith's ideas still form the common currency 
of much pro-market thinking, any examination of his thought is of more than historical interest.  
In my reading of Smith, I attempt to put him into conversation with several conservative 
thinkers, especially Edmund Burke. I do this for several reasons. First, I tend to believe that a 
critique is more persuasive and interesting when it is made by a writer's intellectual allies. 
Second, since the last half of the 20th century the American Right has become synonymous 
with a particularly simplistic ideology of libertarian capitalism, an unfortunate occurrence, 
since thoughtful conservatives have written insightfully on the tensions and costs of market 
society for several hundred years. To recall their arguments is, I hope, a modest political 





                                                   
1 Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2, Liberty Fund, 1976, 687.  




1. In the Wake of Rousseau 
 
Rousseau’s legacy is multi-faceted, with many different currents and sub-currents 
moving in directions that are not always easy to reconcile. In the previous chapter, I argued 
that Rousseau’s importance to political economy has relatively little to do with his radical 
criticism of commerce in the name of virtue, which mostly reiterates classical critiques of 
exchange relations.3 Instead, I claimed that Rousseau inaugurates a shift in economic thinking 
because he embeds these traditional critiques in a new moral-cum-historical narrative that 
redescribes the human relationship to nature and society. To put the matter somewhat 
differently, Rousseau gives economics an historical perspective, so that it comes to inform 
ideas about everything from the evolution of humanity to the sources of political (dis)order. 
Of the many 18th century writers who were thinking along similar lines, Rousseau's vision was 
the most pessimistic and has proved over the long run to be perhaps the most provocative. We 
should pause to recall just how novel his ideas were, since they largely define the rhetorical 
space and the set of issues to which Rousseau’s many interlocutors respond, not the least of 
whom is Adam Smith. 
On the surface, Rousseau still appears to speak the language of the classical 
philosophers. Aristotle's critique of commerce in Book I of The Politics resembles the same 
set of arguments used two millennia later by Rousseau. For instance, they both insist that 
commerce leads to dependence and corrupts virtue. In their different idioms, they argue that 
greed drives us toward a form of excess — what the Greeks called pleonexia — that dissolves 
social ties. Both look to robust political institutions to constrain commerce.4  
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Despite these rhetorical similarities, there is a key difference: Aristotle’s political 
economy is based on a teleological conception of human nature, which Rousseau attempts to 
discard. To say that Aristotle held to an idea of teleology is to say that he conceives of nature 
either as a movement toward perfection, or, for living entities, as a movement toward a point 
of fully developed capacities or potentialities.5 Humans are defined by their unique nature: 
gregarious animals seeking the good life, a quest which culminates in the study of philosophy.6 
Commerce is unnatural to the extent that the stresses and anxieties of business contravene this 
quest, and thereby conflict with our nature as rational beings. Moreover, Aristotle argues that 
natural desires, e.g. hunger, have a limit or point of satiety, whereas exchange and “retail trade” 
are unnatural practices based on artifice, and therefore tend toward ungoverned excess.7 For 
Aristotle, economic activity should be confined within the hierarchically organized household 
or estate, where its pernicious temptations can be constrained and bent into service of the good 
life.  
It is important to see that, for the ancients, telos was more than a vague goal or sense 
of historical direction. As Ernest Barker notes, “the sense of ‘limit,’ which meant so much to 
the Greek, was a living and active thing.”8 The concept of nature functions as a sturdy 
metaphysical template; not only does it provide a standard by which order can be judged, but 
it is in some way actively alive in the world as an ordering principle.9 Conversely, the unnatural 
is associated with excess and the lack of order. The realm of the unnatural is dangerous and 
not to be trifled with, but the natural order retains all the power that goes with metaphysical 
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priority. For this reason, Aristotle, like nearly every other classical philosopher, cannot 
conceive of irreversible human or social decay or a true social revolution. Political regimes 
rise and fall, yet they recur because the basic regime types are eternal, and humanity retains its 
basic nature throughout. This is one reason why Aristotle confines his comments on political 
economy to a few short pages in the Politics: whatever temptations and dangers are bound up 
in commerce, corruption has its limits and the essence of human nature remains. 
One way of reading Rousseau is to say that he stood on the shoulders of thinkers like 
Machiavelli and Hobbes and resisted or undermined this Aristotelian worldview.10 He thereby 
opened a space of radical possibility, one in which the classical critique of exchange founded 
on the danger of excess takes on a newfound significance. Two aspects of Rousseau’s thought 
are especially important in this regard.  
First, the Second Discourse does away with any politically significant distinction 
between the natural and the unnatural, because it provides a retelling of human history, 
reminiscent of the Christian story of the Fall, in which humanity is cast out of nature and 
thoroughly penetrated by artificial, social qualities.11 In The Social Contract, Rousseau 
explains the meaning of this rupture in history when he writes that, "[T]he social order is a 
sacred right, which provides the basis for all the others. Yet this right does not come from 
nature; it is therefore founded on conventions."12 Humanity is thrown back on its own agency. 
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For him, the idea of the natural loses much of its power as a normative standard, and it ceases 
to function as an active bulwark against disorder and the corruptions of human artifice. This 
conception of society also changes our relationship to history, since the past becomes a murky 
narrative of human moral decay and the future is, at best, uncertain. After Rousseau, these new 
possibilities, hopes, and fears work their way into discussions of political economy in ways 
that would have been unintelligible to earlier writers. In his hands, political economy and the 
philosophy of history grew up together as twin stories of human development, told from 
slightly different angles.  
Second, Rousseau introduces a modern motif not found in Aristotle: a great conflict 
between the species and the individual, or between society and the soul.13 He describes the 
evolution of autonomous social systems that dominate and thwart the freedom of individual 
moral agents. Contra Aristotle, with Rousseau it is the realm of the unnatural – the world of 
commerce and greed – that now seems to represent another kind of teleological order, but it is 
a counter-order that leads to decay rather than perfection. There is a sad irony in his account; 
it is as if human reason appears in history only when it is warped by forces beyond its power. 
Like Benjamin's angel of history, it can be said of Rousseau, "Where we see the appearance of 
a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of 
rubble..."14 
In short, Rousseau introduces the theme of catastrophe as a category of economic 
thought, and it was just this innovation that made his writings shocking to many 
contemporaries. Among others, he provoked Adam Smith to fashion a new economic 
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humanism that reconciles the individual and the broader social order.15 Smith’s hope is that 
commerce can become, not just more humane, but a humanizing force that develops our 
capabilities and accentuates important virtues, sustaining a system of political order at the same 
time. For all these reasons, Smith’s philosophy has been nicely described as a “commercial 
humanism.”16 
Such a thoroughgoing redemption of commercial society is a tall order, and I argue 
that, even on its own terms, Smith’s response is not entirely persuasive.  Significant problems 
appear in two of the core aspects of Smith’s project, which we might call the subjective and 
the institutional. First, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith makes a series of assumptions 
about the stability of intersubjective order and the power of mutual recognition to form the self 
and restrain the passions. In large part, it is his confidence in intersubjectivity as a moderating 
influence that allows Smith to view free economic exchange with confidence. Unlike both 
Aristotle and Rousseau, Smith sees markets as rational and self-limiting because he believes 
that, under appropriate conditions, the mutual encounter of human subjects tends toward order, 
not excess. Second, I claim that Smith quite understandably failed to anticipate the ways that 
institutional changes in the scale and structure of economic markets can alter the virtuous cycle 
he traces in The Wealth of Nations.  
In the rest of this chapter, I first examine the issues at stake in Smith's response to 
Rousseau. I go on to argue that, while Smith provides a partial vindication of commercial 
society, his thought elides some of the most important questions about contemporary politics.   
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 2. The Legacy of Hobbes; Or, what is at stake in the Smith-Rousseau debate? 
Current scholarship has shed new light on Smith’s intimate reading of Rousseau, 
especially the Second Discourse, with the result that it has become difficult not to view works 
like The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and the Wealth of Nations (1776) as, at least in 
part, direct responses to the itinerant Genevan.17 The view of Rousseau and Smith as engaged 
in a closely related philosophical endeavor revises the older view that they were irreconcilably 
opposed, the sentimental primitivist and the worldly liberal economist. It is now widely thought 
that, although he was probably already thinking along these lines, Smith adopts concepts like 
pity and amour-propre from the Second Discourse, which he critiqued favorably in the 
Edinburgh Review.18 Smith argued that Rousseau improved upon Mandeville's one-sided 
philosophy of self-love by supplementing utilitarian self-interest with an understanding of pity 
and sympathy toward others, but takes him to task for carrying the spirit of republican zeal to 
extremes.19  
Indeed, the two thinkers agree in large measure about the evils that afflict modern 
society. Like Rousseau, Smith writes eloquently about the ways that specialization of labor 
degrades modern workers, and about the domination of the upper-class "masters," as he calls 
the emerging commercial class.20 He writes about the ideology of the rich that castigates the 
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poor as lazy and irredeemably ignorant, the better to avoid modest calls for reform.21 Readers 
turning to Adam Smith for simplistic defenses of laissez-faire as the best of all possible worlds 
are apt to be disappointed. Echoing one of the most famous moments in the Second Discourse, 
Smith does not hesitate to observe that “Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the 
security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of 
those who have some property against those who have none at all.”22 From this angle, it is 
difficult to say who is the more strident critic of the budding commercial order, and 
understanding how Smith reconciles his frequent condemnations with a sincere embrace of 
early capitalism has been an enduring puzzle for his readers.  
Yet the dialogue between Rousseau and Smith runs much deeper and involves more 
than a casual similarity of world-views. As the recent contextualist reading by István Hont 
shows, both philosophers begin their respective projects from the same basic dilemma, and 
indeed follow a strikingly similar intellectual trajectory until a very late point. Hont traces the 
links between them back to a shared acceptance of a vision of modern politics first described 
by Thomas Hobbes. Above all, he argues, both Rousseau and Smith accept a series of doctrines 
that are thoroughly Hobbesian, including: the notion that unaided reason lacks the power to 
make men good, and that humans lack an innate "altruism" or social instinct.23 Most 
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importantly, all three agree that pride, envy, and an insatiable desire for status dominate the 
human condition in society.24  
For Hobbes, politics just is the problem of pride writ large. The problems posed by 
pride even take precedence over those of disorder and violent death because vanity is at the 
root of much political turmoil, an urge that is both cause and effect of the social encounter. Our 
desire to see our superiority recognized pushes us into the company of others, and then 
continually disrupts any association. As Hobbes explains in the Leviathan, he takes the 
mythical name for his absolute state from the Book of Job specifically to emphasize its major 
task of subduing mortal pride: 
Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions 
have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) Together with the 
great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that 
comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of Job, where God 
having set forth the great power of the Leviathan, calleth him King of the 
Proud.25  
 
Above all, the political question is: how to reconcile a vain and unruly humanity with political 
order? Hobbes embraces the absolute state because he lacks confidence that anything less than 
undisputed authority can contain human pride. Moral education and habituation alone are 
unreliable, and self-interest always bears the taint of pride.26 Political institutions must be 
expressly crafted for the purpose of muting demands for recognition. Rousseau's strictures 
against inequality and his advocacy of small, self-sufficient republics are designed to solve a 
similar problem. 
                                                   
24 Hont, István, Politics in Commercial Society: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith, Ed. Bela Kapossy,  
Harvard, 2015. On Hobbes and Rousseau, see the collection of essays in Cranston, Maurice, and R. S. Peters, eds. 
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays, Anchor, 1972. On Hobbes and Smith see Cropsey, Joseph, 
Polity and Economy: With Further Thoughts on the Principles of Adam Smith, St. Augustine's, 2001, x-xi. 
25 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, Ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge, 1991, 221.   




 It tends to be forgotten that Smith frequently raises this same question, even in the 
Wealth of Nations, a book that is often read today as a utilitarian textbook on the right use of 
reason. He observes that: 
The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so 
much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the 
law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will 
generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen.27 
 
Like a marriage based on lust, the true Hobbesian paradox is that the same destructive human 
impulses that call political society into being simultaneously undermine a life lived in common. 
For Hont, the influence of Hobbes, with its call to constrain the violent and antinomian aspects 
of the human spirit, forms a thick thread between Smith and Rousseau.28 Of course, for Hobbes, 
the only institution powerful enough for this task was a state Leviathan, that "mortal god" with 
ultimate authority to keep the peace and to arbitrate disputes over religion and the meaning of 
key political terms.29 By contrast, for Smith and Rousseau, a call to reform the desire for 
recognition without lapsing into authoritarianism is a central task. It is to this problem that we 
must trace the origin of Smith's political economy.  
 If in the 18th century, there were three broad ways of explaining the development of 
social order, centered on power, human nature, or self-interest, respectively, then to different 
degrees, Smith and Rousseau reject all three. They reject as incompatible with human freedom 
the Hobbesian solution to the problem of order by way of absolute monarchy and an 
overweening state.30 They abandon as fancifully unrealistic the notion that humans have a 
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natural social and moral instinct that binds society together, held by Francis Hutcheson and 
others who retained stronger links to Aristotelian thought. Finally, they decry the elevation of 
pure individual self-interest recommended by Mandeville and his imitators, because 
Mandeville’s Panglossian romance shields from view the human costs of economic 
development.31 So, the problem of social order remains a fundamental question. As Albert 
Hirschman and Michel Foucault have both argued, the advent of political economy as a 
discourse in the 18th century was not simply the discovery of a new social science, it was also 
a search for new and better modes of governance, which is also to say that it was bound up in 
normative assumptions and reconfigurations of power.32  
 For this reason, it is significant that the connection between Smith and Hobbes has been 
conspicuously downplayed by most of Smith's 20th century interpreters, a strange twist since 
many of Smith's immediate contemporaries considered him to be an unreconstructed Hobbist.33 
Contemporaries are not always the best interpreters, but ignoring Smith's relationship to 
Hobbes runs the risk of overlooking the very problems his system of political economy was 
intended to address. For example, F.A. Hayek, a major popularizer of Adam Smith in the 20th 
century, argues that there is virtually nothing in common between Smith and Hobbes. He 
claims that Smith's entire political philosophy is founded on a distinct epistemology that 
conceives of knowledge as decentralized (no single actor can achieve total knowledge) and 
emphasizes tacit knowledge (not all knowledge can be fully articulated).34 For Hayek, this 
epistemological tradition, which he associates with the Scottish Enlightenment more generally, 
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is utterly distinct from the deductive Cartesian rationalism he attributes to Hobbes. 
Furthermore, he believes that these different epistemologies engender utterly different types of 
politics. On Hayek's reading of intellectual history we have, on the one side, a Smithian respect 
for liberty and the spontaneous evolution of society, and, on the other, an authoritarian embrace 
of the power of abstract reason and scientific planning associated with Hobbes and Descartes.35 
Modern political philosophy then becomes a Manichean story of liberty and its nemesis, power. 
To reestablish the dialogue between Rousseau, Smith, and Hobbes is to raise again questions 
surrounding the human desire for recognition and its relationship to governance, and to ask 
what makes markets distinct as a form of political order. 
 Hayek's narrow point about the political significance of distinct epistemological 
traditions has a good deal of merit. Yet, if we look a bit closer, the general influence of Hobbes 
on Adam Smith should be plain for all to see. They share a sense about the basic shape of the 
human predicament on a host of nontrivial issues. For instance, when Smith speaks of 
“savages” in the early stages of society, he adopts the Hobbesian idiom and describes their 
absence of “sympathy and indulgence” and their “contempt of human life.”36 He also accepts 
the fundamentally Hobbesian notion that death is the worst evil that one man can inflict upon 
another, as well as the related idea that the fear of death, which Smith calls “the great poison 
to…happiness,” is a constant state of mortal dread that underpins obedience to law.37 
Moreover, like Hobbes, Smith sometimes speaks as if the forces of envy and resentment are 
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so destructive that only state power is capable of mitigating social conflict. For example, in the 
Wealth of Nations Smith declares that: 
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both 
driven by want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. It is only under 
the shelter of the civil magistrate, that the owner of that valuable property, 
which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive 
generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times surrounded 
by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, 
and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the 
civil magistrate...38  
 
Society is permeated with resentments that have never been provoked and cannot be appeased. 
At least in this moment, Smith speaks as if brute power is all that prevents the rich from having 
their throats slit at night. This is a far cry from that popular 20th century incarnation of Smith, 
who supposedly shows that free-markets generate positive-sum gains for the whole society, 
and that the creation of affluence supersedes and renders moot all the old worries about 
political order. Instead, Smith's really difficult task is to explain how so fallible and jealous a 
creature as man can be suited to society, and, at the same time, to reconcile political order with 
the widespread individual liberty that he also advocates.  
 The broad questions that Adam Smith poses, and therefore many of the fundamental 
political issues at stake, tend toward the Hobbesian; but his answer to them is a new conception 
of political economy. Part science of order, part blueprint for social reform, part philosophy of 
history, the complicated system of political economy that Smith calls his "science of the 
legislator"39 does much more than describe commercial society: it aims to show how 
economies can be structured in such a way that individuals are molded and constrained without 
the need for extensive intervention by an authoritarian state. It also tells why this diffuse 
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socialization is more desirable than overt political control. Power becomes less oppressive than 
it was for Hobbes and more pervasive. 
3. The Smithian Synthesis: Order as Intersubjectivity 
Perhaps the best way to approach Smith is to see his work as a complex and uneven 
union of two strains of thought. On the one hand, he has one foot in a rather loose tradition that 
runs from Hobbes to Mandeville to Hume.40 The comparative sociology of Montesquieu's 
Spirit of the Laws is also a central influence.41 From this disparate set of writers, Smith solicits 
a set of concerns about political stability and decline, about the political role of self-interest, 
and about the utility of markets. Notice that the core concerns of this (predominately 
Anglophone) tradition are objective or "extroverted," in the sense that the dominant political 
questions revolve around impersonal forces and principles of order. Hence, the archetypal 
British fascination with common law, tradition, and markets.  
On the other hand, Smith is also involved in an intense dialogue with Rousseau (and, 
by anticipation, perhaps, with Hegel, the young Marx, and Karl Polanyi) on a diverse set of 
issues, including poverty and inequality, alienation, the dangers of economic progress, and the 
development of the self in modernity. At its heart, Rousseau's critique is "introverted," centered 
on the nature and experience of the human self under alien conditions. The whole point of 
retracing in the Second Discourse the fall from nature into artificial society is not to provide 
an empirically accurate history, but to show how we inhabit a world that cuts against the grain 
of the self, quashing freedom and leaving alienation in its place. Rousseau, and the thinkers 
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who engage him in dialogue, are concerned with tendencies that run contrary to the mainstream 
of the modern tradition.  
The most common misconception governing readings of Adam Smith is the idea that 
he simply wants to understand the operation of capitalism in its early stages and defend it 
against romantics like Rousseau. But we have already seen that his project is more ambitious. 
In attempting to reconceptualize commercial society as a humanizing moral order, while taking 
account of Rousseau's critique, Smith must argue that the impersonal powers of market 
economics are roughly consonant with the demands of the self. This means, inter alia, that 
markets must somehow redress the human lust for superiority, in the sense that commercial 
life must make use of this motivation and, at the same time, control it. A society based on 
wealth-seeking must avoid the creation of a creeping moral decay in those who succeed and 
the creation of an uncontainable resentment in those whose hopes are not met. For Smith, the 
fissures between man and society that seemed so central to Rousseau cannot be finally 
irreconcilable.   
It is well known that oikonomia, the Greek word from which we get our term 
economics, is a union of the words for house and for law.42 Far from an arcane point of 
etymology, a basic concern to show how the world can be made hospitable is central to Smith's 
political economy. However, this distinctly modern project of homemaking means that Smith 
must produce a synthesis of two very different modes of thought that separated in early 
modernity after the collapse of Aristotelianism and medieval Christianity in the face of 
Newtonian science and the Wars of Religion.43 He must establish new links between opposed 
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attempts to understand the human predicament that can be variously described as introverted 
and extroverted, personal and impersonal, or moral and historical. Smith is among the first to 
try to conceive society consistently from the split-perspective of lived human experience and 
self-ordering systems. Indeed, this is exactly what made his work so seminal for German 
Idealists from Kant to Hegel and Marx.44  
At just this moment, the philosophy of recognition that Smith inherits from Hobbes and 
Rousseau becomes relevant, because it allows him to develop a theory of intersubjectivity in 
which the self (first person) develops to moral maturity through interaction with the other 
(second person). Smith will argue that this process of interaction has self-ordering dynamics, 
and that it can be expanded until the process eventually stabilizes into a predictable social and 
historical order (third person). In essence, for Adam Smith, a theory of intersubjectivity 
mediates between the self and the history, stitching them together in a virtuous order.  
At this point, I suspect the reader may be asking, what does this have to do with Smith's 
political economy? But this might be the wrong question to ask. To say this is not to deny that 
economic markets are central to Smith's thought. But at the heart of his commercial humanism 
is an understanding of intersubjectivity as a source of social order. I argue that, for Smith, the 
market is a special case of a more comprehensive understanding of social exchange or 
interaction. By extension, the real problems with Smith's relatively optimistic account of 
commercial society are not strictly economic at all. They stem from oversights in his account 
of human (inter)subjectivity.  
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A good place to observe the Smithian synthesis in action is his short essay 
“Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages,” first published in 1767, where 
Smith again refers back to the Second Discourse and attempts to answer a question Rousseau 
thought an impossible paradox: how does language emerge?45 For Rousseau, the problem 
seemed circular: the existence of a language with consensual meanings appears to depend on 
dense social ties, but, at the same time, the idea of a dense social life seems to presuppose the 
existence of consensual meanings.46 The gulf between the internal life of the self and the order 
of society appears unbridgeable. It would seem that society and language must emerge 
simultaneously, as if by miracle, or not at all. 
This insistence on the aporetic nature of developmental or evolutionary explanations is 
a persistent feature of Rousseau’s thought, operative most notably in what William E. Connolly 
has called the “paradox of politics.”47 As Rousseau describes it, a truly just polity depends 
upon the existence of virtue, yet virtue simultaneously presupposes the good laws of a well-
ordered society.48 In this scenario, piecemeal political reform appears to be stymied because 
any meaningful reformation of society is linked to a transformation in the virtue of citizens. A 
similar motif reappears in Rousseau whenever he attempts to trace the origins of language, 
society, and politics. He nearly always employs paradox in order to short-circuit developmental 
explanations of harmonious order. At the same time, Rousseau depicts with unparalleled 
vividness a whole series of destructive counter-orders and vicious cycles of decay, from moral 
decline to economic degradation. 
                                                   
45 Smith, Adam, "Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages," In Lectures on Rhetoric and 
Belles Lettres, Ed. John Cameron Bryce, Liberty Fund, 1985, 203-226. 
46 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, Ed. Victor Gourevitch, 
Cambridge, 1997, 144-50. 
47 Connolly, William E., Political Theory and Modernity, Blackwell, 1988, 53-7. 




Since Rousseau was familiar with the idea of spontaneous social order from his 
engagement with Mandeville,49 it is worth pausing to ask why he consistently attempts to 
undermine invisible-hand style explanations. I suspect the answer has to do with his conception 
of moral philosophy. Rousseau’s moral philosophy is centrally concerned with freedom of the 
will and the conditions that make possible the free-choice of the autonomous agent.50 From 
this perspective, explanations of social processes that seem to work by themselves, like 
Mandeville’s distillation of public virtue from private vice, or indeed any simple form of 
historical optimism, eliminate the need for Rousseau's kind of radical free-choice, because the 
final positive outcome remains likely regardless of any actions citizens might take. 
Mandeville’s egoistic actors are riddled with vice; they will never become true moral subjects 
as Rousseau conceives them, no matter how efficient their self-interest appears from a 
utilitarian perspective. Inner experience and outer consequence simply do not align by 
themselves. From this perspective, one danger is that historical or developmental narratives, 
even if they are true, tend to encourage a moral complacency that ultimately becomes a source 
of corruption.51 Optimism undermines itself. Paradox is thus Rousseau's remedy for the self-
congratulatory faith in historical progress apparent in Mandeville and others, as well as a way 
to emphasize the need for moral autonomy.  
Conversely, Smith's task is to explain the possibility of an upward cycle of historical 
growth, so that the future may be redeemed from the perspective of the present. In the 
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“Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages,” Smith crafts a developmental 
account of language. As he tells it, there is no real paradox. He believes that individuals, 
through an effort to make their needs intelligible, develop the rudiments of a primitive language 
that becomes increasingly complex as society develops.52 Out of individual needs and 
motivations, a space of intersubjectivity and mutual exchange develops. Part of this process is 
the development of vocabularies and grammatical structures that shape the experience of a 
common world, allowing individuals to share experiences.  
At least in part, Smith's musings about the slow historical growth of intersubjectivity 
address the old Hobbesian problem of how pre-political actors locked in competition could 
agree to form society, as well as Rousseau's questions about the origins of language. For Smith, 
neither society nor language is primary; instead, they both grow up together in history as people 
interact. This account is already deeply political, since it describes how a minimal community 
develops "behind the backs" of language users without the imposition of sovereignty.  
Self-interest still supplies the initial impetus of the interaction, but over time the “I” 
becomes a “We,” as one famous reader of Smith would describe a similar development.53 This 
does not imply that relations of hierarchy or domination are absent, or that all actors have an 
equal influence on the shape of a language. Self-interest and the longing for superiority are not 
superseded, but come to be supplemented by another kind of experience that depends on a 
minimal degree of mutual recognition and shared interest, even if that just means recognizing 
another person as qualified to speak. Unlike Mandeville’s account of a similar-self ordering 
process in The Fable of the Bees, the individual actors in Smith's story do not remain 
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completely bound to their own egoistic impulses, but come to understand and engage with their 
counterparts, even as they pursue their own self-interest. Unlike the Rousseau of the Social 
Contract, no explicit consensus is required to form this community. Moreover, for Smith, the 
moral aspect of this interaction has to do with the mutual service and shared intelligibility it 
makes possible, whether or not conscious free will ever intervenes in the process.54  
This is not the place to ask whether Smith's brief sketch provides a satisfactory account 
of language (and I do not believe it does). The important point to note is simply that Smith 
centered his account of language on the historical emergence of shared meaning out of 
individual utility and desire. This model of "linguistic exchange" is more important for his 
entire philosophy than is sometimes recognized. For instance, although Smith has often been 
accused of a naive belief that the "propensity to truck and barter" is a simple fact of human 
nature,55 as if every heart beats with the blood of homo oeconomicus, he notably introduces 
the topic in The Wealth of Nations by referring back to the historical acquisition of language:   
Whether this propensity [to trade and exchange] be one of those original 
principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or 
whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the 
faculties of reason and speech [emphasis added] it belongs not to our present 
subject to enquire.56 
 
Language is somehow intimately related to economic exchange, and if Smith deftly sidesteps 
the topic in the Wealth of Nations, it is because he addresses it elsewhere. In any event, Smith 
thought the musings of the "Considerations" were important enough that he insisted the essay 
be included as an appendix in the later editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments that were 
                                                   
54 Griswold observes that Smith consistently avoids terminology that involves or suggests free will or autonomy. 
Griswold, Charles L., Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment, Cambridge, 1999, 115. 
55 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon, 2001, 45, 
258. 




published in his lifetime.57 In truth, this inclusion of the “Considerations” makes sense, because 
both works seek to explain the emergence of different aspects of intersubjectivity, i.e. the 
linguistic and the moral, respectively.  
Smith’s moral theory as it takes shape in the first pages of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments is surprisingly simple. He believes that we continually judge the actions of people 
we encounter, with two possible outcomes. We can accept that we would have acted in a similar 
fashion given that situation, in which case we approve of the action; or we feel that we would 
have acted differently, in which case we disapprove.58 Smith’s claim is that approving or 
disapproving in this way is the common sense meaning of moral judgement.59 Because such 
judgments depend on an understanding of what is usually done or expected of us in typical 
situations, or what Smith calls "propriety,"60 morality for him is intrinsically social or 
intersubjective. It would be appropriate to say that, for Smith, morality is a more or less stable 
pattern of judgments that evolves out of accumulated effects of countless decisions in particular 
situations, just as language evolves.  
Such an act of judgement requires an ability to place ourselves in the position of the 
other and to attempt to recreate his experience in our imagination. To understand and judge the 
actions of a fearful person, we must allow ourselves to experience some semblance of his fear; 
only thus can we decide if his response was brave or cowardly. Smith calls this "fellow-feeling" 
with the passions and actions of others “sympathy.”61  
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Sympathetic identification, seeing oneself as another, depends heavily on the 
imagination, since only an imaginative reconstruction of the whole scenario makes the act 
intelligible.62 For instance, Smith explains that if we observe an inexplicably angry person 
running down the street and shouting, our first reaction is likely to be fear and disapproval.63 
Yet if we learn that the anger is a result of, say, a robbery, we are likely to revise our opinion 
and view the rage with indulgence. Judgement is a process of give and take as we come to 
learn more about others within intersubjective processes.  
Smith’s ethics might appear to be overly socialized or to flirt with relativism, since it 
depends mostly on the practical judgments that real communities actually make, without any 
distinct or transcendent standard to serve as a measure.64 In order to avoid this problem, Smith 
links his account of imaginative moral judgment to a sort of thought experiment that he calls 
the “impartial spectator.” A judgment would be truly just, according to Smith, if it were made 
by a totally disinterested person possessing all the relevant information.65 The better a 
judgment is, the more it will resemble the stance of the impartial spectator. Amartya Sen rightly 
notes that, as a philosophical device, the impartial spectator pushes us progressively towards 
impartiality and universality, and in this instance Smith again precedes Kant.66 The impartial 
spectator serves as a sort of loose standard, a target that moves as we learn more about the 
world.  
However, there is a flip side to moral judgement, namely, the anxious awareness that 
we too are subject to constant judgement at the tribunal of public sentiment. We live with the 
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constant knowledge that our actions and opinions, our tastes and our associations, are regularly 
being judged by those around us. Smith writes that, "As to love our neighbor as we love 
ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves 
only as we love our neighbor, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of 
loving us."67 This ever present awareness of our own vulnerability and subjection to the 
judgment of others has important consequences that will link together Smith's moral theory, 
his understanding of intersubjective recognition, and his political economy.  
Hobbes believed that the fear of violent death was the true remedy for pride. Similarly, 
Smith too believes a kind of anxiety or vulnerability that stems from our continual need to seek 
the sympathy/moral approval of others forces us to moderate our naturally violent and 
"unsocial" passions. A type of fear is still essential. In other words, the vicissitudes of human 
experience are such that moderation is in our own self-interest. In the same way that children 
learn not to throw temper tantrums by observing the displeasure they evoke, we all learn to 
moderate our inflated sense of self-interest by anticipating the likely responses of others from 
social precedent.68 This observation is absolutely crucial for Smith because it implies that 
social concord can emerge spontaneously, without relying on either natural human goodness 
or political control. To put the idea in more contemporary language, Smith believes that social 
interaction tends to be self-limiting because it is founded on a kind of negative-feedback. This 
idea will appear again in the Wealth of Nations.  
Smith's evocative observations are worth quoting at length: 
Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen 
another, that degree of passion which naturally animates the person principally 
concerned. That imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is 
founded, is but momentary....The person principally concerned is sensible of 
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this, and at the same time passionately desires a more complete sympathy. He 
longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the 
affections of the spectators with his own. To see the emotions of their hearts, in 
every respect, beat time to his own, in the violent and disagreeable passions, 
constitutes his sole consolation. But he can only hope to obtain this by lowering 
his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with 
him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of its natural 
tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of those 
who are about him.69 
 
While Smith believes that humans take pleasure in the company of others and tend to seek out 
companionship for just this reason, at root it is our own anxiety and vulnerability that prompts 
us to moderate the antinomian tempest of self-love. Self-interest pushes us into mutual 
exchange with others, and exchange is a process of give and take that generally moves away 
from excess toward a middle ground; at least, that is Smith's basic contention, as well as his 
great hope. 
4. Commercial Humanism and Its Limits 
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith sets forth the view that economic markets, constrained 
by the appropriate state institutions and the rule of law, enable economic growth and 
generalized prosperity.70  At this point, it should come as no surprise that the book has a 
distinctly normative goal, namely, to describe how political economy can fit into a broader 
moral conception. After Rousseau, part of this task necessarily involves the reconciliation of 
individual experience and agency with an understanding of political and historical order, two 
perspectives on the world that began to diverge in early modernity; only on this condition can 
it plausibly be argued, as Smith did, that a future happiness in the world is possible.  
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Commerce plays a key role in Smith's project because it is at the intersection of so 
many questions about how humans develop, relate to each other, and orient themselves in the 
larger social world. If the search for profit lacks any principle of order or degenerates into pure 
excess, as Aristotle claims, then humanity is condemned to choose between stability and 
worldly comfort. If self-love and the desire for superiority can be tamed only by external 
authority, as Hobbes claims, we must choose between justice and liberty, and freedom can only 
be the silence of the law. Finally, if the picture that Rousseau so vividly paints is correct, and 
history is little but a tale of decay and exploitation, then happiness in this world appears 
unreachable. We are faced with a series of stark trade-offs and vicious cycles, in which politics 
must vacillate between radicalism and resignation. 
Smith seeks to provide a vision in which the good things of the world can more readily 
coexist. This reconciliation involves showing that prideful self-interest can be tamed and 
enlarged, and that affluence is compatible with virtue, properly understood. His early works 
already begin to approach these issues by showing how individuals are shaped by a shared 
language and self-interest is muted by our dependence on sympathy and recognition. Smith's 
guiding conception is the idea of an expanding moral community, branching outward from 
immediate localities, to the nation, to the globe, as individuals interact and learn about the 
world.71 
James Otteson argues in his influential book The Marketplace of Life that there is a 
strict parallel that runs across all Smith's work, in the sense that the sort of spontaneous, 
positive-sum exchanges that Smith discovered in language and morality are mirrored in and 
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fully compatible with his account of commerce.72 The upshot is that, for Otteson, Smith shows 
why commerce necessarily has a moral basis and how it reinforces both norms and political 
stability. This reading of Smith, which has gained a conspicuous prominence since the 1980s,73 
reverses the longstanding view that the ethical philosophy of The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
is in tension with the egoism of The Wealth of Nations.74 Otteson, who is perhaps the best 
contemporary interpreter of Smith on the Right, observes that Smith has three moral arguments 
to marshal in favor of commercial society: 1) it generates widespread affluence, 2) it fosters 
community, and 3) its various modes of exchange sometimes create the conditions for moral 
equality between autonomous individual agents.75 To this list we might add other arguments 
often associated with Smith's name, such as the idea that commerce restrains violent passions, 
what Hirschman calls the doux commerce hypothesis.76 Other notions include the idea that 
private property creates a sphere of control that allows each person to develop unique talents 
and capabilities, as well as the vague sense that labor itself can be a source of dignity.77 This 
is Smith's moral vision as it is popularly conceived today. 
Otteson's summary is helpful because it provides a concise overview of Smith's 
position, but he leaves out a few crucial details. Unlike the moral claims that Smith makes in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, his arguments for the essential goodness of commercial 
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society are critically dependent upon a set of contingent historical and social circumstances. 
The parallel that Otteson wants to draw is therefore incomplete. Whereas the positive-sum 
argument of Smith's earlier works depends almost exclusively upon the mutual encounter of 
two or more subjects, his defense of commerce in the Wealth of Nations depends on a particular 
institutional setting, namely, a market economy based largely on face-to-face exchanges under 
conditions of sustained economic growth.  
Furthermore, there is an essential problem with the whole project — I will call it the 
idea of "democratic capitalism" for convenience's sake — that seeks to use a reinterpretation 
of Smith's work as the basis for a kinder, gentler depiction of really existing capitalism. Not to 
put too fine a point on it, the fundamental problem with this outlook is that theories of 
democratic capitalism are too quick to assume that morals, markets, and liberal democracy are 
mutually reinforcing, so that markets naturally produce moral citizens and create the affluence 
required for a democratic civil society. Little attention is paid to ways that, say, volatility in 
markets or periods of extreme inequality might undermine social stability or become politically 
intolerable in democratic states. Other problems fall out of the theory entirely. To take  one  
important example, popular conceptions of democratic capitalism have little to say on issues 
of international politics – such as the longstanding historical relationship between power, 
markets, and prosperity – beyond the rather vague notion that trade generally promotes peace. 





But Smith, who is always alert to the dangers posed by pride and self-interest, did not 
readily simplify the world to fit his theory.78 For instance, he points to problems posed by 
overspecialization and dehumanizing styles of work.79 He also feared that large companies 
would "tend to make government subservient to the interests of monopoly" in England and its 
colonial possessions.80 More to the point, Smith understood that the development of commerce, 
technology, and military capability has historically gone hand-in-hand, with the result that 
large international markets were often forced open by the tip of a colonial bayonet.81 He hoped 
that eventually increased international trade would obviate the various moral and political 
problems that colonialism caused on the international scene. But this was not because he 
believed that trade automatically aligns competing interests and produces positive-sum 
outcomes, thereby rendering power politics a thing of the past, as today's advocates of so-called 
"commercial peace theory" suggest.82 Instead, like the Hobbesian realist that he was, Smith 
hoped that markets would disperse technology, leading to a global balance of power: 
Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those 
of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of 
the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring 
mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some 
respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish 
this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all 
sorts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all 
countries, naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it.83  
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We should be careful not to exaggerate the extent of Smith's critical stance. He is highly 
optimistic about the effects of expanded commerce and confident in its essential goodness. But 
he champions commerce despite the problems he sees in it. Conversely, the simplistic 
worldview of democratic capitalism prevents us from appreciating the nuance and limitations 
of Smith's thought. More importantly, it prevents us from understanding the contradictions and 
evils of the existing market order. In what follows, I explore these issues in more detail.  
For Smith, the moral basis of markets depends upon individual encounters and 
sustained growth. When these conditions are absent, the encounter between subjects is 
distorted, and the moderating influence of recognition no longer holds steady. If the encounter 
is missing, so that one no longer bears the burden of judgment, or if the consequences of one's 
behavior are borne by third parties or shielded from public view, the virtuous cycle never gets 
started. When Jim drinks but John gets drunk, neither learns sobriety. It is not commerce itself 
that reinforces morality, always and everywhere, but only a particular kind of commercial 
exchange, under a fairly demanding set of circumstances. This means that Smith's defense of 
commercial society is, at best, partial and hypothetical, since the virtuous cycle of exchange 
he describes is critically dependent on the particular structure of the market, which is subject 
to change.  
We have repeatedly observed that Smith believes self-interest can be a moderating 
influence because, when we depend on the judgments of others, it is in our interest to temper 
our desires. This same argument is carried over into economic exchange. To the traditional 
charge that profit seeking only engenders greed and excess, or that it encourages us to exploit 




self-moderating, because exchange depends on some degree of consensus.84 Like language, 
regular commercial exchange presumes some modicum of mutual understanding. Trust is the 
classic example. If the corner grocery systematically tried to exploit each customer, or to 
significantly overprice items, consumers would eventually lose trust and take their business 
elsewhere.85 Under favorable circumstances, then, self-interest may actually create the 
conditions to foster moderation rather than excess.   
Ultimately, Smith's defense of commercial society rests on the hope that the restraining 
influence of self-interest would become widespread in a society where most members depend 
on exchange for their livelihood because "The success of such people...almost always depends 
upon the favor and good opinion of their nieghbours and equals."86 Prudence restrains pride. 
The vulnerability and dependence of the "middling" ranks forces them to acquire a set of traits 
centered on honesty and self-discipline. A peculiar type of human being is formed, a type that 
loses "the solid and masculine virtue of a warrior, a statesman, a philosopher,"87 but gains a 
different set of bourgeois virtues: 
Probity and prudence, generosity and frankness, must characterize his behavior 
upon all ordinary occasions; and he must, at the same time, be forward to 
engage in all those situations in which it requires the greatest talent and 
propriety but in which the greatest applause is to be acquired by those who can 
acquit themselves with honour.88  
 
 Or, again: 
Either habitual imprudence...or injustice, or weakness, or profligacy, will 
always cloud and sometimes depress altogether, the most splendid professional 
abilities. Men in the inferior and middling stations of life, besides, can never be 
great enough to be above the law.89    
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Much is contained in Smith's description of the prudent man. This representative member of 
commercial society is generous and strong. He cultivates his gifts and prepares for new 
situations. Above all, his understanding of his own vulnerability and dependence makes him 
subject to the rule of law and more able to see others as his rough equals. These are tall claims 
to make about the citizens of any social order. From one point of view, Smith's ideas look class 
bound and provincial.90 But it seems to me that this charge is somewhat misplaced. Smith does 
not assume that everyone is a bourgeois individualist, nor does he believe that all members of 
the bourgeoisie are virtuous. Rather, he argues that if more people – including those within the 
bourgeois class – cultivated the distinctively bourgeois virtues, the world would be a better 
place.  
       Nevertheless, whether or not the market can have any such moderating influence depends 
on the sort of institutions that are in place, and this simple observation has nothing to do with 
the ideological divisions that shape most discussions of political economy. After all, it was 
Smith's stolid contemporary Edmund Burke who first worried that fast finance and 
unaccountable corporations were undermining the moral fabric on which commerce depends.91 
In recent years, Roger Scruton too has noted that Adam Smith's whole moral vision depends 
on whether or not individual agents bear the costs of their actions, and that this is by no means 
the usual case as markets have become more complex.92 For Smith, like Hobbes, status envy 
and self-love are core aspects of the human predicament, and the impulse to moderation is at 
root a kind of fear that emerges only when we are subject to the negative judgments of others. 
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Of course, Smith's vision assumes that 1) others have roughly accurate information about our 
actions and 2) we personally experience the consequences of negative judgments. But as Roger 
Scruton points out:   
[T]rust can be as easily eroded by a free economy as sustained by it...The 
economies considered by Adam Smith and his nineteenth-century successors 
were economies in which the assets owned by the parties were items of real 
property for which the owner took full responsibility, and which were looked 
after by those who owned them...93 
 
The danger is that Smith's hopeful moral vision begins to implode when responsibility can be 
easily avoided, either through subterfuge or through legal constructions like limited liability 
that can work to ensure that no living person can be held accountable for the actions of 
corporate entities.94 Or, to take another example of the way that responsibility can be avoided 
through legal subterfuge, one could point to the way many companies in recent years have 
sought to prod consumers into arbitration agreements, effectively removing many issues from 
basic forms of judicial oversight that underpin fair and stable markets.95  
Similarly, when the market trades not on goods, but on the possible future movement 
of pieces of debt, over which no single person has knowledge or control, it becomes easier to 
evade judgment and harder to assign responsibility. The encounter between subjects, always 
incomplete, is now almost entirely absent. Without oversight, economic actors are encouraged 
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to cheat, to shift the costs of their actions onto others, or into the future; it once again becomes 
more advantageous to seem virtuous than to actually be virtuous, which was Rousseau's 
fundamental indictment of modernity all along. 
 Nor is it obvious that this situation can be easily remedied, even under the best legal 
and regulatory context imaginable, since it has to do with trends in the long term evolution of 
(post)industrial societies. The way that humans relate to each other through the economy has 
changed in profound ways. Ernest Gellner, in the course of a long paean to the virtues of liberal 
society, soberly recognizes the dilemmas it now faces: 
Technical innovation at the beginning or in the course of the first Industrial 
Revolution was not too far removed in its ideas from the shared common sense 
of the society. The inventors of the time were mainly practical men of good 
sense, not abstract scientists at the very boundaries of current scientific theory. 
The rewards accruing to innovation consequently had a kind of legitimacy: they 
were the recompense of innovative enterprise on the part of those so 
rewarded...Today, innovation is the fruit of an overall scientific advance, and 
the actual inventor is only the fortunate last link in a long chain to which 
countless others have contributed. In fact, notoriously, it very often is not the 
inventor of the new idea who is rewarded by its implementation. Disaggregation 
of the actual contribution of the advance is almost impossible. Rewards are 
random, and frequently go not to creative innovators but to those well placed to 
be insider traders...The legitimacy of such wealth is far from persuasive...But, 
in fact, it is of the very essence of a modern economy that it is based on "insider 
trading," the economic use of information concerning the political creation or 
determination of an environment which has ceased to be natural, and has 
become social, politically created. There is no other kind. There simply is no 
"outside" with which to trade. When the methods of production need to adjust 
themselves for optional effectiveness, not to nature, but to a socially created 
and politically manipulated environment, information about and contact with 
that crucial political milieu is what makes the difference between success and 
failure.96 
 
In short, Gellner argues that the social and institutional prerequisites for 21st century markets 
are so dense that concepts like Smithian responsibility and prudence have largely become 
divested of meaning. The point is not necessarily that the general economic principles that 
                                                   




Smith expounds, centered on individual choice inside a robust legal framework, no longer 
apply. Rather, Gellner suggests that the moral principles start to break down when success 
depends less on one's own actions and more on one's chance position in a social network, a 
situation in which any single person has limited responsibility and others may have little 
oversight. Where this is true, or perceived to be true, increased cheating and resentment are 
likely to result. The Rousseauian discrepancy between appearance and reality again rears its 
ugly head.  
  Furthermore, even if we set aside such speculations on the various moral effects of 
economic structure, it seems that Smith's moral theory simply overemphasizes the ability of 
social interaction and mutual recognition to restrain unruly passions. That is, his theory of 
intersubjectivity itself is not fully satisfactory. Again, Edmund Burke was one of the first to 
point to this problem in Smith's thought. As Burke would observe in his review of The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, Smith’s thought is motivated by an aesthetic ideal of orderly and 
proportionate beauty; as a result, he tends to underestimate the sort of violent and unpredictable 
passions that so fascinated and worried Burke, and the robust institutions needed to constrain 
them.97 Burke suggests that Smith fails to grasp the true extent of the disruptive forces at work 
in the world and exaggerates the ease with which harmony can be wrested from individual 
action. Since The Theory of Moral Sentiments went through six revised editions in Smith's 
lifetime, and he never attempted to redress Burke's critique or the conception of the sublime as 
it appears in Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful (1757), it seems that we are faced with a difference of opinion about the nature of 
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human experience, rather than a casual oversight.98 And it is not obvious that Smith gets the 
better of this argument. 
  Part of the problem may be that Smith attributes too much weight to the powers of a 
well-formed and sharply demarcated individual identity. After all, enlightened self-interest 
depends on a clear sense of self. Yet, as Burke would note in Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, during pivotal moments our individual identity and sense of self can merge with 
others, forming a crowd or movement that seems like a collective agent.99 Identity is thus fluid 
and shifting, and this becomes more evident, for instance, in dynamic, racialized, regulated 
urban environments. Once again, in these situations it becomes hard to assign responsibility, 
to pick out an individual face in the crowd, and to pass judgement. If the market can be de-
personalized, so can we. In this case, Burke implies, the sense of vulnerability and the fear of 
judgment on which Smith founded his ethics of recognition can breakdown. Now the passions 
are not subject to negative-feedback and moderation, but to positive-feedback as we drive each 
other onward. If Gellner's point is that Smith's work seems to describe a world before advanced 
capitalism, Burke implies that it may be just as important that he describes a world before the 
fall of the Bastille.  
  With his appreciation for aristocratic nobility, Burke also tended to be more sensitive 
than Smith to the many ways that modern forms of labor can be psychologically degrading, 
spawning resentments and anxieties that disrupt the political order. "The occupation of a 
hairdresser or of a working tallow-chandler," Burke insists, "cannot be a matter of honor to 
any person — to say nothing of a number of other more servile employments."100 Burke's 
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comment is worth keeping in mind when 21st century conservatives stress the dignity of 
labor.101 Work can be and often is a source of value in life. But Burke was well aware that the 
insecure working conditions and stresses of labor can induce feelings of dishonor or 
inferiority.102  He also knew that, by insisting on the fundamental equality of all citizens, the 
political rhetoric of democratic societies often intensifies the resentments of people in positions 
of manifest inferiority. I suspect that his rhetorical respect for rank was, at least in part, 
designed to mute this kind of status envy. The French Revolution terrified Burke because he 
believed that, in the new era, such resentments might be violently redressed in national and 
international politics. Smith is not sufficiently attentive to these problems.  
 Finally, there is at least one more precondition for the virtuous cycle of commercial 
society. Economic growth itself is vitally important, as indeed Smith himself never hesitated 
to point out.103 When the economy is stagnant or shrinking, the nature of commercial 
interaction can change so dramatically that we witness a breakdown of the moderating effects 
that Smith attributes to intersubjectivity. There are two reasons for this, centered on the spirit 
of generosity and the possibility of equality.    
First, Smith believes that growing prosperity decreases the sense of desperation that 
pervades many earlier societies, and this, in turn, creates a capacity for generosity that has been 
sadly lacking throughout human history: “In a civilized nation the man who gives the present 
is superior to the person who receives it, but in a barbarous nation the case is directly 
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opposite.”104 People are more capable of giving and less fearful of losing when some modicum 
of affluence has been reached. Even better, the open tribute due to status or power loses its 
prevalence in commercial society, clearing the way for the impartial rule of law to take hold. 
Affluence helps remove some of the hopelessness that comes with the fear of economic 
uncertainty and gives more people a happy stake in the future.  
Yet when the economy ceases to grow or, worse, actually shrinks, the moral dynamic 
also threatens to go into reverse. People become more fearful, narrow, and less willing to give. 
Those with wealth and power begin to acquire preponderate influence. The efficacy of law 
comes into question. All of this means that Smith's moral vision is at the mercy of larger 
economic, technological, and historical trends. It may be too cynical to say with Gellner that 
liberal society depends on a large and growing "Social Bribery Fund," but the general 
implication seems true enough.105 
The second reason growth is important has to do with the way it can limit power and 
encourage equality. In brief, Smith thinks that sustained economic growth can combine with 
open labor markets to reshape traditional power relationships in ways that make the virtuous 
cycle described in the Theory of Moral Sentiments more likely to occur. Once again, the key 
assumption of Smith's moral theory is that we have an interest in and vulnerability to the 
judgments others make on us. But Smith also knows that society is not composed of perfectly 
symmetrical relationships, but of power and wealth disparities that often create different 
degrees of moral agency. Under these conditions, the judgements and decisions of some 
persons are likely to matter far more than others, and this too can distort the encounter between 
subjects. 
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In normal circumstances, the upper classes – or “masters” as Smith often calls them – 
are doubly advantaged. Not only, he says, do we naturally admire and acquiesce to the 
prerogatives of wealth and status, but any single poor individual tends to rely intensely on his 
employer or patron.106 By contrast, the master typically has little interest in any particular 
servant or laborer, since the “lower orders” occur in such abundance that they seem 
interchangeable. “It is not,” Smith says, “difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, 
upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a 
compliance with their terms.”107 Smith points to an asymmetry of power that is at heart a class 
relationship, and this disparity appears to set practical limits to the creation of a shared moral 
space through recognition, because real dialogue is absent and coercion can take the place of 
cognitive exchange. It is probably true that no man is a hero to his valet; but no hero stoops to 
care what his valet thinks, either. The gulf seems unbridgeable.   
 However, Smith argues, “[t]here are certain circumstances…which sometimes give 
the labourers an advantage.”108 These circumstances, of course, are periods of economic 
growth. When the labor of the lower classes is required to sustain economic growth, when their 
services are in demand and their purchasing power gives them collective influence over the 
production of goods, the power of the upper classes is restrained because each party has 
something the other needs. In the end, growth seemed to Smith to be the only viable way to 
mute class struggle without relying on the brute power of the state, be it a Leviathan or an 
egalitarian republic. Smith thus presents us with the sobering thought that real liberty, at least 
as he understands it, is only possible during those fortunate periods of material abundance that 
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can look like oases in a vast historical desert. Worse, the Wealth of Nations is sadly ambiguous 
as to whether Smith thought the economic growth he observed taking off in the 18th century 
was a permanent condition, or simply an interlude before society reached its "full compliment 
of riches" and entered a state of permanent stagnation.109 
Smith was not naive about the evils that continue to exist in commercial society. He 
knew that overspecialization went hand-in-hand with the division of labor, and saw how 
dehumanizing the mindless, repetitive style of work inside a nascent industrial economy could 
be for the new urban working class. Specialization, he wrote, often rendered workers “as stupid 
and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.”110 He knew that the “masters” 
continued to have a vast advantage in power, both economic and political, at their disposal, 
and he accepted that, given the chance, the upper classes would always collude to further their 
own interests, regardless of the consequences for public good.111  
Yet Smith embraced this new form of society wholeheartedly, and without fears of 
contradiction or paradox, largely because he was a student of history, especially ancient 
history. By comparison, he felt that commercial society, flawed though it may be, looked 
decent and good. Much of the Wealth of Nations, including most of Book III, is concerned with 
the fall of Rome and the feudal recovery, to which Smith traced the collapse of an early 
commercial period in Europe and the Mediterranean.112 A close reader of Roman literature, 
Smith surely knew how hard it was for the Romans to win their livelihood from the Italian soil. 
He must also have known that it was not unheard of for the Romans to take 150,000 slaves 
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from a single campaign (and these were the proverbial good guys of ancient history!).113 Smith 
hoped that the combination of growth and markets could bring widespread material abundance 
and, at the same time, tie the interests of upper and lower classes closer together. These 
advantages are not to be scoffed at, and he seized them eagerly. If his conception of commercial 
society appears rather less convincing from a contemporary vantage point, it may also be true 


























                                                   




Chapter 3: Skepticism and Utopia: The Liberalism of F.A. Hayek 
 
“[U]topia lost its strangeness and came to appear to me as the only solution of 
the problem in which the founders of liberal constitutionalism had failed.”  
     – F.A. Hayek1  
 
“His liberalism – based not in the humanistic distrust of dogma, but in a 
religious distrust of the reliability of thinking – did not in fact prevent him from 
a sturdy faith in revelation.” 
    – Thomas Mann2 
  
 Duncan Bell has recently observed that liberalism is a catch-all term – he calls it “the 
metacategory of Western political discourse”– whose meaning has become increasingly 
expansive throughout the last hundred years as Anglo-American political thinkers have sought 
to define themselves against a series of authoritarianisms and international threats.3 The result, 
he claims, is that the term has been hallowed out and is of relatively little use for political 
analysis.4 Bell’s point is well taken. The encounter with economic depression, war, and 
totalitarianism has greatly distended the concept of liberalism, so that thinkers with sharply 
opposed political visions are often lumped into the same procrustean category. This produces 
some strange bedfellows; one only has to read John Rawls and Friedrich Hayek side-by-side 
to sense how bizarre it can feel to call both men philosophers of liberalism.  
Nevertheless, I find myself reluctant to abandon the term. In part this is because some 
idea of liberalism, vague as it is, remains central to American political discourse, and this 
remains the case even if, like most political concepts, liberalism incorporates a cluster of ideas 
that are often contested. Just as importantly, philosophers continue to describe themselves as 
liberal. Therefore, although I hear Bell’s admonition, this chapter examines some of the 
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changes that have taken place within liberal thought in the past half-century. I argue that during 
the 1970s many self-described liberals became strangely attracted to avowedly utopian 
thinking. This change is evident in many quarters, but nowhere is it more striking than in the 
work of Friedrich Hayek, the Austrian economist and social theorist. I explore some of the 
reasons for this utopian shift and analyze its consequences for Hayek’s thought and the 
contemporary political landscape. I argue that Hayek’s attempt to unite economic markets and 
liberal individualism with a utopian imagination turns liberalism into an authoritarian political 
project, undermining many traditional virtues of liberal thought.  
It should perhaps be said at the outset that the focus of this chapter is slightly different 
than some other critiques of Hayek. Numerous criticisms can and have been given of his work 
and its basis in a theory of self-regulating markets. Some of these criticisms revolve around his 
failure to appreciate the historical relationship between market economies and colonial 
exploitation;5 some focus on the way that impersonal markets exacerbate social stratification 
and class conflict;6 others center on his failure to appreciate the crisis tendencies within 
capitalism or its capacity to generate ecological disasters.7 (We will encounter some of these 
arguments in more detail in Chapter 4, which covers the work of Karl Polanyi). Many of these 
critiques are powerful and insightful. Nevertheless, in keeping with the theme of this 
dissertation, I attempt to focus on the way that Hayek’s understanding of the human 
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predicament is linked to a vision of impersonal economic processes. I argue that this vision 
leads him to embrace a utopian romanticism that elevates dogma and impairs his ability to take 
seriously the limits of economic markets. In this way, my goal is to illustrate how his call for 
a liberal utopia ultimately begins to resemble a kind of authoritarianism.   
1. Minimalist Liberalism  
 
Bell is not the first theorist to note that liberalism is a diverse philosophy, difficult to 
summarize with any degree of accuracy.8 However, it seems fair to say that, perhaps more than 
any other style of modern political thought, liberalism has for much of its history gone hand in 
hand with a compulsive aspiration to realism and moderation in its approach to politics. 
William Paley summarized in 1785 this minimalist sensibility, which has been part of liberal 
thought ever since:  
[T]hose definitions of liberty ought to be rejected, which by making that 
essential to civil freedom which is unattainable in experience, inflame 
expectations that can never be gratified, and disturb the public content with 
complaints.9 
 
The guiding theme in this conception is a certain skepticism. Implicit in Paley’s remark is the 
fear that imagination will outstrip the realm of possibility, that a temptation internal to the 
desire for liberty might lure us towards unrealizable political projects. The result is a deep-
seated fascination/revulsion with respect to the idea of liberty that has a long history within 
Anglophone political thought. Already in the 17th century, in his effort to explain the English 
Civil War, Hobbes was pointing an accusatory finger at radical notions of true republican 
freedom.10 
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Among other things, then, a liberal is a person who disciplines the imagination, striving 
to keep it within acceptable boundaries.  Yet, as Paley’s remark helps us see, in this task liberals 
face not one but two opponents. The first and most obvious are illiberal modes of thought that 
contest the status of liberty as a privileged concept: aristocracy, theocracy, totalitarianism, etc. 
The second opponent, more difficult to combat because harder to uncover, is the seductive 
aspect of liberty itself. Perhaps the true liberal is the one who knows how and when to temper 
his own concept of liberty. This is not always an easy task. 
A straight line runs from the cautious and self-critical ethos that Paley defends to 20th 
century conceptualizations like Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive 
liberty.11 Within this style of thought, the contours of political life are set by that which is 
probable, plausible, and common, rather than what is perfect, best, or rare (“expectations that 
can never be gratified”). For this reason it has been said that liberalism has learned the lesson 
of Machiavelli: unlike those philosophical radicals from Plato to Karl Marx, who supposedly 
sought after “vague and distant Utopian ideals,”12 Locke, Adam Smith, and their successors 
constructed an image of society on the solid ground of rational self-interest. 13  
On the other hand, the need to balance this sense of realism with an affirmation of 
change and human inventiveness is a crucial point of tension at the heart of many of the great 
works of liberalism. To borrow a phrase from Alan Ryan, the liberal’s desire to navigate the 
space between rearguard and vanguard is a defining trait.14 The simultaneous desires for order 
and novelty pull the liberal in opposite directions. Different thinkers navigate this core tension 
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in different ways, but typically caution is the guiding impulse onto which the embrace of 
change is grafted as a necessary supplement. For instance, John Stuart Mill insisted, against 
religious dogmatists and conservatives, that a society that truly took appropriate “precautions” 
(one of his favorite words) against the fallibility of humankind must also be a progressive 
society, based on the acceptance of necessary change, experimentation, and merit. 15 Therefore, 
Mill advocated expanding suffrage, but only if a method of “plural voting” would ensure that 
the better educated were given more weight at the ballot box as a counterweight to the passions 
of the lower classes.16 The balance between order and novelty must be constantly renegotiated, 
and if Mill’s solution in this instance appears shockingly undemocratic today, it only 
demonstrates how radically the balance can change over time. The possible and the impossible 
are not fixed in stone. 
This vision implies first and foremost a high degree of political restraint; it accepts that 
the good things in life may require a certain political context, but it suggests that these goods 
are not really tied to the promise of political life as such. It also implies a minimalist attitude 
toward the possibilities of life with others, in the sense that there are broad limits to what we 
can properly expect from fellow citizens. Any attempt to push back these limits cuts against 
the grain of the social order. As Adam Smith put it, it is from self-interest rather than 
benevolence that the baker sells us our dinner.17 Smith’s unspoken corollary is that it is 
unrealistic to expect dinner from other people, or for other reasons. To understand politics, the 
liberal begins by asking where politics must cease. Tracing the limits of the realistic and the 
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possible – whether we conceive of these limits as natural rights or simply as practical 
boundaries to feasible action – is therefore one of the central projects of liberalism, a task that 
lends an anti-utopian veneer to the family of ideas we recognize as liberal. However, as we 
will see, the relationship between liberal doctrine and utopian theory is more complicated than 
it appears at first glance. 
Judith Shklar traces liberalism’s attitude of cautious minimalism to Europe’s 
experience in the wars of religion. When even the ideal of a seamless Christianity lost its hold 
in Europe, something like toleration of individual conscience became the modus vivendi 
required to avoid cycles of bloodshed. Hobbes, a proto-liberal in certain respects, signals this 
shift with his doctrine that all men are equal in their mortality and fear of violent death, 
aristocratic pretensions to superiority notwithstanding.18 Human equality rests not with the soul 
and its need for salvation, but with the body, its frailty and need for preservation. By protecting 
life and property, good government is built upon a solid foundation of natural equality, rather 
than the unstable and splintered aspirations citizens may have for salvation. Shklar calls this 
the “liberalism of fear” for the reason that fear of suffering tends to concentrate the mind on 
what really matters.19 This liberalism is “not a [comprehensive] philosophy of life.” In fact, it 
“does not have any particular positive doctrine”20 about how we should live, beyond lending 
its support to the institutions that are required to engender individual freedom and restrain the 
incidence of coercion within society.  
This naturalistic focus on the desire for self-preservation, not simply as a brute fact of 
life but as the foundational source of right and political virtue, is at the heart of liberalism’s 
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supposed anti-utopian realism; it remains more firmly embedded in the genetic makeup of 
liberal thought than is sometimes recognized. 21  Adam Smith took it for granted that death is 
the greatest evil one person can inflict upon another (rather than, say, dishonor, isolation, or 
prolonged suffering),22 and a good deal of his ethical justification of commercial society stands 
or falls with this proposition. F.A. Hayek, who claimed to carry Smith’s legacy into the 20th 
century, once wrote that the modern occurrence of exponential population growth was, from 
one point of view, a sufficient ethical justification of liberal capitalism.23 Population growth 
is, after all, simply self-preservation maximized. This argument can be carried even farther. 
Thus we should not find it surprising that the quest for immortality and a scientific “cure for 
death” has become a prominent fad in some quarters of contemporary libertarianism.24 If mere 
life is the foundation of the good, a ragged line runs from the preservation of life, to the 
embrace of population growth, to the quest for universal immortality. What began as a 
regulative principle asserting the equal status of each human life against arbitrary coercion 
slides toward a more radical social vision; it can easily end by embracing a complicated set of 
assumptions about the benign nature of endless economic and technological development.  
This slide illustrates the way that the ostensibly moderate claims at the heart of liberal 
doctrine can become radicalized when their logic is pursued to its farthest reaches. In this case, 
the proposed limit – e.g. demand for self-preservation – eventually shows itself to be unlimited. 
More prosaically, we can say that supposedly “formal” limitations are usually only formal in 
relation to a particular set of problems or in a particular context. When viewed in isolation, or 
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transferred to an inappropriate set of questions, the merely formal will slide more and more 
toward a substantive vision. This has always been the accusation leveled by critics of the liberal 
claim to moderation, from conservatives like Burke to radicals like Marx. On this reading, 
liberalism harbors a potential for revolution within itself, for good or ill.  
Whatever stance one takes on the true nature of liberal doxa, it is not unimportant that 
its openly avowed program has in fact been consistently minimalist. At the risk of personifying 
a family of thought, it must be said that liberalism’s self-understanding, from its rhetoric to its 
embrace of “formal” rights and self-interest, has always insisted on its own essential 
moderation, and this very insistence has frequently had a moderating influence. Liberalism 
claims to offer social change without revolution, and flourishing without utopia. Contra Burke 
and Marx, I would argue that liberals have pursued these goals with as much success as we 
have any right to expect over the better part of the last two centuries. 
2. Liberalism’s Utopian Turn 
Starting in the 1970s, however, this traditional posture begins to change. In the place 
of self-professed minimalism, liberal thought begins to display a surprising transformation that 
we can see, first and foremost, in the growing willingness of liberal theorists to appropriate 
and work with the concept of utopia – precisely the sort of idea that early liberals strove to 
keep at bay. The resuscitation of utopia as a concept that can be defined from a liberal 
standpoint, and, indeed, as an essential component of a complete liberal philosophy, is only 
the most surprising incidence of a more thoroughgoing change. Late 20th century liberals 
increasingly come to recognize the value of high expectations: for global justice, for individual 
rights, for personal flourishing and economic growth. More and more, liberalism becomes an 




The outstanding example here is Robert Nozick’s 1975 book Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia, which envisions “a framework for utopia” in the form of a “minimal state” that “grows 
spontaneously from the individual choices of many people over a long period of time.”25 In 
Nozick’s hands, liberal theory has moved far beyond the mere de facto concern with freedom 
and limits to coercion and has become a search for the best regime, i.e. a utopia.  
Minimalist liberals tended to argue that some mixture of liberal rights and markets were 
the best society in practice, given the fallible and fractious nature of humankind, what Kant 
calls our “unsocial sociability.”26 This line of argument was never fully satisfactory. The de 
facto defense already seems to concede the moral high ground by implying that liberalism is a 
second-best philosophy for beings without virtue.  More importantly, it leaves considerable 
room for debate about whether new institutions or historical changes make different regimes 
possible. After Nozick, however, a recognizable shift in strategy occurs. We witness, as one of 
his current disciples describes the project, a new propensity to defend liberalism as the best 
society conceivable, that is, as inherently the most desirable sort of life for everyone concerned 
in all situations imaginable.27 For Nozick, the right to individual choice is not simply one 
instance of the good, to be prized and balanced against others, but a foundational right, a 
centerpiece that supports a whole view of society, in a manner not unlike the transformation 
we witnessed earlier with regard to the right of self-preservation.  
Nozick offers the most clear-cut example of an emerging, more assertive liberal ethos, 
but other thinkers made similar moves at roughly the same time. Friedrich Hayek, who 
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received his Nobel Prize in 1974,28 also began to integrate explicitly utopian speculations into 
his economic and political theories at about this time.29 Even the ever-cautious John Rawls felt 
compelled to add the idea of a “realistic utopia” to his conceptual vocabulary when he began 
to expand and defend his work from the 1970s.30  
This reemergence of utopia is symptomatic. To wear the mantle of utopia is to lay claim 
to nothing less than the fullness of truth and justice; it entails a shift in emphasis away from a 
“defensive” mentality – a liberalism motivated to define itself in a negative way, against the 
injustices of, say, tyranny or theocracy – toward an “assertive” liberalism that feels compelled 
to stake out the continent of justice in advance, regardless of its opponent.31 The “muscular” 
neoliberalism that came to the fore in the 1980s and 90s is one outgrowth of intellectual trends 
that first coalesced within the English speaking world in the 1970s (although it is always 
possible to find earlier antecedents).  
Why the shift should take place at this moment is not entirely clear. The Cold War had 
for years been at a comparatively low boil, and Western economies had just completed twenty-
five years of growth that Hobsbawm calls the “golden age” of capitalism.32 It is not uncommon 
today for political commentators to remember the 1970s with a heavy dose of nostalgia, seeing 
it as a time when foreign policy was clearly defined and middle-class wages still reliably rose 
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with productivity gains.33 What, then, accounts for the palpable sense of urgency in writings 
that date from around this time?  
The truth is that only after a massive failure of historical sense can one view this period 
with nostalgic self-assurance. The whole era is virtually defined by its association with a series 
of epochal stalemates – between communism and capitalism, East and West, democracy and 
dictatorship. It was also marked by an energy crisis and economic “stagflation” that seemed to 
indicate the limits of Keynesian policy fixes. These major historical crises are paralleled by a 
litany of minor impasses and crises whose meaning is no less troubling for being ambiguous. 
The blank round fired by the soixante-huitards in France, Britain’s sterling crisis and IMF 
bailout in 1976, America’s debacle in Vietnam and the ongoing backlash against the Civil 
Rights Movement34– the list is seemingly endless. In the light of the pervasive uncertainty of 
the 1970s, minimalist liberalism, with its continual appeals to caution and dislike of speculative 
justifications, can look positively anemic.  
There is some historical precedent for this situation. The history of liberal thought is 
punctuated by a series of crises of confidence followed by doctrinal adjustments and 
reassertions. According to Pierre Manent, 1789 forms the major dividing line,35  but to this we 
could easily add 1848 and its aftermath, the 1930s,36 and the 1970s. Each period calls forth 
distinct permutations of older liberal beliefs; in the 30s, the novel doctrine was Keynesianism; 
in the 70s, it was a new neoliberal utopianism.  
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 This is all to say that in order to account for the advent of utopian neoliberalism, one 
has to understand the broader intellectual currents that operate during eras of perceived 
stalemate. Generally speaking, the prospect of a stalemate will generate two potential 
responses: it can either be avoided altogether, or it can be overcome. Thus we see at this time 
a proliferation of what might be called avoidance strategies, styles of thought that attempt to 
evade some particular deadlock, either by redefining the issues in contention or by shifting 
expectations. If history appears to have reached an intractable dead-end, then it may be 
presumed that the problem lies in the modes of interpretation that shape historical experience. 
Claims have been made on behalf of history that simply cannot be redeemed. For example, it 
has been argued that the desire for continuous and unambiguous manifestations of progress or 
increasing liberty, traits that seem to be deeply embedded in Western democracies, cannot but 
be disappointed.37 The task then becomes the construction of a more realistic outlook, or at 
least one less prone to disappointment.  
The attractiveness of avoidance strategies led to the prevalence in the late 20th century 
of what Andrew Gamble calls “endism,” i.e. philosophies that pronounce (or appear to 
pronounce) the end of institutions and conceptions formerly taken for granted as the solid 
ground of political life.38 So, for example, we see the proclamation of the end of historical 
“meta-narratives” – which, if true, would dissolve the entire set of troublesome political 
binaries at once – the death of the author, the dissolution of the subject, the eclipse of man, the 
end of humanism, the end of modernity, etc.39 Nietzsche’s influence here is obvious, as is a 
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certain Marxist anticipation of transitional ruptures in history. Of course, these examples come 
largely from French theorists on the Left, but the essential impulse is more diffuse.40  
On the other hand, a stalemate can be overcome. Disputants can embrace the terms of 
the deadlock as essentially correct and reassert or refine their initial position, in essence 
claiming that what appears to be an impasse is merely a temporary roadblock. This is 
essentially the route that liberalism takes in the 1970s. It is mostly a phenomenon within 
English speaking countries, but not exclusively; Habermas’ project of carrying out modernity’s 
“unfinished” potential, for instance, also goes in this direction.41 Even before Rawls’ 1971 A 
Theory of Justice, there is a renaissance of attempts to ground encompassing visions of liberal 
society, more detailed and far more thorough than anything since the work of Mill or Sidgwick 
a century earlier. Hayek calls his own “urgently needed” philosophical project a 
“comprehensive restatement and revindication” of classical liberalism.42 But the context of this 
liberal renaissance, which is essentially one of reassertion, has a natural tendency to make 
claims more expansive. In the past, liberals had often been their own best critics, but in the last 
decades of the 20th century something goes awry. The incorporation of a utopian longing into 
liberalism marks this shift.  
3. The Case of F.A. Hayek: A Skeptical Utopian? 
It is for just this reason that F.A. Hayek stands out as such an intriguing figure. Hayek 
is widely regarded as the dominant voice in the late 20th century resurgence of classical 
liberalism, both as an economic doctrine and as a pervasive political ideology.43 Whereas 
interest in the work of Rawls or Nozick is found mostly within the academy, Hayek’s influence 
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extends across the social sciences, through political discourse, and into popular culture. His 
1944 polemic against state intervention in the economy, The Road to Serfdom, was issued in 
condensed form by Reader’s Digest, and was distributed by General Motors as a graphic novel, 
in which “readers” are warned against the perils of utopian philosophy via some rather 
unambiguous drawings of bald men in SS armbands.44 Still, one should not be too flippant 
about the many vulgarizations of Hayek’s work. His conception of the market as a device for 
distributing information, and of society as an evolving “spontaneous order,” were in some 
respects decades ahead of their time, foreshadowing developments in systems theory and the 
science of complexity. Moreover, Hayek was prescient about the systematic failures that would 
result from bureaucratic economic management. In this sense, he is one of the consummate 
realists of the last century. 
Paradoxically, Hayek also came quite openly to regard concepts like utopia and 
ideology as indispensable elements of a functioning liberal society, warning against that 
“spurious realism” which sees the existing world as the only one possible.45 As one of his more 
perceptive biographers has put it:  
Hayek was a utopian philosopher. He ultimately looked forward to a ‘universal 
order of peace.’ This would be a utopian world that would unite all mankind 
into one society….He sought a world in which as many people as possible 
would be as wealthy as possible…Such a society would secure individual 
freedom and group order and would have the most advanced technology.46  
 
Thus a characteristic tension that liberal thought faces – the need to balance order and the 
embrace of novelty within a framework of individual liberty – reaches a fever-pitch in Hayek’s 
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writings. To study this interplay between utopia and anti-utopia within his thought is perhaps 
to appreciate an ambiguity within contemporary liberalism writ large. His final vision of a 
single, cosmopolitan society, united by universal law, characterized by constant growth and 
technological innovation – and all this accomplished more or less peacefully – is as radical as 
anything Saint-Simon or Marx ever penned. Furthermore, the image of a techno-cosmopolitan 
utopia is not merely a temperamental idiosyncrasy on Hayek’s part, as much as it is an 
intensification of some notions that had long been latent in liberal thought, with its proscriptive 
universalism and Whiggish inclination to read history as a story of economic growth.  
“Our faith in freedom,” Hayek declares, “does not rest on the foreseeable results in 
particular circumstances but on the belief that it will, on balance, release more forces for good 
than bad.”47 But is there not something problematic in this easy assurance that the dilemmas 
of the present will, on balance, be resolved in the future? Carl Schmitt puts the question in its 
pure form, when, in a critique designed to encompass both messianic Marxism and utopian 
liberalism, he insists that: 
The acute question to pose is upon whom will fall the frightening power implied 
in a world-embracing economic and technical organization. This question can 
by no means be dismissed in the belief that everything would then function 
automatically, that things would administer themselves, and that a government 
by people over people would be superfluous because human beings would be 
absolutely free. For what would they be free? This can be answered by 
optimistic or pessimistic conjectures, all of which finally lead to an 
anthropological profession of faith.48              
 
Schmitt challenges Hayek on two key points: first, he claims that the skeptical sensibility of 
liberalism is incompatible with its utopian longings; second, he denies that a utopian liberalism 
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is any less destructive than other forms of utopian belief.  These are the challenges to which 
Hayek must respond.  
In the rest of this chapter I examine the motivation behind and consequences of Hayek’s 
embrace of a style of liberal utopianism that has become particularly prominent in recent 
decades. I argue that, for Hayek, the concept of a utopia emerges as the answer to a specific 
question: what cements a complex social order together? This question has been at the very 
heart of modern political thought at least since Hobbes and Rousseau. However, its urgency is 
exacerbated for Hayek because his work systematically undermines three traditional answers 
that Western political thought has given to questions about the sources of social order, namely, 
divine providence, the political traits of human nature (e.g. Aristotle’s zoon politikon), or the 
power of human reason to structure the world.  
These three traditional answers still exert a preponderate influence on political thought. 
The continuing presence of religious fundamentalism needs, I think, little in the way of 
explication. As for arguments based on human nature, it remains true that communitarians, 
civic-republicans, admirers of Tocqueville, and Durkheimian sociologists on all ends of the 
political spectrum carry on the Aristotelian tradition,49 whereas defenders of capitalism are still 
prone to base their arguments on an ahistorical notion of self-interest.50 Conceptions of social 
order based on reason also remain widespread, although they tend to go unrecognized as such. 
On the Left, writers continue to enlist the powers of human reason for the task of a conscious 
restructuring of society.51 Alternatively, proponents of new forms of technocratic politics seek 
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to free expert rationality from democratic pressures through what are sometimes called “non-
majoritarian” institutions (a truly Orwellian euphemism).52 In short, all the old answers to 
Hayek’s basic question – what holds a complex society together? – are very much alive.  
By contrast, Hayek places a thoroughgoing epistemological skepticism at the center of 
his work. Rather than beginning from what we know, he starts from a Kantian insistence on 
the limits to human knowledge, with the result that the traditional answers no longer appear 
persuasive.53 Hayek’s skepticism is anti-foundational in a particular sense: if the basic feature 
of the human condition is overwhelming ignorance and uncertainty, then it becomes impossible 
to ground a theory of social order on the firm knowledge of something outside of society, e.g. 
nature or reason. The factors that generate social stability must be immanent. Emergent order 
is always thoroughly bound up in the social process itself.  
We can divide Hayek’s arguments for skepticism into three categories: ontological, 
psychological, and sociological. On the ontological level, Hayek posits a condition of radical 
human finitude, extrapolating from what he sees as the individualism implicit in Western styles 
of thought, especially Christianity, with its conception of the personal soul and insistence on 
the fallibility of human reason.54 Hayek strips these Christian conceptions of religious content. 
Instead, he argues, the tradition demonstrates that social theory must begin with a conception 
of the faculties of single individuals, for the reason that, whatever larger processes they may 
participate in, it is single individuals that think, feel, and actually have the experiences of which 
theory is an interpretation. But no human mind, he continues, can ever achieve an exhaustive 
knowledge of its own deepest workings, or even a comprehensive overview of its own cultural 
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tradition, let alone of the universe at large. Human life is characterized by extreme fragility 
and dependence, hence Hayek’s fondness for words like “humility” and “submission.”55  
His psychological arguments are mostly found in the underappreciated book The 
Sensory Order.56 It is possible to view his psychology as an attempt at a “scientific” 
explanation of his ontological standpoint. Hayek argues against the empiricists and positivists 
who inhabited the Vienna of his youth that the human mind is built up, not strictly through 
experience or sense data, but through a hierarchy of classifications or rules that partially 
precede all individual experience, forming an evolving cognitive map that allows for the 
pattern recognition which composes our conscious life.57 As the foundation for consciousness, 
not all of these rules can themselves be conscious, although some may be. Some rules or 
classificatory schemes are so basic as to be part of the biological makeup of the brain, while 
others are unconscious historical or cultural additions; this is the case even if the divide 
between biology and culture is difficult to draw. Recognitions of patterns are interpretations of 
the world, and what we experience is this world of historically evolving interpretations. Much 
happens cognitively below the level of consciousness, tacitly embedded in habits and practices. 
“Not all knowledge in this sense is part of our intellect, nor is our intellect the whole of our 
knowledge.”58 
As Alan Ebenstein explains, “His work here [is]…in the tradition of Kant, who held 
that sensory experience occurs in an organism rather than possessing separate ontological 
status.”59 For Hayek, a theory and critique of cognition must precede empirical observation, 
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because essential features of our world, in this case the priority of individuals and their 
conceptual maps, are unobservable.60 In other words, individual experience is “really real,” 
and everything else is a provisional interpretation, lacking full ontological status.61 On the other 
hand, Hayek also adds a distinctly post-Kantian emphasis on experimentation and social 
evolution, a trend that becomes increasingly prominent in his later writings.62 The evolutionary 
context of competition for survival weeds out some cultural traditions and allows others to 
spread, setting the ground for an eventual convergence around the most successful 
institutions.63  
 Hayek’s sociology builds on the previous claims. For him, the social order is composed 
of countless instances of these fragile, finite beings, none of whom have anything like a 
conscious understanding of the entire society.64  The key question is: how is it possible to 
sustain a complex social order under these restrictive conditions? Hayek’s answer is that 
institutions must evolve to circulate partial knowledge and coordinate actions. Institutions arise 
that bring our disparate interpretations of the world into a lose alignment. Examples include 
the common law, language, traditions of moral and aesthetic judgment65 – and, of course, the 
market.66 The historical emergence and steady adaptation of these institutions is what Hayek 
calls the “spontaneous order” or, more grandiosely, the “game of catallaxy.”67 Only by 
allowing these impersonal  institutions to function, and thereby abandoning the false dream of 
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controlling and guiding social development, can a complex society subsist. On Hayek’s 
reading, the problem with traditional kinds of utopian thought is that they seek a final vision 
that methodically restricts the free emergence of these self-coordinating institutions, of which 
the market is only one.  
 
4. Problems of Spontaneous Evolution: The Plastic and the Brittle 
 
Roland Kley nicely redescribes Hayek’s question as: how much plasticity exists in the 
world?68 This is half right. Hayek is fascinated by the question of plasticity and change. What 
are the zones of novelty and stability in the world? How much freedom do humans have to 
alter the conditions of their existence? But this line of questioning necessarily attunes Hayek 
to a second set of issues involving the limits and boundaries of plasticity. What happens when 
we approach those limits and how can we know them? “Though we cannot see in the dark,” 
he writes, “we must be able to trace the limits of the dark areas.”69 If there are limits to 
plasticity, as Hayek believes, then the world may be both dynamically plastic and very brittle, 
as complex adaptive systems crumble into disorder when a limit is approached. The traditional 
liberal quest to trace the limits of the possible is radicalized in Hayek’s hands because it 
becomes the basis for a full-fledged evolutionary ontology. The final result is that political 
thought, which does not directly grasp the problem of limits, becomes parasitic on a speculative 
theory of evolution, which does.  
How much plasticity is there? Hayek’s position on this question is more nuanced than 
it appears. On the one hand, Hayek does not foresee any real boundaries to the growth of human 
economic and cognitive powers. No obvious “external” limits constrain evolution in advance. 
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For example, Hayek believes that economic crises arise almost exclusively out of misguided 
political interventions into the economic sphere, rather than volatility inherent in the market 
order itself.70 He also displays none of the pessimism of the classical economists that economic 
growth is bound to halt in a steady state due to natural limitations, and he seems strangely blind 
to the danger that spontaneous capitalism on a global scale might generate an ecological crisis 
whose solution lies beyond its adaptive capacity.71 For him, these are practical problems to be 
addressed as necessary through experimentation, not deep problems about the character of 
social order or its relations to nature.  
On the other hand, even if the outcome of the developmental tendencies at work in 
society is potentially unlimited, the formal structure of the evolutionary process itself contains 
certain “internal” limits on the world’s plasticity. Hayek’s world is also brittle. Finite 
knowledge means that we cannot directly judge what is and is not possible, but we can say 
certain things about the typical manner in which cumulative change occurs, and such reflection 
upon the structure of change gives us a second-order theory of possibility. A theory of the 
modality of change – a critique of evolution – is logically prior to the observation of “really 
existing” societies.72  
Human action takes place within a context always already defined by complex adaptive 
systems. Hayek observes that “we can never produce a crystal…by placing the individual 
atoms in such a position that they will form the lattice of a crystal…but we can create the 
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conditions in which they will arrange themselves in such a manner.”73 The key question to ask 
about any complex system is what scenario is required before the constituent elements can 
arrange themselves. For example, Hayek maintains that, under current conditions, the 
adaptation of institutions depends on a steady flow of experimentation and fortunate accidents; 
as a result, any system of social order that attempts to minimize or eliminate unplanned 
occurrences is less likely to persist over the long-term because the system thereby restricts its 
own adaptive capacity.74 In the same way that trying to divide a number by zero makes no 
sense according to the rules that govern mathematics – that is a limit situation that will ruin an 
otherwise orderly equation – there are things that we can imagine on a conceptual level that 
are constitutively impossible. Imagination is apt to exceed the bounds of possibility because it 
is not cognizant of the formal limitations that compose the internal horizon of evolution. This 
has two major implications.  
First, some problems are insurmountable or insoluble. No degree of experimentation 
or innovation will overcome them. To cite the most well-known example, Hayek believes that 
it is impossible for a central planning agency to aggregate all the relevant information 
regarding an economy, since economic information only emerges through the unplanned 
actions and experiments of countless actors, many of whom act based on unconscious 
knowledge. Information of this sort is inherently partial and incapable of being formalized. An 
attempt to centralize or structure the social process can only degrade the complex organizations 
that have grown up to manage the tricky problem of coordinating information (prices, habits 
of interpersonal trust, etc.).  
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Second, even in light of the extraordinary plasticity that evolution makes possible, 
certain problems may only have a small set of solutions, sometimes only a single solution, and 
this may be the case even if we can imagine other possibilities or cannot fully understand what 
accounts for the necessity: 
There may exist just one way to satisfy certain requirements for forming [a 
complex social order] – just as the development of wings is apparently the only 
way in which organisms can become able to fly (the wings of insects, birds and 
bats have quite different genetic origins). There may also be fundamentally only 
one way to develop a phonetic language, so that the existence of certain 
common attributes possessed by all languages does not by itself show that they 
must be due to innate qualities.75 
 
This argument is at once ontological and political. Contrary to the Cartesian perspective 
of someone like Noam Chomsky, grammatical commonalities between languages may not 
imply a universal structure in the mind that can be mapped out.76 We may never understand 
why wings are necessary for flight or what accounts for the commonalities between languages. 
Until proven otherwise, we should assume these things are functionally indispensable. From a 
Hayekian perspective, an overestimation of rationality is the common trait that unites 
Chomsky’s linguistic program with his version of radical politics. For Hayek, it may simply 
be the case that there is no alternative, even if we can imagine that another world is possible. 
Imagination must be disciplined, prevented from overrunning the bounds of possibility and 
disrupting the evolutionary process.  
It may be asked, is Hayek’s skepticism not just a little self-serving, in that it seems to 
discredit his opponents as it spares his favored political vision? How can a self-professed 
skeptic claim to trace the limits of the possible? Does he not, despite himself, adopt a synoptic 
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view of how impersonal markets work? These are important questions that rightly gesture at 
the strange mixture of doubt and dogmatism in Hayek’s political writings. However, I want to 
resist the idea that Hayek is crudely ideological or contradictory, because I think this prevents 
us from appreciating his importance. His stance can, I think, be clarified by a simple analogy.  
Consider a computer algorithm that produces a random number every ten seconds. On 
the one hand, given its random nature, the program is completely unpredictable. The wise 
stance is skepticism about the next round of change. On the other hand, we have a kind of 
absolute and unerring certainty, namely, the purely formal certainty that the outcome is 
unpredictable. Whatever else we know, we are certain that any attempt to predict or constrain 
the process is a fool’s errand.  
Hayek appears to believe that social change is similar to the computer algorithm. My 
analogy is not perfect, since he does not think social evolution is purely random, but it is close 
enough to show the basic tendency of his thought. Unlike more moderate liberals, who are 
usually not unamenable to compromise or doctrinal inconsistencies for the sake of prudence, 
Hayek’s certainty about the modality of change means that there is a limit beyond which 
political compromise is impossible.                                 
5. Modern Utopias: Hayek on the Revolt of the Intellectuals  
 
Hayek’s concern with utopia emerges out of this need to discipline or harness the 
imagination to render it compatible with the spontaneous evolution of social order. He writes, 
Utopia, like ideology, is a bad word today; and it is true that most utopias aim 
at radically redesigning society and suffer from internal contradictions…But an 
ideal picture of society is…the chief contribution that science can make to the 
solution of the problems of practical policy.77 
 
                                                   




Utopia is intimately related to practical policy and governability for Hayek. The true scientist 
or philosopher is known, not by his lack of utopian vision, but by his ability to distinguish 
between contradictory and harmful utopias and those “ideal pictures” that are, if not “true” in 
any straightforward sense, at least politically valuable to the liberal polity. In essence, Hayek 
believes that his conception of evolution as unpredictable in content yet with an impersonal 
structure (only some aspect of which can be known) offers a vantage point from which to 
evaluate the feasibility of proposed utopias.  
He first addresses the topic of utopia in a 1949 article “The Intellectuals and 
Socialism.”78 Here Hayek argues that modernity has given rise to complex societies whose 
survival depends on the continuous dissemination of vast amounts of information, and that this 
requires dense communication networks, literacy, and a widely intelligible conceptual 
vocabulary (what Gellner later calls “universal high culture”).79 Such a situation necessarily 
engenders a broad new class of intellectuals – “professional secondhand dealers in ideas”80 – 
who lack the creative insight of the true scientist or philosopher, but who serve to disperse 
ideas throughout the wider community, allowing our joint interpretations and perceptions to 
adjust as society evolves. Intellectuals, Hayek writes, are the “organs which modern society 
has developed for spreading knowledge and ideas, and it is their convictions and opinions 
which operate as the sieve through which all new conceptions must pass before they can reach 
the masses.”81 The intellectual occupies a strategic position in the contemporary world, 
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mediating between conceptual innovation and public opinion, between economic advance and 
political stability.  
However, this arrangement poses a serious problem for the Western combination of 
free markets and liberal democracy, because, Hayek claims, intellectuals as a type are too often 
tempted by romantic or utopian ideologies, particularly socialism. In short, they are apt to 
popularize the “wrong” ideas, and this problem emerges from the very nature of the role they 
are encouraged to play: sensitivity to exciting thoughts and flights of imagination are the grease 
in the wheels of a modern economy. According to Hayek, intellectuals as individuals are 
usually honest, and not infrequently people of good will, but they also lack the sense of caution 
and nuance that comes with deep expertise in a single field.82 In short, they tend to overestimate 
the power of abstract reason and are prone to that greatest of all sins: pride. The socialist vision 
of remaking society based on reason and conscious control has a natural appeal to such people. 
And where the intellectuals go, the rest of the political class eventually follows. To forestall a 
descent into socialism, one first has to capture the aspirations of the intellectuals. This is 
precisely what minimalist liberalism fails to do. Hayek’s diagnosis is that a revamped modern 
liberalism must incorporate a visionary social philosophy: 
The ability to criticize accepted views, to explore new vistas and to 
experiment with new conceptions, provides the atmosphere without which the 
intellectual cannot breathe. A cause which offers no scope for these traits can 
have no support from him and is thereby doomed in any society which, like 
ours, rests on his services…What we lack is a liberal Utopia, a program which 
seems neither a mere defense of things as they are nor a diluted kind of 
socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the 
susceptibilities of the mighty (including the trade unions), which is not too 
severely practical, and which does not confine itself to what appears today as 
politically possible.83 
 
                                                   
82 Ibid., 420.  




From Hayek’s perspective, it is not enough to debate socialists on the level of factual argument 
because only a few highly trained experts have the wherewithal to parse complicated economic 
data. What liberalism needs is an aesthetic reformation. Without vision the people may not 
perish, but the intellectuals will revolt, and the final result may be more or less the same. 
Instead, one must craft a formulation of liberalism that has the instinctual appeal of novelty 
and can be used for the intellectual’s favorite pastime of social critique. Under current 
conditions, the only viable liberalism is a utopian liberalism.  
On the surface, Hayek’s critique of the intellectual is rather unremarkable, in that it 
reiterates the old worries of Burke and Tocqueville about the role of “the writer” as a 
precipitating cause of the French Revolution.84 Indeed, books claiming to expose the conceits 
of “intellectuals” have long since become a cottage industry within conservative literature.85  
Novel in Hayek’s version of this argument, however, is his suggestion that the problem is 
inherent in the configuration of complex societies and cannot be avoided. Intellectuals are part 
of the formal structure of social change, and, as a class, they are both functionally indispensable 
and uniquely destructive.  
By contrast, Burke and Tocqueville still believe in the possibility of what are essentially 
political solutions to the problems raised by unruly intellectuals. Burke merely attempts to 
persuade his readers that respect for traditional norms and constitutional reform are the surest 
ways to progress.86 Tocqueville advocates liberty as a palliative. He reasons that, since it was 
a lack of liberty that pushed the philosophes into quixotic political speculation in the first place, 
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the experience of true political liberty, with all its rights and responsibilities, will temper their 
casual radicalism.87 Neither of these solutions is plausible for Hayek, because, for him, the 
problem is inherent in the structure of social adaptation. For this reason, his response is not 
immediately “political,” but what we might call ideological. Hayek still advocates tradition 
and liberty, but also creates a new vision of a constructive, liberal utopia that will contain and 
shape a popular discontent that can never be fully eliminated. This is not a casual difference. 
6. Individualism: True and False 
Hayek’s concerns in “The Intellectuals and Socialism” can be traced to his classic 1945 
article “Individualism: True and False,” which contains his most sustained meditation on the 
condition of modernity. That this essay draws overtly on Tocquevillian themes of the interplay 
between civilizational development and individual psychology is unsurprising, given its title, 
since Tocqueville was one of the first to reflect deeply on modern “individualism” and its 
implications.88  
In the pessimistic second volume of Democracy in America, Tocqueville explains his 
fear that the democratic age he saw embodied in America might pave the way to a new form 
of administrative despotism. Implicit in democratic individualism (which Tocqueville 
understood as a society of equal individuals lacking distinctions in status, rather than any 
specific form of government per se) is the danger of what Raymond Aron calls a “universal 
embourgeoisement.89 Because they lack the sense of tradition and the solid, intermediary 
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institutions found in aristocracies, Tocqueville feared that democratic regimes could 
degenerate into atomized societies of competitive and narrowly self-involved individuals, each 
concerned with just an immediate sphere of material well-being. In this scenario, formerly 
independent citizens might acquiesce to increasing amounts of state intervention, both to 
secure material comfort and to redress the symptoms of the social disintegration caused by 
their own narrow passivity.90 Democracy would then lead into administrative despotism, with 
its good intentions paving the “road to servitude”91 (the phrase that inspired the title of Hayek’s 
The Road to Serfdom). Against this bleak vision, Tocqueville hoped that democratic love of 
independence and distrust of authority, enhanced by religion and an abundance of voluntary 
civil associations, would provide a counterweight. In the end, he vacillated in his opinion on 
which dynamic would rule in democracies. This basic ambiguity is the source of an anxiety 
that haunts Tocqueville’s conception of modernity.92 
Hayek’s wide-ranging and speculative article on individualism embeds Tocqueville’s 
central motifs in a broader set of conjectures on history, epistemology, and social development. 
He argues that the decline of “the accepted Christian tradition”93 has thoroughly undermined 
both the content of established moral orientations and, more importantly, the willingness of 
citizens to abide by any general principles and rules. As Tocqueville noted, one consequence 
of the new democratic individualism is an increased willingness to abandon traditional norms 
and forms of authority under the pressure of current exigencies. The result is that government 
becomes ad hoc and increasingly illiberal as customary restraints on administration decay. 
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Hayek observes that the normative space left vacant by the withering of traditional 
religious understandings has been colonized by several competing conceptions of 
individualism that arrive in early European modernity.94 This is decidedly a mixed blessing. In 
one sense, for Hayek, modern individualism should be the culmination of the whole course of 
Western development; it should be the secularization and deliberate appropriation of what was 
really valuable in the old religious content. The problem is that the political upheavals of the 
past three centuries, a period that witnessed both the industrial revolution and the advent of 
democracy, have led to the dispersion of new and, according to Hayek, dangerous conceptions 
of the individual.  
Above all, Hayek draws upon the critique of Descartes that Tocqueville mounts in the 
second volume of Democracy in America.95 Tocqueville holds Descartes responsible for the 
notion that abstract reason is a universal standard, generally accessible to each individual 
through unaided reflection.96 Tocqueville had noted that this sort of vulgarized “Cartesianism” 
is deeply ahistorical in the way that it corrodes authority and tradition, pushing the burden of 
seeking truth onto each individual. Thus the price of increased personal freedom and individual 
initiative, both of which Tocqueville consistently applauds, is the specter of skepticism and 
lurking anxiety.97 By encouraging individuals to submit each question to the abstract tribunal 
of reason – even on issues in which they may not be competent to judge – Cartesianism tends 
to breakdown institutions, severing ties with the past and throwing citizens back on their own 
meager resources. In the guise of reason, imagination is given free reign.  
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Hayek develops Tocqueville’s argument into a generalized critique of modernity, 
arguing that the legacy of Cartesian rationalism is at the heart of contemporary political 
crises.98 According to Hayek, rationalists tend to think of the world as a coherent structure, 
unified through reason, the nature of which can be discovered a priori by an individual human 
mind and grasped in conscious thought. The universe displays deep intelligibility, i.e. it makes 
sense “all the way down” and hangs together in a single, coherent framework. Rationalism 
implicitly claims that reason is, in principle, equally accessible to everyone; this, in turn, 
implies not just that each individual should be her own judge, but also that we should all 
converge on the same truth. As in geometry, a true proof is not open to dispute.  
In other words, a metaphysical monism is regulative for the rationalist enterprise.99 But, 
as Hayek will attempt to show, Cartesianism is an especially pernicious variety of monism 
because it leads in contradictory directions. On the one hand, rationalism is anti-authoritarian 
to the point of being anarchic (“each man his own judge”). On the other, it is thoroughly 
despotic (“a single truth for all”). We can anticipate Hayek’s claim: when the postulates of 
rationalism become accepted elements of the ambient culture, politics swings between disorder 
and tyranny.100  
The dominant metaphor here is of the individual as isolated spectator, of Descartes 
meditating in his study, or of Lycurgus single-handedly giving law to the Spartans (an image 
of which Descartes and Rousseau were both fond).101 Under the keen eyes of the master, the 
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world is surveyed before it is redescribed or recreated. This attitude passes from the philosophy 
of science, to the human sciences, from which it permeates accepted understandings. It is 
forever showing up in unexpected places. Sheldon Wolin highlights a wonderful passage from 
the economic writings of James Mill that expresses the synoptic ideal exactly. Not 
coincidently, it imitates a Platonic dialogue: 
B. “…[A] commanding view of a whole subject, in all its parts….is it anything 
but another name for theory, or science of the subject? Theory (theoria) is 
literally VIEW…meaning view or knowledge, not simply of this and that part, 
but…of the whole.” 
 
A. “…you mean to say that the theory or science of political economy is a 
commanding view of the vast combination of agents…”  
 
B. “You have anticipated me correctly.”102 
One must not lose track of the central issue here. James Mill was not a socialist or a 
Rousseauian romantic, but a free-market liberal. Despite this, Hayek’s argument allows us to 
detect a deeper harmony of apparently opposed perspectives. Rationalists begin from the 
presumption of a coherent whole and therefore have no conception of the extent to which 
wholes must be assembled piecemeal over time. The corollary to this is that rationalists also 
lose sight of the inherent limits to human knowledge. Consequently, they continue to miss the 
lesson Burke never tired of repeating: that much of social order inevitably rests on tacit 
knowledge that has slowly evolved and exists below the level of articulate thought, embodied 
in tradition and institutions.103  
A surprising twist thus takes place within the rationalist conception: when the 
individual enters the political sphere, he attempts to legislate for the entire society based on the 
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truth of his knowledge, and individualism passes over into collective prescriptions for society 
at large, enforced, in the last resort, by state power. For Hayek, a straight line runs from 
Descartes and Rousseau, to Comte and Marx.104 
At the same time, rationalism destabilizes moral norms, because it encourages an 
“unwillingness to bow before any moral rules whose utility is not rationally demonstrated.”105 
This attitude is immensely disruptive because the rules and customs that bind society together 
develop without the reasons behind them being known or even knowable. Not coincidentally, 
this is why the original Cartesian philosophy retained the conception of a benevolent God to 
underwrite the rational order; without the divine backstop to limit critique, it is a short step 
from Descartes’ purely heuristic venture of hyperbolic doubt to Marx’s more political call for 
“a ruthless criticism of all that exists.”106  
The anarchic strain of the rationalist project is allied to what Hayek views as the second 
major conception of individualism at work in modernity, a romantic individualism that he 
traces to 19th century German writing (above all Goethe) and to John Stuart Mill in the English 
speaking world.107 “In this age,” Mill declares in one of his freer moments, “the mere example 
of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service.”108 
Romanticism applauds nonconformity for its own sake, because, on this view, the individual 
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is fundamentally engaged in a project of aesthetic self-creation. Social structures and shared 
norms are seen as constricting impositions on self-creation, rather than as the unavoidable basis 
of meaningful interaction.  
Romanticism exacerbates feelings of alienation and resentment when experiments in 
living go wrong, which they often do. Personal alienation then becomes the motive for social 
critique, a motive Hayek attributes to Rousseau.109 Finally, the Germanic tradition provides an 
emotional thrust to radical nationalism, viewed as the self-creation of the community. In these 
scenarios, instrumental reason operates as the handmaiden of irrational desire. Thus Saint-
Simon, that barometer of the future, sometimes envisioned society as a sort of rationalized 
aesthetic hierarchy in which the artists would guide the scientists, who would in turn lead the 
industrialists.110  
To the extent that they systematically misrepresent the powers of the human mind, the 
importance of evolved traditions, and the place of the individual within society, romanticism 
and rationalism are both false. Against this, Hayek points to a third style of individualism, a 
true individualism that he believes is frequently overlooked and misunderstood: that of Bernard 
de Mandeville, the Scottish Enlightenment, and Tocqueville. Unlike the heirs of Descartes, 
who begin from the presumption of a rationally ordered whole, the true individualists begin 
from the twin problems of epistemological finitude and the novelty of change. They “rate rather 
low the place which reason plays in human affairs” because they know that order emerges from 
the unintended consequences of action.111 
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This tradition of true individualism is not primarily a moral attitude but a social 
scientific theory about the emergence of social order; it is “only in the second instance a set of 
political maxims.”112 It does not, for instance, assert that the self is the locus of all value, or 
that each person should only pursue his rational interest, or that utility should be maximized. 
It holds that: 
All the possible difference in men’s moral attitudes amounts to little, so far as 
their significance for social organization is concerned, compared with the fact 
that all man’s mind can effectively comprehend are the facts of the narrow circle 
of which he is the center.113 
 
True individualism posits radical finitude as the eternal condition of humankind. Instead of an 
individual surveying the world, its guiding metaphor is a struggle to pierce through darkness 
(another Christian image).114 It claims with Hume that the Cartesian dream of rational synopsis 
is impossible – in the end no God or structure underwrites our knowledge of the world – and 
with Adam Smith it insists that the really interesting question is how social order is possible at 
all under these restrictive conditions.  
Society is a coordination problem that can only be solved through rules and institutions 
that allow individual actions and expectations to come into alignment through trial and error. 
What Adam Smith called the “system of natural liberty” is merely the enforcement of 
individual rights and freedoms against encroachments by the state so that a space for 
experimentation can be encouraged. For Hayek, this entails a dogged resistance to overarching 
policies designed to shape the course of society and a reliance on minimally restricted 
economic markets as the best method for coordinating change.  
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However, Hayek also recognizes that his stance entails a deep feeling of loss. Liberty 
offers none of the assurances or sense of mastery that comes with rationalism or romanticism. 
The system of liberty, with its insistence on contingency and change fosters “resentment rather 
than…wonder or curiosity. Much of our occasional impetuous desire to smash the whole 
entangling machinery of civilization is due to this inability of man to understand what he is 
doing.”115  
In the end, we learn that the skeptical standpoint of true individualism gives rise to its 
own dangers and temptations, perhaps no less radical than those that stem from Cartesianism 
and its offshoots. This is because the attraction to utopian solutions appears to be one potential 
reaction to the skepticism at the core of the liberal view. Shklar’s so-called liberalism of fear, 
designed to calm the mind and produce moderate politics, can lead quite easily into a liberalism 
of anxiety, a deep uneasiness of the soul in search of a remedy. No one has captured this anomic 
feeling better than Hume, the quintessential skeptic and a thinker to whom Hayek owes a great 
deal: 
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human 
reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain that I am ready to reject 
all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable 
or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my 
existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favor shall I court, and 
whose anger must I dread?...I am confounded with all these questions and begin 
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7. Why liberalism? The Problem of Justification  
Thus at precisely this point – that is, immediately after he describes his positive vision 
of a society based on liberty, juridical law, and markets – Hayek encounters two related 
problems that haunt his writings for the rest of his life. The first is a problem of ethical 
justification, the second a problem of how to legitimate the lived experience of the spontaneous 
order. The first question asks in what way liberalism is good from the more detached standpoint 
of ethical philosophy; the second asks why citizens should embrace a liberal society, with its 
volatility and dislocation, as the context of everyday life. This quickly becomes a problem of 
democracy, of sustaining broad-based popular support for economic policies that often have 
unpleasant side-effects.   
To put it bluntly, moral philosophy is a problem for Hayek. The impossibility of a 
synoptic perspective on the world does not merely undermine Cartesian rationalism, but, as he 
clearly recognizes, it also precludes the traditional ethical justifications for the liberal order 
that he champions. These classical justifications are natural right, utilitarianism, and a looser 
style of thinking that I call “economic rationalism.”  
On the one hand, Hayek’s intensely skeptical perspective denies that there is a static 
human nature or a divine source that can ground a theory of natural rights, as in John Locke. 
For all of his professed affinity with Locke’s liberalism and his empiricism, Hayek’s whole 
project should be seen as an attempt to avoid the central Lockean question of moral 
sovereignty, “Who is to be judge?”117 For Locke, there is a judge in heaven, if not on earth; 
indeed, it is the heavenly judge who restricts earthly authority in the name of natural right.118 
For Hayek, no ultimate judge exists and no principle gives us certain moral knowledge. The 
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right as such is not known, but may over time be discovered or embodied in tacit, unarticulated 
practices. It could be said that spontaneity is the silence of sovereignty. This difference always 
remains a real point of tension between Hayek and theorists of natural right from Locke to 
Nozick.  On the other hand, Hayek also denies that we can reliably predict the outcome of 
complicated social policies, or that maximal happiness is a worthy goal in itself. As a 
consequence he also cuts the legs out from under any recognizable form of utilitarianism. 
More to the point, Hayek is likely to reject any strictly ethical response to the question 
“Why liberalism?” because ethics as such tends to produce rational truths based on some 
putative telos or vision of the whole, precisely the endeavor that Hayek claims is impossible.119 
“Ethics,” he says elsewhere, “is the last fortress of human pride.”120 Society as a spontaneous 
system cannot conform to a substantive conception of justice without the often dire 
consequences that come with institutional rigidity. “Social justice” is, for Hayek, an oxymoron. 
“A Rawlsian world could thus never have become civilized…It would have scotched most 
discoveries of new possibilities.”121  
It must also be understood that Hayek’s political vision distinguishes him from many 
defenders of neoliberal markets.122 His views on the centrality of cultural traditions and the 
impossibility of impersonal reason prevent him from claiming that free-markets stem from a 
universal human nature, or that they are optimally efficient or rational according to some ideal 
standard.123 These three arguments are the most well known elements of a broad style of 
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thinking I call “economic rationalism” for short. In fact, Hayek insists that the overt rationalism 
of much contemporary economics makes exactly the same mistake as the old Cartesian view: 
it assumes the real has an ideal structure that the theorist grasps upon reflection and summarizes 
in a (preferably mathematical) theory.124 Hayek is suspicious of anything that resembles a 
structural theory, and this is what differentiates him not just from Keynes, as is well known, 
but also from many of the best known neoliberal economists like Milton Friedman or Gary 
Becker. “Keynes’ economics,” Hayek once told an interviewer, “is just another branch of the 
centuries-old Quantity Theory school, the school now associated with Milton Friedman.”125 
(That is, both Keynes and Friedman have structural theories based on a small number of 
factors, in this context money.)  
Hayek attacks the crudest versions of neoclassical and neoliberal economics for 
political reasons. Exactly like the prominent 19th and 20th theories of century socialism, they 
are based on the synoptic illusion of total knowledge and fail to understand the costs of 
acquiring information.126 By keeping the idea of surveying the “real” economy alive, 
neoclassicism covertly sustains the false utopian dream of the socialist plan. The two schools 
are different sides of the same Cartesian coin. Hayek can and does argue that the market is the 
best alternative of which we know – and likely an indispensable device – for coordinating 
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information within a complex society, but he never argues that it is uniquely rational or 
infallible. Just because the economy, for Hayek, is not a stable site of rational calculation but 
an aggregation of individual attempts to adapt to unknown circumstances, it entails mistakes, 
accidents, excesses.127 “Waste,” he writes, “is everywhere the price of freedom.”128 (Whether 
or not the wasteful and excessive nature of markets represents a problem during the current 
epoch of ecological crisis is a question to which Hayek seems strangely oblivious.) 
So the question, “Why liberalism?” remains unanswered. Hayek’s final justification 
does not rest on a normative claim about what is good in human life, but on a common sense 
affirmation of material prosperity, and, more importantly, on a meta-theory about the 
possibility of the development of any morality. In short, he argues that what we call liberty just 
is that set of social practices that has allowed for the cumulative development and expansion 
of a normative order over time. Liberty is not a norm but a meta-norm, i.e. a framework that 
allows for the discovery of norms when no one has the ability to be the final judge. “Liberty is 
not merely one particular value but…is the source and condition of most moral values.”129 
(Tellingly, Hayek does not address the question he begs here: what moral values is liberty not 
the condition of?) Nonetheless, this turn toward meta-theory means the final moral status of 
liberal society, or of any particular feature or law, is always somewhat uncertain for Hayek, 
lacking ultimate justification. The main thrust of his argument merely shows that liberalism is 
unavoidable, not that it is desirable. He tells us not how we should live, but how we must. Thus 
Andrew Gamble, with a nod to Max Weber, calls Hayek’s vision an “iron cage of liberty.”130 
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Not unlike Weber’s Calvinists, Hayek’s stern version of spontaneous liberalism places 
living individuals in a precarious existential situation due to its insistence on moral 
agnosticism, epistemological skepticism, and the need for continual adaptation to novelty. 
What he calls “the game of catallaxy” necessarily produces losers. It is often unpleasant and 
always uncertain. It cuts against the grain of desire and demands a “hard discipline.”131 
Intellectuals are actively hostile to it. The poor resent it. All this raises the specter of a 
breakdown of the normative ensemble that sustains free-market liberalism. The most pressing 
danger Hayek sees is not that markets will collapse, or even that the state will become despotic, 
but that an irrational citizenry will react against the spontaneous order, destroying the source 
of novelty and wealth in society. His deepest fear is a legitimation crisis, and therefore finding 
an answer to the question “Why be liberal?” that persuades in day-to-day politics is the 
indispensable task. In one of his most revealing statements, Hayek writes: 
The individual, in participating in the social process, must be ready and willing 
to adjust himself to changes and to submit to conventions which are not the 
result of intelligent design, whose justification in the particular instance may 
not be recognizable, and which to him will often appear unintelligible and 
irrational.132 
 
The spontaneous order is not just unpredictable but unintelligible. Spontaneity does more than 
elude rational oversight; through its volatility, the spontaneous order undermines the 
frameworks and categories that citizens rely on in daily life to make the world intelligible to 
themselves. Why did I lose my job? Does this failure undermine my own conception of myself 
as a caretaker, a responsible hard-worker, or masculine? And if so, as Hume asked, what am 
I?  
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Liberalism is doubly fragile, threatened from two directions at once. On the one hand, 
the administrative state can easily regulate it out of existence. This fear goes back to 
Tocqueville and is never far from Hayek’s mind. But, unlike many of his current disciples, 
Hayek was aware that the experience of spontaneity could be painful and disorientating, and 
that this experience was both central to the success that liberalism has enjoyed and a point of 
real vulnerability. Administration is the external danger, but the experience of radical 
contingency is the adversary in the heart of liberalism itself.  
The ideas of Joseph Schumpeter, Hayek’s interlocutor and fellow Viennese liberal, are 
an instructive counterpoint. Schumpeter combined the legacies of Tocqueville and Weber to 
produce what was probably the most compelling formulation of the “big bureaucracy” theory 
of capitalist decline in the 20th century. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, he argues 
that as capitalism grows, it is likely to become so bureaucratic that it will simply pass over into 
socialism once citizens become accustomed to life inside domineering institutions.133 
Schumpeter’s claim is not that monopolistic industries undermine growth and innovation (as 
in Marxist theories of monopoly capital).134 Capitalism remains as dynamic as ever, but the 
system inches ever closer to socialism as citizens grow acclimated to lives structured by 
governmental and corporate control and come to insist upon a planned society. Much to 
Hayek’s displeasure, Schumpeter also wrote that socialism would be a viable alternative, if 
less dynamic and heroic than entrepreneurial capitalism. Since a long term and seemingly 
inexorable process of institutional change was driving the shift in ideas, there was little that 
could be done about it from Schumpeter’s perspective unless the institutional structure of the 
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economy changed in an unforeseen way that forced individuals to be more entrepreneurial and 
competitive, thereby internalizing the capitalist ethos anew.135  
In spite of his respect for Schumpeter and their political affinities, Hayek never 
believed this story, for reasons that are fundamental to his theoretical approach. Hayek’s 
thought is epistemological and abstract, more than institutional or historical. He seldom 
discusses concrete institutions and economies from the past, except when they illustrate some 
larger point he wishes to make about theory. To him, the need to solve novel problems based 
on finite knowledge and to coordinate bits of information scattered throughout society cannot 
be overcome. The institutions that work towards coordination might change (within limits), 
but the fundamental problem does not. It characterizes all stages of economic history because 
cognitive finitude is not a problem so much as a condition of possibility of social life. For 
Hayek, this condition of fundamental uncertainty drives adaptation in a market economy. The 
increasing size of institutions, which Hayek also anticipated, does not eliminate this problem 
or pose a necessary threat to spontaneity. 136  
In a sense, then, Hayek seems more optimistic about the future of liberal capitalism 
than Schumpeter and other “declinists,” because he does not see any institutional trend that 
automatically undermines it from within. To the extent that Hayek is worried about the growth 
of an authoritarian state apparatus, as in The Road to Serfdom, its origins are traced to the 
creeping ascendancy of Cartesian rationalism as a mode of thought, rather than some Weberian 
bureaucratic inertia. Socialism as an alternative can be ruled out in advance as a Cartesian 
delusion, so there is no real debate to be had about what form society should take.  
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At the same time, Hayek’s vision is darker and more precarious. For Schumpeter, ideas 
are much more tightly bound to institutions. For Hayek, however, cognition is primary and 
institutions are intensely fragile because, at root, they are composed of historical patterns of 
interpretations. As such, they are sedimented together over time in ways that can foment 
instability. Shift the interpretations and you can change the institutions rather easily, as the rise 
of rationalism shows. “Indeed,” he says, 
The great lesson which the [true] individualist philosophy teaches us on this 
score is that, while it may not be difficult to destroy the spontaneous formations 
which are the indispensable bases of a free civilization, it may be beyond our 
power to deliberately reconstruct such a civilization once these foundations are 
destroyed.137  
 
It therefore becomes very important to maintain a constant vigilance over popular ideas and 
beliefs. Our alternatives are not dynamic capitalism or a somewhat stagnant and boring 
socialism, as Schumpeter thought. Either we preserve space for the spontaneous order to 
function, or risk a collapse of the complex society which has evolved, complete with mass 
starvation and poverty.138 Thus the battle against intellectuals and their romantic utopianism 
must be won at all costs. Policing the ambient political culture for traces of Cartesian 
rationalism is one aspect of this struggle. Hayek’s own utopia is really a counter-utopia, and it 
emerges from this basic dilemma.  
Given his influence on Hayek, it should come as no surprise that Tocqueville confronts 
an analogous problem regarding the connection between social contingency and despotism. 
The distance between the ways that Tocqueville and Hayek respond to this issue helps us to 
understand what is novel in the idea of a utopian liberalism.  
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Tocqueville worries that the smallness of the single individual within the “great body” 
of the democratic crowd, combined with the experience of skepticism and chance in the 
modern world, will produce an apathetic and passive citizenry, open to the seductions of 
benevolent despotism. Citizens acquiesce to arbitrary authority when faced with either the 
apparent dominance of impersonal forces or a world of ungoverned chance. In this situation 
apathy becomes predominant and the possibility for resolute action that aristocratic societies 
displayed in abundance is diminished. Tocqueville writes:    
There is hardly any human action, however particular a character be assigned 
to it, which does not originate in some very general idea men have conceived 
of the Deity, of his relation to mankind, of the nature of their own souls, and of 
their duties to their fellow creatures….doubt on these first principles would 
abandon all their actions to the impulse of chance, and would condemn them to 
live, powerless and undisciplined.139 
 
Much like Rousseau, whom he claimed to reflect upon almost daily,140 Tocqueville believed 
that modern societies display real advantages compared to earlier social formations. But they 
also contain downsides and losses. Also like Rousseau, Tocqueville believed that the self or 
soul requires a considerable degree of stability, even as it is often restless and insatiable.141 The 
best social order will provide some room for both elements. Too much order and stability 
quickly become despotic. Past a certain point, however, the experience of chance harbors a 
despotic force. Tocqueville helps us see that the modern experience of contingency is 
paradoxically linked to the rise of an administrative state, since a bureaucratic apparatus can 
claim to address perfectly normal demands for stability that life inside a mobile, skeptical, and 
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egalitarian society constantly undermines. In this way modernity can be chaotic and despotic 
at once.  
 Tocqueville clearly recognizes the problems that stem from the conjunction of 
democratic politics and the distressing unintelligibility of complex societies, but, despite 
Hayek’s assurances that he and Tocqueville represent a unified tradition of liberal thought, 
their responses to this issue move in opposed directions. Tocqueville’s distinct response 
operates on several levels. Above all, he argues that religious faith and liberty should be allied. 
By attuning citizens to a higher set of common values and a long term perspective, the Christian 
religion can attenuate the acquisitive myopia he sees in democratic societies founded on 
competitive egalitarianism.142 This faith should not be doctrinaire or oppressive, and it must 
not be tied to the state, but, as with Rousseau’s minimal civil religion, it should provide 
assurances that contingency has its limits and that individual merits are divinely rewarded.143 
In other words, a modest space for something transcendent needs to be preserved that 
simultaneously supports and limits liberal society. On a second level, Tocqueville champions 
the virtues of civic association in democracy. The needs that Rousseau realizes through his 
tightly bound, egalitarian social contract are put in motion by Tocqueville inside a democratic 
society. Through collective action in civil society, individuals can come together to exercise 
power and undertake larger projects, and in this way democracy both resists the administrative 
state and provides a partial remedy for the anomie it generates. The soul’s natural desire for 
distinction and rule find a new outlet in politics.  
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What both of Tocqueville’s suggestions – the aspiration to sustain religion and the 
advocacy of democratic participation – have in common is a sense that the liberal order, 
however just it is on the final calculation, may not by itself support all elements of the good 
life. He retains from Rousseau the intuition that contemporary society is an ambiguous 
development from a prior condition, not the culmination of all that is valuable in a single 
process of cultural development. There is always a table of gains and losses that we must 
attempt to balance. “Let us endeavor to make the best of that which is allotted to us.”144 
Tocqueville suggests that we retain a healthy distance from liberal democracy, even while he 
upholds its essential justice and admits its historical ascendancy. His liberalism is adamant, but 
chastened.  
Hayek is far more radical. For him, in order to survive liberalism must become its own 
foundation, internalizing all that is valuable within a comprehensive vision of the liberal 
society. There is nothing “external” to the spontaneous order that lends it support or softens its 
rough edges. Sincere religious traditions, he believes, are no longer persuasive for historical 
reasons, and in the current era democracy tends toward illiberal policies.145 What Hayek really 
desires is a liberalism without supplements. There is no perspective outside of the liberal order 
from which we can pass judgment on it; this is the meaning of a liberal utopia as Hayek 
understands it and the real significance of Hayek’s apparently anodyne reflections on 
epistemology. “It is not the fruits of past successes,” he writes, “but the living in and for the 
future in which human intelligence justifies itself. Progress is movement for movement’s 
sake.”146 
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But, by definition, progress cannot merely be movement for movement’s sake, but 
requires some larger goal or vision to contextualize events, to allow them to hang together in 
a cumulative way; otherwise, what we have is not progress, but simply motion.  In the end, 
perhaps Hayek’s true dilemma is that he feels compelled to defend liberal civilization and to 
legitimize it during a time of instability, but the intensity of his skeptical view prevents him 
from making the sorts of normative arguments that might explain why liberalism is good for 
us, or to parse how it fits in comparison with other goods. When economic change threatens 
social stability or the integrity of political institutions, how do we weigh these competing 
needs? Hayek has almost nothing to say in this regard, beyond faith in markets and confidence 
in individual experimentation. However, it seems to me that democracy requires some form of 
public ethics because normative argumentation is required, not merely to defend notions like 
progress, but to achieve the popular consensus on values that Hayek thinks the survival of 
liberty requires.  
Lacking this, Hayek seeks to generate consensus around a utopian vision of the ideal 
liberal society. But even this utopia is somewhat disingenuous, because what it offers is not 
justice or reconciliation with an imperfect world, those hallmarks of the whole tradition of 
utopian thinking, but a radicalized version of really existing society. It appears doubtful that 
this image of the radiant tomorrow is enough to legitimate liberalism during periods of change 
and volatility, to pull the intellectual class away from romantic political philosophies, or to 
arbitrate disagreements between citizens who uphold alternative worldviews. The spontaneous 
order, with all the anxieties and uncertainties it generates, is therefore likely to remain 




More to the point, the broader tradition of Austrian liberalism has a disconcerting 
history of embracing authoritarian regimes in moments of crisis. Their hostility toward robust 
ethical theory, coupled with the certainty that rule-following individuals and markets are the 
only true source of value, has long made the Austrians ready to support strongmen of the Right. 
Hayek’s friend and mentor, Ludwig von Mises, wrote in his 1927 book Liberalism about the 
importance of Italian fascism: 
It cannot be denied that Fascism and similar movements aiming at the 
establishment of dictatorships are full of the best intentions and that their 
intervention has, for the moment, saved European civilization. The merit that 
Fascism has thereby won for itself will live on eternally in history. But though 
its policy has brought salvation for the moment, it is not of the kind which could 
promise continued success. Fascism was an emergency makeshift. To view it 
as something more would be a fatal error.147 
 
For Mises, fascism is the lesser of evils. Dictatorship may be necessary during critical 
interludes to sustain the basis of the market order. But who should judge when a crisis has 
reached a terminal moment that requires the services of a dictator? Moreover, doesn’t the 
propagation of a doctrine of “good” dictatorship make authoritarian rule more likely? Mises is 
unclear on these points. As a result, this ambivalent attitude toward authoritarianism remains 
a consistent problem for Austrian liberals. Six decades later, when asked to explain his 
favorable stance toward the regime of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet,148 Hayek was 
plainspoken:  
It is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible that 
a democracy governs with a total lack of liberalism. My preference is for a 
liberal dictator and not for a democratic government lacking in liberalism.149   
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Now, Hayek might seem to be raising legitimate questions about the dangers of illiberal 
democracy. Salvador Allende, whom Pinochet would overthrow, was elected to the Chilean 
presidency with a narrow plurality of 36%.150 Does such a modest electoral victory provide the 
sort of mandate that could legitimize a social transformation? Can any electoral majority justify 
the infringement of, say, property rights? What is preferable, illiberal democracy or 
undemocratic liberalism? These may be perfectly legitimate philosophical questions in some 
circumstances, even if considerations of such questions remain relatively underdeveloped in 
Hayek’s work.  
 The deeper problem is the facility, not to say eagerness, with which Hayek sometimes 
invents justifications for undemocratic practices.151 He sought a utopian vision of liberalism, 
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in part, to generate popular excitement for individualism and markets. But this liberalism 
threatens to tip back into an authoritarian regime of law and order if and when popular support 
is not forthcoming. The dangers inherent in the authoritarian undertones of Hayekian liberalism 
should be obvious for a century that promises to be a period of intense global inequality, 
expanding urban slums, and looming ecological catastrophe.  
8. From the Authentic Self, to Evolution, and Back   
Andrew Gamble’s Iron Cage of Liberty, a work that remains one of the more astute 
readings of Hayek from the Left, recognizes at once the key question raised by Hayek’s 
procrustean division of Western political thought into “true” and “false” traditions: if liberal 
individualism is clearly true, what accounts for the longevity and power of the rationalist and 
romanticist strains?  
If the problems of Western civilization are due to intellectual error, how has 
this error arisen?...rationalists have existed for at least as long as Hayek’s true 
liberals…but they show no signs of being sidelined…The source of his 
difficulty lies in his refusal to accept so much of the Western intellectual 
tradition as an authentic part of that tradition…[this is] one of the most 
significant ideological closures in his work.152 
 
Gamble asks the correct question. Is it not the case that Hayek merely attempts to eradicate, or 
at least delegitimate, ideas that he finds politically distasteful? Even sympathetic critics usually 
admit that he exaggerates the distance between the English and French Enlightenments; after 
all, Voltaire and Montesquieu were profuse in their admiration of the English.153 However, 
Gamble takes it as self-evident that Hayek simply has no explanation for the persistence of 
rationalism. This is not correct. Much of his later work, especially his final book, The Fatal 
Conceit, revolves around this very question. Hayek’s answer, in brief, is that the evolutionary 
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heritage of humanity has left us torn between two mutually incompatible ideals: a society based 
on intimate, interpersonal relations and the new world of dynamic spontaneity.154  
So, pace Gamble, Hayek is aware of at least some of the problems that stem from his 
divisive reading of the Western tradition. As with so much of Hayek’s thought, in the last 
instance his critique of rationalism and other radical “isms” boils down to a series of claims 
about sociocultural evolution. Evolutionary theory appears to offer a disinterested, scientific 
description of why the world looks the way it does, and it demarcates the realm of the possible, 
all while avoiding the pitfalls of rational philosophy, the odium theologicum of moral 
argumentation, and Rousseau’s romantic conceptions of freedom and the authentic self. Of 
course, this tidy solution is more complicated than it seems. Far from eliminating the sources 
of political radicalism, I argue that Hayek’s evolutionary turn allows them to enter quietly 
through the back door, but in order to see why this is the case we need to see how all the old 
issues re-emerge in his last work.  
In The Fatal Conceit, Hayek observes that Aristotle apparently believed an effective 
polity could extend only as far as a herald’s voice would reach.155 The scale of a social order 
was thus limited by modes of coordination that required the intimacy of physical proximity 
and the shared interpretations of the world that come with a common language. Hayek points 
out that the Hellenic world had long outgrown these restrictive conditions by Aristotle’s time 
and claims that the philosopher overlooks the obvious because he commits a common mistake: 
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Aristotle’s communitarian social thought is based on the conceptual apparatus that evolved 
during the era of “roving bands or troops in which the human race and its immediate ancestors 
evolved” over the course of a “few million years.”156 During that period the social order was 
based on circumscribed circles of trust and intimate knowledge of the needs of one’s 
companions. The drives that emerge from this massive span, such as the impulses to charity 
and group solidarity, are part of the biological heritage of humankind.157  
The context of contemporary life is profoundly different. Hayek starts from the 
observation that modern society is a tenuous order in which citizens often have virtually no 
knowledge of each other, and asks how this remarkable situation is possible. His answer is that 
only abstract rules of behavior – rules that govern general patterns of behavior for “typical” 
situations158 – can account for the existence of such complex societies. Only formal rules that 
dictate general behaviors toward unknown others allow for the emergence of an extended 
order. It is therefore culture – the evolved system of rules – that sustains the complexity of 
modern society, and not human nature or human reason.  
The spontaneous order is an extremely recent phenomenon relative to the whole course 
of human development. Hayek observes: 
The innate natural longings were appropriate to the condition of life of the small 
band during which man had developed the neural structure which is still 
characteristic of Homo sapiens. These innate structures built into man’s 
organization in the course of perhaps 50,000 generations were adapted to a 
wholly different life from that which he has made for himself during the last 
500, or, for most of us only 100 generations.159 
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In other words, the era of spontaneous order – the period of complex cultural development – 
comprises only about .02% of what Hayek considers to be the relevant time scale for social 
theory, even if we begin to date the rise of the spontaneous order from about 8,000 BC (roughly 
the period of the Neolithic Revolution).160 In turn, the period of liberalism, capitalism, or 
whatever one chooses to call our current situation, is only a small fraction of that 0.2% Our 
moment is one of extraordinary novelty.  
As Hayek’s thinking developed, he increasingly came to appreciate the many different 
types of evolutionary systems that interact.161 The idea of “the market” thus loses its special 
significance and becomes primus inter pares, just one of many nested systems that make up a 
cultural tradition, which itself is only one component of the evolved universe. Much like the 
market, law and language also coordinate individual behavior based on expectations embodied 
in rule governed systems. Following Popper’s conception of an open universe, Hayek even 
speculates that the basic components of the physical universe are composites that have evolved 
through time based on patterns or rules.162 This vision of the universe accounts for Hayek’s 
sense that the human predicament is defined by its participation in evolutionary systems over 
which conscious knowledge and control are hardly possible. “Man is not and never will be the 
master of his fate.”163  
Once the vistas of history are thus opened, Hayek increasingly comes to recognize the 
incredible fragility implied by his understanding of spontaneous order. The recent appearance 
and weak institutionalization of complex societies is only part of the problem.  Spontaneity 
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itself is at the heart of a fundamental conflict. Complex societies exist neither because of 
humanity’s political nature, as the ancients thought, nor because of the powers of rational 
thought, as many of the moderns believe. They emerge in the space of an “in between” zone 
of cultural evolution that has grown up through an experimental process of trial and error. But 
this experimental process is extremely painful to both instinct and reason. For instinct, 
spontaneity implies a wrenching away from accepted contexts and evolved moral feelings. For 
reason, the whole unintelligible process appears lawless and imperfect in the light of 
conceivable alternatives.  
It may not be readily apparent, but there is a pronounced irony in Hayek’s stance. In 
his attempt to eliminate rationalism and romanticism from the canon of thought, and in 
consequence to render socialist and nationalist offshoots literally unthinkable, Hayek comes to 
embrace a vision that, on the essential points, mirrors the thought of Rousseau, the writer at 
the fount of the radical traditions from which he desperately wants to escape.164 For both Hayek 
and Rousseau, humankind is torn between its original “natural” state and a radically new social 
formation with its own set of novel rules, rules that will demand from citizens a severe and 
disciplined fidelity. Their theories examine the origins of the rupture and the possibility of 
renewal, and only a historical narrative that surveys the whole evolution of social order is 
capable of providing political guidance in a situation in which the deep past has been 
irrevocably lost.  
Hayek’s disavowed and perhaps unrealized closeness to Rousseau is apparent when 
they are contrasted as a pair with more traditional liberals like Adam Smith and Tocqueville, 
thinkers Hayek typically cites as his key influences. Adam Smith believed that human nature, 
                                                   





in the form of the individual’s propensity to better his condition, to truck and barter, is the real 
foundation of a free society.165 Whatever institutional evolution subsequently occurs, nature 
continues to form the bedrock of social order. For Tocqueville, the key historical change is the 
institutional mutation from aristocracy to absolutist monarchy to democratic equality; again, 
there is a certain continuity of human nature that Tocqueville typically refers to as the soul.166 
This sense of natural continuity gives both Smith and Tocqueville a sense of reassurance and 
moderation when they suspect that modern society might be going off the rails.  There is less 
sense that desperate times call for desperate measures. As Mill put it, “If civilization has got 
the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be 
afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer 
civilization.”167 
By contrast, for Rousseau and Hayek, there is a rupture in history, a radical division 
between humanity’s natural past and its modern condition so profound that the old rules no 
longer apply. That they each seek the source of new rules in divergent ways is of less 
importance than the basic scenario of desperate groundlessness. An irrevocable change has 
taken place within humanity, and it is this internal shift that must be conquered. What Rousseau 
recognized as the distance between natural man and modern bourgeois, which Tönnies would 
– with some significant changes – formalize for social science in the distinction between 
communal Gemeinschaft and atomistic Gesellschaft,168 Hayek explains as the contradictory 
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legacy of two evolutionary moralities, a primordial communalism and a more modern ethic of 
individualism and spontaneity. As Ernest Gellner noticed, at this level the chief difference 
between the Rousseauians and Hayek is merely that Hayek abandons the attractions of 
community and opts for an idealization of atomistic Gesellschaft.169 
In the age of spontaneity, the human self is at the center of a conflagration in which 
contradictory impulses pull in two directions at once. Ironically, Hayek not only chooses to 
emphasize this point with a line from Goethe’s Faust, but also selects a passage that was close 
to the heart of that other master theorist of historical rupture, Karl Marx: 
Zwei Seelen whonen, ach, in meiner Brust 
Die eine will sich von der anderen trennen. 
 
(Two souls live in my breast,  
The one wants to separate from the other)170 
 
Marx uses this image in Das Kapital to describe the soul of a typical member of the bourgeoisie 
under capitalism, torn between the drive to invest for expanded accumulation and the desire to 
indulge in the pleasurable consumption that wealth makes possible.171  For Hayek, the passage 
expresses the split between humanity’s communal instincts and the need to submit to the “hard 
discipline” of the spontaneous order.172 These two readings of Faust may not be all that 
different. Both Hayek and Marx read the work as an allegory about the travails of 
modernization, and both point to the splits between gratification and necessity, nature and 
culture, pleasure and duty.173 
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Of course, many Marxists thought that this sad state of affairs could be remedied in a 
communist society in which the social instincts of man – who remains a zoon politikon through 
it all – would be remade on a new and higher level. Rousseau, too, seems to hope that the self-
involved bourgeois might, under appropriate circumstances, become the citoyen. The hope is 
that the divergence between duty and desire could be, if not eliminated, at least reconciled.174 
For Hayek, on the contrary, there can be no such reconciliation, no negation of the negation 
over the horizon to ease fissures within the soul; there is only fidelity to the spontaneous order 
or else a relapse into primitive poverty.175 For him, the split within the soul is never eliminated 
so much as it is repressed. This bleak picture, as Hayek himself observes, resembles the one 
Freud paints in Civilization and Its Discontents.176 Humanity is forced to choose which set of 
impulses to reject and which to embrace, even though the choice cannot be based on firm 
knowledge. For Hayek, in the end, we must choose liberal civilization as a bloc, with all that 
it entails, because we are already civilized. There is no alternative.   
Hayek’s thought continually undergoes a strange reversal: the logic of his own 
ostensibly scientific narrative of social evolution, prompted in part by the search for the 
objective foundations of a liberal society, repeatedly carries him right back to something that 
resembles the old romantic problem of how to craft the true and authentic self, now re-imagined 
as the heroically self-disciplined liberal citizen, willing to face the traumas of modernity with 
a stiff upper lip. The difference is that this time the authentic self is the endlessly dynamic 
inhabitant of the spontaneous order, rather than l’homme révolté. In his romantic demand for 
the construction of such a world – a whole social order composed of citizens at home in their 
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very homelessness – and his failure to grasp the magnitude of this task, we can see the 
existential roots of Hayek’s slide into authoritarianism.  
As Andre Górz has pointed out, the paradox of Hayek’s work is apparent in this 
disjuncture between science and romance.177 It contains one of the most rigorous and 
thoughtful attempts at understanding the contours of liberal society, but at the same time it 
manages quite openly to turn liberalism into the crusading political ideology that critics like 
Marx, Carl Schmitt, and Karl Polanyi always accused it of being. Indeed, perhaps this very 
dissonance accounts for some of his current allure. Frederic Jameson once remarked in passing 
that no one could persuade him to see glamour or romance in Hayek’s work,178 but this 
comment, typical of the Left’s dismissal of Hayek as a “reactionary,” fails to understand the 
source of his popular appeal.179 Górz was closer to the truth when he indicated that the “abyss” 
which separates Hayek’s social science from his romantic ideology produces a cognitive 
dissonance that, far from being unpleasant, is seductive precisely because it is politically 
versatile. With his tenuous combination of traditionalism and utopian futurity, knowledge and 
crusade, Hayek seems to be a man for all seasons. 
Despite his Marxist affinities, Górz would be the first to admit that Hayek’s social 
epistemology captures something vital about our current condition, and that it effectively 
undermines the classical, 19th century version of socialism.180 But this is not the whole story. 
He also worries that the afterimage of Hayekian skepticism seems to preclude any kind of 
political aspiration, as well as any conscious responsibility for the future. Hayek’s proscription 
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against social justice and his assertion that we do the most good for others only when we seek 
our own aims with our own knowledge creates an immense sense of relief. His agnostic 
insistence that there is no summum bonum to be sought removes a moral burden from our 
shoulders. The elitist rhetoric of Hayekian liberalism flatters the reader’s self-image with its 
message that only the disciplined, reasonable individual will truly understand the need to 
submit to the strictures of the market in order to flourish.181 The idea that everyday life – even 
in its most toilsome aspects – involves participation in endless novelty and creativity is 
instinctively attractive, while the notion that this order is fragile gives us the lure of something 
vital to protect.  
As an ideological trope, the idea of “spontaneous order” seems to reconcile a whole series 
of uneasy alternatives between which we would otherwise have to choose: self-certainty 
masquerades as skepticism; submission becomes autonomy; rigorous order becomes 
synonymous with the most profound creativity. In this way, through the ambiguous trope of 
spontaneous evolution, Hayek appears to spare us the burden of making the most difficult 
choices.182 Among his contemporary devotees, we witness an increasingly hyperbolic attempt 
to show that all values and political goals are fully compatible with a society based on markets 
and exchange. Thus, for example, the libertarian philosopher Jason Brennan has recently 
argued that individual choice within unconstrained markets provides the basis for “not just a 
utopia, but a meta-utopia in which you may choose the utopia that is best for you.”183  
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But the appeal to an image of social order in which all good things are possible is an illusion 
because, as Isaiah Berlin observed, politics in pluralistic societies is characterized by disputes 
between people who disagree about the ends of life, about what is valuable and how to seek 
it.184 To borrow another of Berlin’s metaphors, opening one door (unconstrained-markets) may 
simultaneously close others (security, stability, solidarity, equality, etc.).185 There is always a 
table of gains and losses. Like Berlin, I see no obvious way to avoid this dilemma, and doctrines 
which promise to supersede dissensus through the propagation of the one true doctrine risk 
exacerbating the underlying condition of disagreement.  
Consequently, the need to arbitrate disagreement and negotiate trade-offs between 
incommensurable goods (some examples of which might include the contrasting values of 
individual and community, freedom and authority, stability and progress, or economic growth 
and ecological sustainability) appears unavoidable. But Hayek leaves us no alternative to his 
stark vision of minimally restricted markets and continual social dislocation. He has virtually 
nothing to say about what happens when various political and economic values come into 
conflict, about what mutual obligations exist in complex societies, or even about the different 
kinds of markets that a society might adopt. And, if anything, Hayek’s free-market dogmatism 
only becomes more pronounced as his later works take on the trappings of a Darwinian 
evolutionary theory.  
When reading Hayek, I am often reminded of a short remark near the end of Democracy in 
America, in which Tocqueville, reflecting on the effects of changing economic circumstances, 
writes that: 
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When I see property become so mobile and the love of property so anxious 
and so ardent, I cannot prevent myself from fearing that men will arrive at 
the point of looking on every new theory as a peril, every innovation as a 
distressing trouble, every social progress as a first step towards revolution, 
and that they will altogether refuse to move for fear that they will be carried 
away.186   
 
Tocqueville’s anxiety is well founded. Today Hayekian themes of spontaneity, the sanctity of 
choice and property, and the limits of epistemology are frequently used to close off debate and 
to restrict the boundaries of thought.187 Did it have to turn out this way? I am not sure that it 
did. There are certain moments when we can sense intimations of other possibilities in Hayek’s 
work, passages when he seems to recognize that new lines of inquiry might be needed that 
would complicate his understanding of self-regulating markets. His current advocates often 
overlook these reflections, meager though they are. For example, in The Road to Serfdom, he 
writes: 
Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist…individuals in 
providing for those common hazards of life against which, because of their 
uncertainty, few individuals can make precautions…[W]here, in short, we 
deal with genuinely insurable risks, the case for the states helping to 
organize a comprehensive system of social insurance is very strong…there 
is no incompatibility in principle between the state’s providing greater 
security in this way and the preservation of individual freedom.188 
 
In The Constitution of Liberty, he reiterates the same point in even stronger language: 
The amount of relief now given in a comparatively wealthy society should 
be more than is absolutely necessary to keep [citizens] alive and in 
health….Once it becomes the recognized duty of the public to provide for 
the extreme needs of old age, unemployment, sickness…it seems an 
obvious corollary to compel [citizens] to insure against the common hazards 
of life.189 
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These lines come from the middle period of Hayek’s career, after he abandoned formal 
economics but before he embraced an evolutionary account of human history. Here all the 
issues of obligation, social stability, and political power that he tried to foreclose with a theory 
of impersonal economic processes threaten to creep back into his philosophy. But he never 
follows these leads, and the dominant trend of his thought is to preclude examinations that 
point in this direction.  
As a result, whatever his contribution to the disciplines of economics and social science, 
as a style of popular rhetoric Hayekian liberalism is inherently utopian – just as Hayek 
intended, but in ways that he did not fully appreciate. In a crisis, the most dogmatic and least 
democratic tendencies of his doctrine threaten to bubble to the surface. And, we should ask, at 


























Transformation, Theodicy, Tragedy: Karl Polanyi and the Experience of 
Economics 
 
“For many years the memory of those bleak months haunted me. I could not rid 
myself of the idea that by some weird chance I had possessed myself of Hamlet’s 
secret. I knew why he did not kill the King. I knew what it was he feared…In its 
turn [this knowledge] faded into a mere intellectual understanding. I…could 
only faintly remember what once had formed part of my being: Hamlet’s 
inhuman suffering.”  
– Karl Polanyi1  
 
“The form in which the nascent reality came to our consciousness was political 
economy. Its amazing regularities and stunning contradictions had to be fitted 
into the scheme of philosophy and theology in order to be assimilated to human 
meanings.” 
– Karl Polanyi2   
 
 
1. Economics as Ethics 
The work of the Hungarian social theorist and economic historian Karl Polanyi has 
gained renewed prominence since the financial crisis of 2008. As Gareth Dale notes, Polanyi 
is now one of the most cited figures in the social sciences.3 The Great Transformation (1944), 
his classic book on the socially embedded nature of markets and the costs of free-market 
utopianism, appears increasingly prescient after several decades of neoliberalism, crisis, and 
backlash. Nevertheless, the urge to read Polanyi in the light of current political crises has meant 
that the breadth of his thought is sometimes underappreciated.  
Like Aristotle and Rousseau, two philosophers whom he read with special care, Polanyi 
is at heart an ethicist. With Aristotle, he wonders about human flourishing and the institutional 
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context that supports a life well lived.4 Like Rousseau, he asks, “How can we be free, in spite 
of the fact of society?”5 This Rousseauian question encapsulates for him the central dilemma 
of modern politics because Polanyi sees the failure of modernity to arrive at a viable 
understanding of freedom as one source of the extreme ideologies that have wreaked havoc on 
politics and society over the past several centuries.6 What he calls free-market utopianism is 
linked to fascism and communism through a common failure to understand freedom that is 
itself a kind of moral blindness.7   
Polanyi responds to the problem of freedom in modernity by crafting a novel ethical 
vision, at the heart of which is a tragic existential sensibility that acknowledges both the reality 
of society and the unique claims of the individual. Crucially, however, such acknowledgement 
remains sensitive to the irreducible gap between self and society and stops short of a call for 
full reconciliation, the desire for which is responsible for much of the volatility he finds in 
recent conceptions of freedom. This means that, unlike many liberal individualists, he does not 
envision society as a seamless extension of individual choice. It also means that, contra 
Rousseau and the communitarians who remain within his orbit, Polanyi abandons the search 
for a polity that, in the words of William E. Connolly, harmonizes citizen and society through 
a politics of civic virtue.8 Finally, he insists that theories of society based around the idea of 
impersonal order – such as the neoliberal theory of self-regulating markets9 – exacerbate the 
tension between self and society by losing sight of individual citizens and their concerns.  
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Instead, Polanyi negotiates these longstanding tensions by seeking to change the 
attachments and expectations that animate the utopian desire for reconciliation. He does this 
in part by merging an understanding of freedom and finitude that he draws from Christianity 
with his reading of certain tragic themes from Shakespeare. These views permeate his writings, 
and therefore, as I read him, the economic history that Polanyi presents in The Great 
Transformation is fully intelligible only after his views on freedom, tragedy, and mortality are 
taken into account. I also take seriously his claim to be providing an historical “genealogy.”10 
This means, inter alia, that like the Nietzsche of On the Genealogy of Morals, Polanyi attempts 
to give an account of the psychological drives that buttress institutions and motivate ideational 
change.11 Utopian liberalism for Polanyi functions like a symptom: it emerges with shocking 
force in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and he attempts to discover the underlying source 
of the disruption in mutating patterns of thought and belief.  
This chapter seeks to explore the interrelationship between Polanyi’s political economy 
and his existential sensibility. I do this in two phases. First, I briefly examine his call for an 
interpretive or, as he calls it, a “substantive” approach to social science. In essence, Polanyi 
believes that only an interpretive approach to the study of society can simultaneously 
understand social processes and create a theoretical basis for responsible political action. I 
show how this sensibility relates to The Great Transformation and demonstrate how Polanyi’s 
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work can be situated alongside Nietzsche’s genealogy and Max Weber’s sociology of religious 
life.  
The second phase constitutes the core of the chapter. I argue that Polanyi provides us 
with a genealogy of economics, that is, a historical reconstruction of the discipline designed to 
show how deeply the utopian temptation has become embedded in the study of economics. In 
brief, he claims that the failure to understand forms of mass poverty that arrive with industrial 
capitalism leads to a cycle of utopian political projects that have one thing in common: they 
attempt to locate solutions to some of the most fundamental problems of human existence, 
from suffering to questions of freedom and obligation, in economic explanations of production 
and exchange.  
Finally, in the conclusion, I examine Polanyi’s tragic vision as an alternative 
disposition toward modern political and economic crises, one that provides a framework for 
reform but resists the urge toward utopian solutions. I contrast his reading of Hamlet to Marx’s 
use of Shakespeare, and argue that, for Polanyi, tragedy revolves around the attempt to 
acknowledge openly the irreducible elements of autonomy (democracy, individual freedom) 











2. Market Utopianism and Polanyi’s Critique of Formalism 
Polanyi was a constant advocate throughout his life for what he called a “substantive” 
reconstruction of social theory, as opposed to what he considered the overly “formal” or 
external approach that he saw infecting a range of disciplines.12 Formalism, as Polanyi 
conceives it, embraces a methodology akin to Newtonian natural science: impersonal, value 
neutral, and ahistorical. In the early 20th century, this style of thinking was prominent in 
Germany and Central Europe, where a diverse set of neo-Kantian thinkers were producing 
creative work across the philosophy of science and the social sciences. In social science, for 
example, the influence of neo-Kantian formalism can be seen in the work of such luminaries 
as Georg Simmel and, to some degree, Max Weber, with their varied attempts to craft 
definitions and value-free descriptions of the basic modes of social experience.13  
More importantly, a strain of neo-Kantianism also served to underpin the classical 
liberal approach to economics associated with Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises, members 
of what is known today as the “Austrian School” of economics and forerunners of 
contemporary neoliberalism.14 According to Lawrence H. White, “[As] a neo-Kantian, [Mises] 
denied the possibility of arriving at laws by induction and defended the possibility of a purely a 
priori system of economic theory which he labeled ‘praxeology.’ ”15 On this view, a cleanly 
demarcated sphere of social interaction called “the economy” just is its own foundation (or 
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rather, has its foundation in a priori rules of human action).16 Robert Heilbroner was therefore 
speaking literally when he coined the term “transcendental capitalism” to describe such 
theories.17  
Polanyi suggests that the urge to discover unchanging, impersonal laws of social order 
– a desire he locates at the heart of the Austrian free-market project – is the utopian temptation 
par excellence.18 As Ira Katznelson has observed, these concerns place him in the company of 
a number of writers during and after the Second World War who share a common attempt to 
discover the intellectual foundations of modern political extremism.19 However, Polanyi was 
one of the few to trace the source of the disruption back to the theory of self-regulating markets. 
Consider for a moment Isaiah Berlin’s characterization of modern utopianism: 
Utopias…are static. Nothing in them alters, for they have reached perfection: 
there is no need for novelty or change….The assumption on which this is based 
is that men have a certain fixed, unfaltering nature, certain universal, common, 
immutable goals….The very idea of universal fulfillment presupposes that 
human beings as such seek essential goals, identical for all, at all times, 
everywhere.20 
 
Berlin’s understanding of utopia, although it is quite similar to Polanyi’s, is often mobilized 
against leftists and other reformers who call for any significant reorganization of society. But, 
as Fred Block and Margaret Somers point out, Polanyi turns the rhetorical tables by arguing 
that neoliberal advocates of unrestrained markets are the true utopians because they long to 
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discover a universal behavioral structure, reinforced by the political and legal order, to which 
all citizens must conform. He argues that much of the turmoil of 20th century politics results 
from an escalating cycle of failed attempts to realize programs of impersonal economic order.   
Whereas Polanyi is essentially a humanist who approaches politics via a conception of 
the mutual obligations that underpin human flourishing, von Mises views politics as derivative 
from the impersonal order of self-regulating markets.21 This means that, for von Mises, a social 
scientific theory of what is natural or politically possible limits in advance the claims that can 
be made on behalf of ethics. However – and this is the point of Polanyi’s critique – impersonal 
theories fail to take account of the experiences of human agents and are therefore deeply 
misleading. Because they lose sight of the variety of human motivations and the complexity of 
social interaction, impersonal theories often oversimplify political life and minimize the trade-
offs it entails. Moreover, such theories tend to overlook impending crises until they can no 
longer be ignored; one reason for this is that without some recourse to the real experiences of 
citizens and communities, it is difficult to fully evaluate the consequences of policies or gauge 
likely reactions to social change.22 By closing itself off from dissenting voices, impersonal 
theory too easily becomes locked in a blind loop of self-justification.  
For example, one contemporary libertarian, the economist Bryan Caplan, argues that 
free-market economics provides true knowledge about the world that all rational and non-
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biased citizens should agree upon.23 One of his favorite examples of the gap that separates 
expert opinion from the distorted views of the public has to do with protectionism. Since free-
market economics supposedly shows that regulations designed to protect domestic industries 
are inefficient compared to the gains from trade, Caplan reasons, the many citizens who 
support protectionist measures must be biased, ignorant, or irrational.24 The goal, then, should 
be to place such decisions in the hands of knowledgeable economic experts and to minimize 
the amount of popular input, which is likely to be misinformed.25 However, beyond the 
contestable nature of the theory itself, Caplan fails to appreciate that the complexity of society 
means clear-cut outcomes are rare, trade-offs are often unavoidable, and experts with deep 
knowledge of a single field are not always well positioned to understand the other factors that 
affect a given situation. Consider the example of a somewhat inefficient steel mill. Even if we 
accept that a tariff designed to protect the mill is inefficient, there may be other variables to 
consider. Perhaps the well-being of this community is an important value in its own right, 
worthy of protecting even at the cost of minor losses in efficiency. Maybe the loss of good jobs 
will have unanticipated consequences, such as a long-term local recession, social dislocation, 
or an epidemic of crime and drug abuse. Alternatively, it may be the case that the loss of a 
domestic steel supplier represents a strategic vulnerability from the perspective of national 
defense. Finally, maybe Caplan is correct and the gains to efficiency outweigh other 
considerations in this instance. It seems likely that no single theory exists that can provide an 
Archimedean point from which to evaluate these incommensurable goals.  
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The preceding argument illustrates some of the epistemological shortcomings of 
formalistic theories. But Polanyi also offers a critique of formalism that revolves around 
questions of ontology, or, to put it more simply, questions about the fundamental composition 
of the world. He argues that, whereas impersonal theories such as free-market liberalism often 
envision society as an harmonious order of steady growth and evolution,26 the world is in fact 
much more volatile: contingent events periodically act as “shocks to the system,” creating 
moments of unexpected novelty when radical change arrives in punctuated bursts.27 The 
problem is that, because impersonal theories tend to focus on a set of established variables or 
principles, they often overlook the initial signs of change or fail to appreciate the full 
significance of emerging trends. In the 1940s, for example, Polanyi claimed that liberals had 
yet to grasp the magnitude of ecological change underway as a result of the Industrial 
Revolution and the advent of international markets. Climate change, deforestation, and soil 
erosion were emergent forces that had the capacity to upend everything from established 
methods of agriculture to patterns of democratic politics, and yet orthodox economic thought 
largely ignored the impact of these phenomena for decades because they seemed to involve 
something other than the analysis of markets.28 Greater sensitivity to the unexpected allows 
one to be more attuned to the possibility of radical change; however, this requires a more 
complicated and precarious vision of the world than formalistic theory usually allows.   
Because it often engenders the illusion of value-free objectivity and a sense of self-
certainty, the theory of free-markets can degenerate into a utopian ideology, dogmatically held 
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and blindly pursued. This ideology, Polanyi charges, has provided Western governments over 
the last two centuries with reasons to ignore the claims and protestations of citizens during 
periods of rapid change; the result has been moments of popular reaction against the volatility 
that often accompanies markets.29  
His charge that economic liberalism harbors a utopian urge looks increasingly 
persuasive as time goes on. One measure of this is the way that writers whose political 
allegiances differ have come to accept a viewpoint that Polanyi pioneered.  For example, the 
late Robert Conquest, a conservative historian and Thatcherite who cannot be dismissed as 
temperamentally hostile to capitalism, arrives at a reading of the past few centuries that largely 
confirms Polanyi’s critique. In his book Reflections on a Ravaged Century, Conquest observes 
that “advocates of free-market industrialization” in late 18th century England were fascinated 
by the same sort of abstract social theory and “excess ideation” that would fuel fascism and 
Soviet communism in later centuries. “An extreme anti-regulatory theory was widely held and 
inflicted,” he says, at the cost of many lives and much avoidable suffering, until a reform 
coalition pushed a package of regulations through Parliament.30 This sounds remarkably 
similar to the history recounted in The Great Transformation.  
  The intent of Polanyi’s critique is therefore twofold. First, it aims to show how 
formalism in social science is often allied to anti-democratic political projects. At stake in this 
methodological argument is an academic question about the possibility of discovering 
economic laws a priori, seen in separation from history and institutions. Second, his advocacy 
for an interpretive method is one aspect of a broader project to explicate a social theory that 
retains space for meaning, democratic politics, and cooperative decision making. 
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For this reason, the call for a substantive approach to the study of society is a theme 
that reoccurs throughout his books and essays.31 He believed that the way agents feel about 
and understand their lives has the power to inflect social processes in new directions because 
experience is a crucial component in what an event is.32 With this focus on lived experience, 
Polanyi draws upon a phenomenological and existential current of thought that also circulated 
through the German speaking world in the early 20th century, due in large part to the legacy of 
philosophers such as Nietzsche and Diltehy.33 (His brother, the philosopher of science, Michael 
Polanyi, stressed similar themes of the personal and tacit character of scientific research.)34  
This substantive sensibility forms the backbone of a criticism that Polanyi applies to 
utilitarianism in ethics, Marxism and liberalism in economics, and positivism in physical 
science.35 For him, each of these distinct schools of thought shows a disturbing tendency to 
overlook the reality of human experience. As a result, they seem to preclude any creative role 
for human agency, making social processes look highly deterministic and leaving little 
conceptual space for freedom or responsibility. In short, epistemology has political 
consequences. The danger is that by helping to give their respective subject matters a veneer 
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of unassailable objectivity and necessity, formalistic theories engender an ethos of fatalism and 
empower experts at the expense of democratic forms of decision making.36 By contrast, 
Polanyi’s writings strive to understand society from the viewpoint of actors themselves, with 
the effect that their responses, beliefs, and reactions become integral aspects of events.37 On 
this view, individuals are embedded in broader meanings and shifting normative contexts that 
set the contours of human action. The result is that the goal of an improved theory of society, 
organized around the concept of experience, and the possibility of a more democratic ethos 
find renewed compatibility in Polanyi’s work.  
3. The Great Transformation: The Need for a Tragic Interpretation  
The broad strokes of Polanyi’s argument are well known. He traces the theory of self-
regulating markets to its origin in 18th century England, where a diverse group of writers and 
intellectuals were struggling to understand the social dislocation brought on by 
industrialization.38 He argues that the impact of new machines, moving in an endless cycle of 
repetitive motions, combines with the naturalistic perspective of the emerging biological 
sciences to create fertile ground for thinking about self-regulating systems.39 It is no 
coincidence, he suggests, that many of the innovators behind theories of economic self-
regulation – Mandeville, Quesnay, and Joseph Townsend – had extensive medical training.40 
In their eye’s, the economy will become something like a bodily organ, and the organ 
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something like a machine, characterized by simple laws that operate with impersonal 
regularity. As this crude naturalism gains prominence, it displaces the older view of the 
economy as a set of moral relationships and obligations.41  
It is one of the virtues of Polanyi’s interpretative method that it allows us to trace the 
process through which changing social conditions become intertwined with new modes of 
thought and belief. He provides vivid descriptions of the way that early industrialism created 
unemployment, idleness, and social dislocation on an unprecedented scale. Much like the 
suffering of Job, mass poverty was all the more shocking because it seemed to lack a place 
within the accepted moral scheme. Traditional natural law conceptions of the economy allowed 
for the centrality of labor, even as they stressed the obligation of the wealthy to aid those in 
need.42 These ideas fit into a broad conception of Christian charity which, if it was not always 
followed closely, nevertheless commanded wide allegiance. At this moment in time, however, 
long-held beliefs were breaking down in the midst of growing numbers of able-bodied workers 
without any visible means of employment, coupled with the emergence of a class of profit-
seeking entrepreneurs. “Neither the new wealth nor the new poverty was quite 
comprehensible.”43 For all these reasons, the last quarter of the 18th century was a fertile and 
uncertain moment, ripe for new ideas.44  
Even before justice can be sought, suffering itself must be made intelligible and given 
a meaning that can serve as a basis for redress.45 As George Steiner observes, “Job the Edomite 
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does not cry out for justice…Job the Edomite cries out for sense…He demands that God make 
sense of himself.”46 Similarly, Polanyi notes that making sense of the question “Where do the 
poor come from?” became an overriding preoccupation of intellectual life during the industrial 
age.47 This question fused into a single economic problem both the need for understanding and 
the widespread anxiety in the face of social upheaval. Like “theological questions,” he 
declares, “[v]iews on the poor mirrored more and more views on existence as a whole.”48 The 
problem was: how to make suffering intelligible, and therefore manageable and livable? These 
two components – the nascent idea of self-regulation and the quasi-theological demand that 
industrial poverty be made intelligible – merge to produce a potent new political discourse: 
utopian liberalism.49 Polanyi therefore suggests that the theory of self-regulating markets is 
best understood as an answer to an existential need,50 rather than as a discovery of economic 
laws that had been there all along.51  
The sociologist Anthony Giddens has pointed to a process that he calls the “double 
hermeneutic,” whereby social theories, once they are popularized and widely dispersed, alter 
the behavior of the very agents they intend to study, thereby leading to surprising outcomes 
that exceed the boundaries of the initial theory.52 Similarly, Polanyi shows that the theory of 
impersonal markets opened a novel rhetorical space that justified new kinds of political action. 
Above all, the new discourse paved the way for the liberal projects of the 19th and 20th centuries 
that used the power of the state to expand and support international markets.53 Land, labor, and 
                                                   
46 Steiner, George, Grammars of Creation, Faber and Faber, 2001, 36. 
47 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation, 94. 
48 Ibid., 110. 
49 Ibid., 141-58. 
50 Block, Fred L., and Margaret R. Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi's Critique, 
Harvard, 2014, 89-90. 
51 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation, Ch. 10. “Political Economy and the Discovery of Society.” 
52 Giddens, Anthony, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford, 1990, 15. 




money – what Polanyi calls “fictitious commodities”– were drawn by the state into markets, 
first national and then international.54 As we have already observed, Polanyi views this project 
as a utopian undertaking that wreaks devastation on the moral foundation of societies and the 
environment.55 Eventually, widespread destruction calls forth a protective “double 
movement,” a collective response through which society attempts to recapture the state and its 
institutions in order to secure protection from the ravages of the market.56 During the 20th 
century the double movement takes two primary forms: social democracy and fascism.57 
Polanyi ends The Great Transformation with a call for the renewal of social democracy and 
the rejection of utopian creeds.  
Although this short summary of Polanyi’s argument is mostly conventional, it is 
important to point out how a tragic reading differs from what I call the “orthodox” reading of 
The Great Transformation. Too many current interpretations of Polanyi focus on his 
institutional theory or his historical narrative to the exclusion of all else.58 The result is that 
Polanyi’s account of the psychology of social change is sometimes overlooked and key 
arguments are therefore apt to be misunderstood. For example, the orthodox reading tends to 
see the rise of free market thinking as a simple mistake or an ideology in the service of an elite 
political project.59 This manner of thinking insinuates that, once Polanyi and others have 
demystified free-market utopianism and shown it to be an impossible political ideal, the liberal 
                                                   
54 Ibid., 75-6. 
55 “Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social 
exposure…Nature would be reduced to its elements.” Ibid., 77.  
56 Ibid., 79. 
57 “Fascism, like socialism, was rooted in a market society that refused to function.” Ibid., 248. 
58 A quick review of the secondary literature on Polanyi will show that the bulk of it is concerned with his 
institutional theory and the idea that the market is “embedded” in society. For representative examples, see 
Gemici, Kurtulus, "Karl Polanyi and the Antinomies of Embeddedness," Socio-Economic Review 6.1 (2008): 5-
33; Cangiani, Michele. "Karl Polanyi's Institutional Theory: Market Society and Its "Disembedded" Economy," 
Journal of Economic Issues 45.1 (2011): 177-98. 




project should simply wither away. It therefore comes as something of a shock when free-
market liberalism refuses to go quietly into the night. However, Polanyi does not describe such 
liberal utopianism as an “ideology” but as a “creed.”60 The difference is enormous. By insisting 
on the deep human need to make suffering intelligible, Polanyi also offers an explanation for 
the desire to believe that makes liberal utopianism attractive in the first place. It is not enough 
to simply debunk laissez-faire economic theory. One must also foment a new sensibility that 
enables alternative schemes for coping with the problem of suffering. To renew politics, one 
must reconcile, as he puts it, “knowledge of death, knowledge of freedom, [and] knowledge of 
society.”61 Hence his detailed reflections on tragedy and religion. 
Another common reading tends to see Polanyi merely as one more critic of capitalism.62 
On this view, the social ills described in The Great Transformation stem from capitalism as a 
mode of production and exchange, and the implicit assumption is that Polanyi points the way 
towards a post-capitalist society in which these problems will be transcended. Polanyi 
becomes, on this interpretation, a sort of ersatz Marx.63 This reading is not false so much as it 
is incomplete. “What appears to be a problem of capitalism,” Polanyi once wrote, “is in reality 
the far greater problem of industrial civilization.”64 For him, it is part of the tragedy of 
contemporary life that even after the destructive tendencies of capitalism and free-market 
radicalism have been overcome, humanity remains bound up in the more profound process of 
industrialism. The tensions inherent in the need to balance individual freedom and the reality 
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of society – a dilemma that was also at the heart of Rousseau’s thought – remain after free-
market utopianism has been abolished. 
This is all to say that several prominent views of Polanyi err because they fail to take 
seriously his tragic vision of the human predicament as embedded in a complex world, a world 
of real suffering that is inherently beyond our ability to master.65 The temptation is always to 
reduce Polanyi to an empirical social scientist, but his intentions go deeper than that. In order 
to make a tragic conception more intelligible vis-à-vis economics, it is instructive to see how 
Polanyi’s project has precedents in the works of Nietzsche and Weber. 
4. Precursors: Nietzsche, Weber, and the Theology of Economic Life 
Polanyi’s intellectual influences are eclectic. However, for our purposes, coming to 
terms with the influence of Max Weber is indispensable. That Polanyi was concerned to take 
account of Weber is no secret.66 His ideas, for instance, on the role of the state in the expansion 
of markets are presaged in Weber.67 “For economic anthropology,” Polanyi once observed, 
“no [other discipline] is more relevant than the sociological approach…rather along the lines 
of Weber.”68 As Block and Somers observe, Polanyi’s work builds on Weberian social science 
in the way that it examines “different social arrangements that generate different belief systems 
with different structural possibilities.”69  
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Weber is reported to have once remarked that the measure of a thinker is their ability 
to grapple with the best insights of Marx and Nietzsche.70 Whether such a delicate synthesis 
can actually be accomplished is a troublesome question in its own right, but it is reasonably 
clear how Weber interpreted the task. Simply put, he sought to find a connection between 
economic and historical development and the various forms of religious and otherworldly 
attachments that Nietzsche calls “metaphysical faiths.”71 
Nietzsche believed that to understand human action the philosopher must do more than 
just probe the reasons agents give.72 If one accepts that life – and its immense array of 
subconscious biological systems – is a precondition for thought, self-consciousness loses some 
of the priority that modern philosophy often accords it.73 Reason tends to arrive – as Marx 
might say – post festum, and not uncommonly in the form of rationalizations for actions that 
have already taken place. Instead, one must understand the historical and existential source of 
the attachments and desires that motivate agents, or what Nietzsche sometimes referred to as a 
“metaphysical need.”74 The philosopher must read thought in the service of life,75 attuned to 
the ways that thinking is oriented by an array of biological and psychological drives.76  
To varying degrees, these drives are obscured from consciousness.77 For example, the 
way that resentment can infiltrate a religion of universal love may not be transparent, either to 
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believers themselves or to an interpreter who takes their self-justifications at face value. The 
meaning of the religious act must be interpreted if it is to be understood; that is, the desire or 
need that the belief addresses must be excavated and contextualized. Belief in a given doctrine 
takes on different modalities depending on whether it is driven by anxiety, the need to belong, 
or an impassioned faith. This same dynamic holds for other activities. Nietzsche claims that 
academic and scientific pursuits are often characterized by a will-to-know that is both a demand 
that the universe be made intelligible and a belief that an intelligible structure is indeed 
accessible in principle, generally using tools that the researcher already commands (empirical 
science, mathematics, critical philosophy, etc.).78 The scientific enterprise (at least as it existed 
in the 19th century) only becomes possible given an essentially theological faith that the 
universe has an intelligible structure that also happens to be amenable to the powers of the 
human mind. This is why even a dogmatic positivist like Comte wrote that a metaphysical 
religion is a necessary prerequisite for science.79 It is the faith that makes inquiry reasonable 
in the first place. The difference is that, whereas the positivist thinks the erroneous faith falls 
away once the facts have been discovered, Nietzsche believes that some faith or other always 
sustains and motivates knowledge. 
The presupposition that the universe has a given form, composition, or meaning is, for 
Nietzsche, virtually the definition of a theology. Weber adopts much the same conception.80 
The crucial point to note is that theology is defined not simply by its reference (e.g. to the 
transcendent, to God, the Absolute, etc.) but rather by its function as a tissue of presuppositions 
and attachments that serve to unify and give value to human experience. Even after explicit 
                                                   
78 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, 1974, p. 287-8. 
79 Comte, Auguste, Introduction to Positive Philosophy, Ed. Frederick Ferré, Hackett, 1988. 
80 Weber, Max, “Science as a Vocation,” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright 




reliance on religious premises declines (after “the death of God”) the theological function turns 
up in disparate modes of thought – from science to economic doctrines – that claim to provide 
an account of the most basic structures of the world.81 The task of the Nietzschean 
psychologist, then, is to probe the ways thought and action remain animated by what are 
essentially theological presuppositions and to trace the consequences of different metaphysical 
faiths. (Of course, this activity is further complicated, as Nietzsche knew, by the fact that the 
genealogist also brings a faith to bear on such interpretations.) 
Weber’s most famous attempt at marrying a Nietzschean psychology of drives to 
Marx’s interest in the dynamics of historical development is found in his book The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.82 Weber argues that trends in Reformed Christianity, 
particularly Calvinism, created a tremendous psychological anxiety in believers. Calvinist 
theology, which insists upon strict pre-determination and salvation for only the elect, seems to 
place the soul of believers in a state of total dependence on the mysterious grace of God, 
leading to a situation in which the status of one’s salvation is constantly open to doubt.83 
Weber claims that the situation of existential limbo Calvinism produced was inherently 
unsustainable. Ordinary believers were compelled to flee doubt and seek more reliable 
indications of salvation. For many Protestants, such signs of salvation come increasingly to be 
identified with success in their worldly occupation or “calling.”84 That is, success in business 
becomes one indication of salvation, giving believers a reason to be especially diligent in their 
business concerns.85 The Protestant ethic of self-denial, moderation, and rational calculation is 
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precisely the set of traits required for success in an economic calling, particularly during the 
early stages of capitalist accumulation. The Bible had advised Christians not to store up 
treasures here on earth, but to store them up in heaven (Matthew 16: 19-20). For the new 
Protestant strain, the old impetus is reversed and earthly treasures come to reinforce heavenly 
aspirations. Once the new capitalist system is in place, it runs by itself, freed from its older 
subjective moorings. It presents itself to contemporary individuals as “an unalterable order of 
things.”86 
The details of Weber’s view of the protestant ethic and the many criticisms of his theory 
need not detain us here.87 Weber is important because he plausibly connects how forms of 
economic thought and action resonate to existential belief, attachment, and anxiety.  
However, there are two additional points about Weber’s theory that I would like to 
stress because they relate closely to my reading of Polanyi. First, the Protestant Ethic was 
simply the inaugural study of Weber’s examination of the great salvation religions that erupted 
into history during what has come to be called, following Karl Jaspers, the Axial Age (800 – 
200 B.C.).88 Weber has book length studies of Judaism, as well as of the religions of China and 
India.89 (Strangely, he has comparatively little to say about Islam.) He finds that each salvation 
faith manages to institute a more or less rigorous theological systematization in the face of the 
existing blend of amorphous, local polytheisms. Again, we see that theology in Weber’s sense 
implies the structuring of world and cosmic intelligibility. More importantly, the salvation 
faiths all attempt to formulate an explicit theodicy (a justification of evil or extreme undeserved 
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suffering that is broadly accepted) in response to what Weber calls the fundamental tragedy of 
life,90 which he variously characterizes as the dense intertwining of good and evil in human 
experience91 or the “brute fact” of suffering.92  
Weber shows that systematic justifications of human suffering seem to proliferate after 
a certain degree of social complexity has been reached. Perhaps large societies require a more 
explicit method of legitimation.93 Maybe the exigencies of food storage or the rise of literacy 
push cultures to speculate on the collective fate of societies in more comprehensive ways.94 
Regardless of the precise cause, the point is that the rise of religious theodicies is a global 
phenomenon, not something unusual about “the West.”95 It is not something “the West” got 
“right” or “wrong.” The existential need for a theodicy of some sort is not something that can 
be easily banished or brushed aside.96 
But if theodicy is a global phenomenon, this should raise the question of why 
Protestantism supposedly developed such close affinities with European capitalism, and herein 
lies a second aspect of Weber’s argument. The Protestant ethic is able to grow and spread 
precisely because of the unique role of city life in Europe.97 While urban areas around the 
world typically remained subjugated to larger state or imperial powers, cities in Europe were 
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able to attain a modicum of independence, for reasons that range from its fractured geography 
to the divide between the universal church and a feudal patchwork of local rulers.98 By way of 
contrast, urban settlement in the Islamic world was characterized by more restrictive kinds of 
property rights and remained highly vulnerable to nomadic raiders, two facts that may have 
sent Islamic commercial life on a different and less expansive trajectory.99 For all these 
reasons, it was in European cities that new modes of commercial activity began to take shape, 
craftsmen of various sorts clustered together, the notion of equality and self-governance began 
to assume a political valence, a status group of lawyers and jurists arose, and individuals began 
to peel away from kinship ties.100 It is not a coincidence that Luther’s father was an ambitious 
burgher who sent his son to law school.101 The point of departure for Protestant theology was, 
according to Weber, “This context…of the political problems engendered by the bourgeois 
status-group of the city.”102  
If one ignores this political context, Weber’s theory may seem like a case of 
straightforward “idealism.” But in fact he views the emergence of Protestantism as a response 
to specific social strains and political struggles. The style of economic thought Weber 
highlights in The Protestant Work Ethic, characterized by self-discipline and adherence to 
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impersonal rules, arises out of interactions between the urban milieu, commerce, and existing 
theological schemes. As we will see, Polanyi points to a similar origin for economic liberalism. 
However, Weber’s thought undergoes a peculiar twist by the time it reaches 
contemporary Europe. Once the edifice of capitalism is in place and supported by powerful 
state bureaucracies, modernity for Weber runs largely on autopilot. This is the meaning of 
Weber’s depiction of modernity as an “iron cage.”103 The subjective experiences of individual 
actors lose the causal influence that had made The Protestant Ethic so compelling. Instead, 
interlocking bureaucracies and structures of power now appear to dominate a regimented social 
order. Modernity is “disenchanted.”104 In the end, social life becomes so constricted in Weber’s 
view that he finds little room for individuality or political action in any meaningful sense. He 
is, as Wolfgang Mommsen said, “a liberal in despair.”105  
According to Anthony Giddens, Weber’s profound influence meant that his conception 
of a systematic, rationalized modernity became the guiding framework for much of 20th century 
social science, while the project of interpreting subjective and intersubjective experience was 
hived off into anthropology departments.106 It is not a coincidence, then, that for a few decades 
Polanyi’s influence was felt most dramatically in the field of anthropology,107 because his 
critique of utopian liberalism aims to bring the “irrational” role of ideas and faith back into an 
analysis of the contemporary economy.108 Polanyi will emphasize the continuities rather than 
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the differences between “developed” and “undeveloped” economies.109 His genealogy of 
economic utopianism deploys many of the same elements as Weber’s interpretation of 
Protestantism, but with the crucial difference that Polanyi aims to depict the continuing impact 
of these ideas on contemporary life. By retelling the history of economies and economics, 
Polanyi hopes to undermine from within the idea of the modern economy and the corollary 
notion that economics is a rigorous science. Let’s trace the contours of Polanyi’s critique.  
5. “Where do the poor come from?”  Polanyi’s Genealogy of Economics Pt. I 
There is a popular version of the history of modern economic thought that begins with 
a fable.110 The fabulator in question is Bernard de Mandeville, the English physician and writer 
whose 1723 book The Fable of the Bees (which began life as a poem called “The Grumbling 
Hive, or Knaves turn’d Honest”) reversed longstanding condemnations of commercial activity 
by showing how vices such as pride and the pursuit of luxury can encourage self-discipline 
and industry among citizens.111 Mandeville writes: 
Thus Vice nurs’d Ingenuity, 
Which joined with Time and Industry, 
had carry’d Life’s conveniences, 
It’s real Pleasures, Comforts, Ease, 
To such a Height, the very Poor 
Liv’d better than the Rich before.112  
 
Whereas much Christian and civic republican thought condemned the selfishness and greed 
that trade fosters and the way that commerce corrupts martial virtue, Mandeville argued that 
self-interest can generate widespread prosperity that improves the lives of the vast majority of 
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citizens.113 The upshot is that the good polity no longer requires a foundation in virtuous 
citizens. Mandeville thereby reverses an argument that runs from Aristotle to 18th century 
republicans like Rousseau. “Thus every Part was full of Vice/Yet the whole Mass a 
Paradise.”114 By separating individual motives and conduct from the collective outcome, he 
depicts an early image of an impersonal, self-regulating economic process. It is he who invents 
the term “division of labor” to describe the complex interdependence of commercial 
relationships, a conceptualization that helps open the way for economics as a defined area of 
study.115 “If Adam Smith is the father of economics,” one commenter declares, “then Bernard 
Mandeville must be its godfather.”116   
After Mandeville, as the story goes, the general notion of the benefits of unintended 
consequences is taken up and systematized, first by the physiocrats and then by the Scots, 
particularly Adam Smith.117 The physiocrats and Smith carry the idea of an economic process 
one step further by insisting that wealth is not synonymous with bullion but is instead the result 
of a cumulative social process of economic generation that involves the acts of numerous 
individuals over time. They also begin to discover some of the basic categories of economic 
thought so that economics is henceforth able to discard a little more of its medieval, 
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Aristotelian teleological baggage118 in order to deal directly with individuals and their 
interests.119  Classical economics then passes through a period of what the philosopher of 
science Thomas Kuhn calls “mop-up work” as Malthus, Ricardo, and Mill flesh out the 
implications of economic theory for a market system that is becoming increasingly 
dominant.120 
Finally, beginning in the 1860s Jevons, Menger, and Walras inaugurate the “marginal 
revolution” by shifting discussions of value away from a focus on human labor toward the 
dynamics of individual choice under conditions of scarcity.121 At this point, with the relevant 
structure of economic life thus specified, it is possible to construct mathematical models of 
choice in the manner of 19th century physics. As this version of history has it, economics 
progresses from modest beginnings until it becomes a true social science.122  
By contrast, Polanyi argues that the foregoing story never leaves the realm of fable. He 
insists that the “origin story” beginning with Mandeville and Adam Smith is a selective history 
that is often used to support dangerous myths whose hold on political thought has yet to be 
broken. Above all, recounting the history of economics as the discovery of a method makes 
the formalistic, impersonal theories of liberals such as von Mises seem too plausible. As a 
detached and purely formal method, economics appears to study society objectively without 
being unduly influenced by political concerns; it seems to soar above the rancor of partisan 
struggles and therefore acquires the authority of a mode of knowledge equipped to speak the 
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plain truth about the workings of society.123 Just as importantly, this history of economics as 
science occludes the values and political interests that continue to shape the discipline itself. 
Thus a certain style of history, a kind of methodology, and a type of expert authority forge a 
symbiotic relationship, each working to reinforce the others.  
Polanyi attempts to undermine this authority by constructing an alternative history of 
economics, a genealogy that demonstrates how existential needs and utopian politics form the 
initial motive for free-market thinking.124 On his reading, politics – along with a new political 
faith – provides the disavowed drive at the heart of modern economic theory.125 
Polanyi’s genealogy begins with a counter-fable called “the theorem of the goats and 
the dogs,” found in Joseph Townsend’s Dissertation on the Poor Laws. If you have never heard 
of Townsend, that is exactly Polanyi’s point: the intellectual sources and drives behind the 
style of thought that becomes economics have been obscured by the retroactive endeavor to 
read Mandeville and Smith as its “founding fathers.” The standard view that traces a 
continuous line from Mandeville to Adam Smith to 19th century economic liberalism overlooks 
the impact of the early phases of industrialization in England and the emergence of new modes 
of urban poverty. These issues gave rise to an intense political struggle over changes to the 
Poor Laws that governed the treatment of the lower classes. It is in the context of these debates 
that Townsend’s work changes the shape of economic thought, shifting it onto a more radical 
trajectory. By recounting this history and Townsend’s role in it, Polanyi hopes to show that 
19th century economic liberalism is a political response to a phase of social disintegration. This 
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new liberalism, he argues, represents a far-ranging reconceptualization that diminishes the 
status of the poor, popularizes a proto-Darwinian theory of competition, and injects a utopian 
sense of urgency into economic theory. Whereas the standard history of economics is a tale of 
methodological refinement and intellectual continuity, Polanyi’s reconstruction contends that 
discontinuities in modes of thought are linked to shifting social and political conditions.   
Townsend is a central participant in these debates. Published in 1786, a decade after 
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations but twelve years before Malthus’ Essay on Population, 
his work inflects economic thinking in a decisive way.126 Townsend’s Dissertation centers on 
a mythic account of the ecosystem of a small island near the coast of Chile. A Spanish sailor 
named Juan Fernandez was reported to have introduced goats onto the island as a food supply 
for future visits to the area. In the absence of natural predators, the goat population increased 
to enormous levels and, unfortunately for the Spanish, became a very convenient source of 
protein for English pirates. In an effort to remedy this problem, Spain released a pack of dogs 
onto the island. Soon the populations of both the goats and the dogs were reduced to moderate, 
stable levels. Townsend saw in this event a kind of miraculous harmony. “A new kind of 
balance was restored,” he wrote. “The weakest of both species were among the first to pay 
their debt to nature; the most active and vigorous preserved their lives.”127  
Townsend believed that the lessons gleaned from the Chilean ecosystem could be 
applied directly to the contemporary English debates over what to do with the emerging 
industrial proletariat. The Watt steam engine was nearing completion in 1775, right about the 
time Smith was finishing Wealth of Nations.128 As industry gathered speed, the increase of 
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grinding urban poverty in the midst of growing productive capacity troubled England’s best 
minds. What was to be done with the poor? Where did they come from?129 And, perhaps most 
important of all, how could they be made to work? As we can see, a complicated and 
contradictory mix of motives lies behind these questions. Fear of social disorder, questions of 
privilege and power, all this mingles with shock at the scope of human degradation and a more 
or less sincere effort to understand the nature of the common good in an economy undergoing 
drastic change.     
Polanyi claims that the acceleration and sheer scale of the new poverty made it virtually 
unintelligible according to existing ethical and political categories.130 Christian teachings 
regarding treatment of the poor and the paternalistic conventions of the English monarchy 
seemed to suggest that government should intervene to support the poor and ensure that the 
able-bodied would find work. Tocqueville provides us with an outstanding account of the 
moral economy as it was supposed to operate under the regime of noblesse oblige: 
Under the feudal system the lord, while possessing extensive powers, had no 
less imperative duties, one of these being to succor the needy within his domain. 
A last vestige of this ancient obligation, which once obtained throughout 
Europe, can be found in the Prussian Code of 1795, where we read that “the 
lord must see to it that poor peasants are given education. As far as possible he 
should provide means of livelihood for such of his vassals as have no land, and 
if any are reduced to poverty he must come to their aid.”131 
 
However, by the 1790s such paternalistic policies had already been attempted in Britain; yet 
they had failed either to visibly decrease the number of paupers or noticeably improve their 
condition. Such failures increased popular confusion and anxiety. Townsend’s genius was to 
take the theorem of the goats and dogs as the archetype of an impersonal, natural process and 
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use it to provide systematic support for a view that had been floating through the ambient 
culture for several decades, unable to find firm footing.132 Simply put, the government should 
do nothing. As natural beings, humans were subject to the same laws as the dogs and goats, 
i.e., incessant struggle for food and survival. In this life and death struggle it is not just a 
contingent fact that some succumb so that others thrive, it is a law of nature. In this sense, the 
poor are not seen to be caused by social policies. They don’t “come from” anywhere so much 
as they are an ineliminable aspect of the natural world.  
For Townsend, impersonal laws of selective survival govern society; when they are 
given free rein to operate, the whole social order will self-regulate. Polanyi calls this the 
“mechanical” aspect of his thinking and suggests that its origin can only be attributed to a 
society in which use of machines is becoming dominant.133 While the work of earlier thinkers 
such as Quesnay, Turgot, and Adam Smith utilized some concept of self-regulation or the so-
called “invisible hand,” in practice they deployed this concept in a highly restricted manner; it 
tended to appear in the context of certain economic sectors or particular domains such as 
agriculture or international trade.134 By contrast, Townsend both extended the concept of 
impersonal self-regulation and relied upon it more intensely. In his hands a theory of the 
impersonal law of nature increasingly came to supersede morality as a dominant mode of 
economic argument. Just as competition stabilized the populations of goats and dogs, he 
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believed that “It is the quantity of food which regulates the number of the human species,” and 
therefore the number and condition of the poor.135 There was no longer any need for noblesse 
oblige, or indeed for obligation of any kind.   
This new way of thinking was, as Foucault observes, “more a naturalism than a 
liberalism.”136 Beneath the apparent continuity in a style of rhetoric concerning individuals and 
their rights, the perceived relationship between society and nature has changed. The image of 
society shifts from a conception of moral order to a theory of impersonal law. In turn, this shift 
alters the perceived role of the individual within the economy (especially when that person is 
poor). The break is clear. While Mandeville still retains a meaningful, albeit much diminished, 
discussion of virtue, while he recognizes the need for wise politicians to maintain economic 
institutions, Townsend finds the government to be impotent to resist the amoral and impersonal 
laws of nature.137  
However, Townsend finds one saving grace in his otherwise bleak conception. The 
solution to the old problem of getting work out of the poor now becomes clear: they will work 
for food. Government’s responsibility, then, is to see that nature runs its course. Townsend, as 
Polanyi puts it, learned that scarcity was a “better disciplinarian than the magistrate.”138 A 
jagged line of influence runs from Townsend to Malthus to 19th century social Darwinists such 
as Herbert Spencer (who in turn influenced Hayek and other 20th century libertarians).139 This 
lineage forms the subterranean undercurrent of liberal and neoliberal thought. 
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In the pages of Townsend’s Dissertation a seismic shift has taken place. It is not Adam 
Smith but Townsend and his like who inaugurate a rupture in the framework of economic 
thought. The systematization of impersonal laws now means that a realm of experience called 
“the economy” can be hived off from the manifold that is social life and made the object of an 
explicit theory. In attempting to describe this change, Polanyi suggests that we: 
 [E]mploy a physiological analogy: With the [earlier economists], economy 
was…a function of the social organism as a whole. Now economy became 
something more definite, rather like the digestive organs of the body.140 
 
The economy is reconceived as a demarcated domain with a more specialized, but perhaps for 
this reason more important, function. When the economy was merely “a function of the social 
organism as a whole” it could have no single purpose because society as a whole has no single 
purpose. Economic life on the old model therefore had a mix of sometimes contradictory 
objectives: to support the poor and the nobility in their designated roles, to increase the wealth 
of the nation, to encourage virtuous behavior when possible, to provide the sinews of war. 
Unlike organisms, however, organs can have a single function. As an organ, the economy now 
has one goal, namely, to regulate the efficient use of scarce resources. Moreover, this single 
goal must be pursued with an intense focus, utilizing the power of the state if necessary, 
because if the economy falters, the entire social body may perish, just as a heart attack can kill 
a person. What may seem like an inconsequential change of analogy thus has far-ranging 
consequences because it alters the concepts that surround economic thought and increases the 
urgency with which these concepts are deployed. We can grasp the full impact of this shift by 
examining several areas in which Townsend’s work diverges from that of his predecessors.  
                                                   




First, while Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees openly declares its fictional origins and 
tries to persuade the reader through an allegorical method that Jerry Z. Muller calls the 
“rhetorical redescription” of economic values,141 Townsend’s “theorem” purports to reveal a 
scientific fact established by empirical observation. However, Polanyi notes that no sources or 
research have ever been able to authenticate the story.142 Polanyi’s point here is not (just) that 
Townsend’s tale is therefore a crude ideological fiction. Actually, even if Townsend’s 
particular story is utterly false, we can certainly imagine that something similar to the scenario 
he describes is rather plausible. The point is that by disguising its imaginary origins and 
claiming to be a scientific statement of the laws of nature, the very criteria of what counts as 
truth – what is acceptable as an argument about economics and who is qualified to speak – 
undergoes a profound alteration. The distance from fable (a loose but persuasive set of moral 
and rhetorical ideas) to theorem (a postulate of necessary law) is enormous. 
Polanyi’s account resembles the more recent history of neoliberalism in Foucault’s The 
Birth of Biopolitics. Foucault claims that an inflection takes place when the modern economy 
transitions from its former role as a “site of justice” to a regime defined by a new set of rules 
that demarcate authoritative statements, what Foucault calls a “regime of truth.”143 “A good 
government,” he says, “is no longer…simply one that is just…To be good government, 
government has to function according to truth.”144 Scientific knowledge is required because it 
“distinguishes those things” – such as the natural competition between goats and dogs – “which 
it would be pointless for government to interfere with.”145 Townsend is a founder of this 
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transition, and the concealment of the fictional basis of his work is one technique that makes 
the transition possible.  
Second, Polanyi argues that whereas Mandeville’s fable remains within the Hobbesian 
strain of English thought in claiming that humans behave like beasts, “Townsend asserted that 
they were actually beasts, and that, precisely for that reason, only a minimum of government 
was required.”146 Ethics, politics, history, institutions – none of these seemed to matter for the 
mechanistic naturalism of Townsend, to whom “The biological nature of man appeared as the 
given foundation of a society that was not of a political order.”147  
Townsend is thus one of the earliest advocates for the intertwining of economics and 
administrative governance that Foucault calls biopolitics. Under biopolitical regimes, one 
might say an old Marxist line is given a twist: it is indeed true that “the government of persons 
is replaced by the administration of things,”148 but this is true only to the extent that people are 
reduced to the status of living things to be administered. The biological substrate forms the 
connection between man, government, and nature’s law. No other intermediary is required. As 
a result, after Townsend the reduction of the human to “bare life” is an ever present temptation 
for economic liberalism.  
These ideas continue to have repercussions today. For example, even a 20th century 
neoliberal like Friedrich Hayek, who spent a lifetime defending economic liberalism as a 
safeguard of freedom, can at crucial moments reduce his defense of markets to their ability to 
sustain bare life as such, thereby stripping the ethical content out of economic debates. In his 
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final book, Hayek begins from the premise that “life has no purpose but itself”149 and then 
proceeds to give Marx another disturbing twist: “Karl Marx was thus right to claim that 
‘capitalism’ created the proletariat: it gave and gives them life.”150 The sheer dynamism of 
capitalism enables greater numbers of people to survive, but for Hayek this fact alone is enough 
to defend his vision of free-market liberalism from any critiques that might be leveled against 
it from the perspectives of ethics, tradition, or social stability. “Whatever men live for,” he 
contends, “today most live only because of the market order.”151 It is this “calculus of lives” – 
and he pauses to note that the phrase is “more than a metaphor”152 – that justifies unconstrained 
markets.   
In their different idioms Polanyi and Foucault both argue that neoliberalism is 
continually tempted to reduce politics to the amoral administration of life, especially in 
moments of crisis. Polanyi traces this biopolitical temptation back to Joseph Townsend. “From 
this time onward” he says, “naturalism haunted the science of man.”153 
Third, Townsend signals a reversal in the status of revealed religion. As Carl Becker 
has shown, throughout the 18th century Christianity continued to exert a major influence on 
philosophy and political thought.154 Such remnants of religious tradition often worked to 
impede rapid economic change. Indeed, as Polanyi points out, the older sense of a spiritual 
community is one reason why the movement toward a true market for labor was halting and 
slow.155 But, once again, we see a reversal after Townsend and the tumult of the 1790s. For 
Townsend, unrestrained competition takes precedence over traditional institutions because, as 
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the law of nature, competition is also the law of God.156 The shift is subtle but important. On 
Townsend’s account, we no longer experience the moral law directly through our interactions 
with other people and the claims they make upon us; rather, we come to know it through the 
scientific observation of nature. While tradition appears to depend on outmoded habits and the 
uncertain interpretations of men, scientific knowledge seems to provide unmediated access to 
divine law by revealing how it actually operates in the world. Thus it is no longer a case of 
God sacralizing the economy. Instead, according to the new conception, a theory that reveals 
an empirical truth about society defines the boundaries of ethical life. The marketplace and its 
law become the axis mundi of commercial society: for Townsend and the thinkers who follow 
him, ethics must be deduced from our knowledge of economics. One can put Townsend’s 
discovery into a syllogism: An ethical policy cannot contradict the laws of nature and nature’s 
God; to guarantee food to the poor is to contradict laws of nature; therefore, a policy based on 
the easy provision of food is unethical.  
Again, Townsend provides an early example of themes that continue to shape liberal 
and neoliberal economic thought to this day. Examine, for instance, another passage of 
Hayek’s: 
There is no ready English or even German word that precisely characterizes an 
extended order [i.e. a spontaneous market-society] …The only appropriate 
word, “transcendent,” has been so misused that I hesitate to use it. In its literal 
meaning, however, it does concern that which far surpasses the reach of our 
understanding, wishes and purposes, and our sense perceptions, and that which 
incorporates knowledge no individual brain, or any single organization, could 
possess or invent. This is conspicuously so in its religious meaning, as we see 
for Example in the Lord’s Prayer, where it is asked that “Thy will (i.e. not mine) 
be done on earth as it is in heaven”; or in the Gospel, where it is declared: ‘Ye 
have not chosen me but I have chosen you, that ye should go and bring forth 
fruit, and that your fruit should remain’ (St. John, 15:26). But a more purely 
transcendent ordering, which also happens to be a purely naturalistic ordering, 
as for example in evolution, abandons the animism still present in religion: the 
                                                   




idea that a single brain or will (as for example, that of an omniscient God) could 
control and order [the world].157 
 
For Hayek, a concept of transcendence remains important because it suggests the unknowable 
character of complex economic processes and the extent to which they exceed mastery. 
Transcendence also carries the appropriate connotation of necessary submission to impersonal 
powers greater than ourselves.158 However, when Hayek insists on “a more purely 
transcendent” naturalism – according to his own conception of nature – he also jettisons God 
and with Him any essential ethical content in his idea of transcendence. “Life has no purpose 
but itself.”159 The functional process is its own purpose. This is not to say that Hayek has no 
room for any kind of ethics in his philosophy, but rather that, for him, ethics always remains 
subservient to natural, functional systems.  
The crux of Polanyi’s critique is that Townsend and the 20th century neoliberals who 
resemble him make moral obligations conditional upon one version of a speculative philosophy 
of nature. Along similar lines, Charles Taylor has argued that many of the ideas that emerge in 
the 18th century, from natural rights to the primacy of the individual and property, go through 
a series of what he calls “redactions” as the original theological and social contexts that once 
moderated such ideas are stripped away.160 In their redacted forms, these ideas become 
increasingly strident and one-dimensional in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Finally, Townsend’s Dissertation is also a radical departure from the thought of Adam 
Smith. Townsend does not “refine” Smith’s methodological insights. As Polanyi notes, Smith 
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is pre-modern to the extent that he embraces an aesthetic scheme of harmony and 
moderation.161 While diverse interests may clash, the Smithian view of social conflict is usually 
rather mild; with the right set of market, governing, and ethical institutions competition will 
work to the benefit of all, or nearly all, members of society.162 Smith also retains a sense that 
society has moral obligations that precede economics. For him, Polanyi argues, “Reason and 
humanity set a limit to piece work.”163 Lastly, in his concern with the wealth of nations, Smith 
is still fundamentally oriented toward governing the territorial state. Townsend’s universal 
naturalism shatters these boundaries. Conflict and competition are now discovered at the very 
heart of social order, all notions of “reasonable” limits according to some transcendent 
perspective are discarded, and the state is, at least in theory, demoted to secondary importance. 
Smith, by contrast, is still basically a humanist.164 His vision of the economy springs from an 
understanding of the way that habits, traditions, and institutions shape social interaction. With 
Townsend, the system itself is sovereign and humans are utterly dependent.165  
6. Speenhamland: Polanyi’s Genealogy of Economics Pt. II 
One is forced to ask, why exactly did such a remarkable transition in accepted modes 
of thought transpire in the space of a few decades? Certainly, Polanyi argues, not because of 
the slow, internal refinement of a scientific method.166 A different motivation has already been 
hinted at. The transformation was motivated in part by the need to cope with an immense 
human tragedy that, like Joseph Townsend himself, is too often forgotten today. For Polanyi 
the catastrophe is synonymous with a single word: Speenhamland, a new system of labor 
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regulations enacted in England during the Napoleonic Wars that unintentionally resulted in the 
total collapse of the longstanding policies of the English Poor Law.167 This event was the result 
of complex interactions between the first stages of the industrial revolution in England, 
growing international trade, and a national labor market that had been partially released from 
feudal and mercantile restrictions.  
Adam Smith had dimly sensed the coming disruption of industrial urbanism. In the 
final book of Wealth of Nations, Smith observes that in a small agricultural village “a man of 
low conditions” lives within institutions that discipline his habits and order his life: 
While he remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, and he 
may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and this situation only, 
he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes to a 
great city, he is shrunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and 
attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and 
to abandon himself to every sort of profligacy and vice.168 
  
To help bring structure to the anomie of urban life, Smith advocated religion as well as state 
spending on innocent entertainment that would “amuse and divert the people by painting, 
poetry, musick [and] dancing.”169 But Smith wrote before the deluge. When London passed 
Paris in its number of residents, the total population of France was six times greater than it was 
across the channel. Moreover, because the unsanitary conditions of life in industrial London 
meant that the mortality rate inside the city exceeded the birth rate, it took a continual stream 
of migration from the surrounding countryside to achieve this heretofore unprecedented level 
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of concentration.170 A churning cycle of hope, urbanization, desperation, and change was 
underway.   
Poverty in some forms may be as old as civilization. But The Poor as a concentrated 
class of unfortunates who are more or less healthy enough to work but unable to find any way 
to support themselves was new to industrializing society. The mere existence of such a class 
shocked post-Smithian thinkers into a search for more radical economic theories. “Out of the 
horrors of Speenhamland,” Polanyi writes, “men rushed blindly for the shelter of a utopian 
market economy.”171 Much like Weber’s Protestant ethic, utopian liberalism is founded on the 
demand for a theodicy – an existential justification of the necessity of an impoverished class – 
born from a pressurized urban environment, in this case intensified by the Industrial 
Revolution. Townsend’s strident, mechanistic materialism is the resulting ethico-political 
formula that attempts to meet this existential demand. In writing the history of this transition, 
Polanyi claims to be describing the traumatic origin of concepts and metaphors that continue 
to influence economic thought.172 
 The sources of the Speenhamland catastrophe are clear only in retrospect. By the late 
18th century, mechanical production for sale on national and international markets was 
assuming a predominant economic role. Trade was nonetheless extremely volatile and uneven. 
It was concentrated in a few big cities, with wide and apparently inexplicable changes possible 
at short notice.173 England had already been through an agricultural revolution, which saw the 
enclosure of common lands, and a commercial revolution, with the construction of national 
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markets, as well as an upswing in population growth.174 Crucially, however, one segment of 
the economy remained largely outside of the market: labor.   
 The central problem of the labor supply was that it appeared to be subject to conflicting 
demands. On the one hand, Christian charity as well as the interests of the workers and the 
poor seemed to demand government protection against the volatility of emerging international 
markets. Rural villages also had an interest in preventing a disorderly loss of population into 
urban centers. On the other hand, in an economy ever more based on trade, private capital, and 
markets, industry had an insatiable demand for free labor that could be hired when business 
was good and released when it slumped. It was the impossibility of reconciling these 
conflicting imperatives within the given order that gave the situation its tragic character.  
We should recall that at this time there was no popular conception of industrial 
capitalism as a system that might produce long-term growth despite its cycle of boom and bust. 
When growth is presupposed, it is possible to adopt an attitude of attrition during recessions, 
to tighten one’s belt and “wait out” the bad times in the expectation of future development. 
Without the growth postulate, however, the suffering caused by poverty loses its meaning, 
thereby intensifying feelings of anxiety and uncertainty. The unemployment caused by 18th 
century trade fluctuations was all the more troubling for the very reason that it arrived in 
England as a potentially permanent blight that had erupted into the world without evident cause 
or remedy. Over time, such feelings of anomie have the potential to corrode faith in existing 
institutions and beliefs. 
                                                   




The problem lay with the difficulty of trying to understand several processes that were 
operating on different time scales and of recognizing a secular trend in the face of wild change. 
Polanyi writes: 
While [trade] accounted for the rise in employment, the fluctuations accounted 
for the much bigger rise in unemployment. But while the increase in the growth 
of general employment was slow, the increase in unemployment and 
underemployment would tend to be fast. Thus, the building up of what Friedrich 
Engel’s called the industrial reserve army outweighed by much the creation of 
the industrial army proper.175 
 
The paradox here is that although the result of industrialism was a steady increase in wages 
and per capita income, the sheer volatility of the process resulted simultaneously in even larger 
increases in poverty and suffering over the short-to-medium term as traditional styles of life 
were destroyed. If we contemporary observers look back only at the aggregate trend of rising 
incomes, which is only apparent in retrospect, the trauma and desperation of the actual situation 
for many is obscured.  
The central drama of the age, then, was the emergence of a class of paupers who seemed 
to be multiplying out of all proportion to what the environment would bear, just like 
Townsend’s goats. But if the lack of any unified understanding of the systemic relationship 
between trade, markets, and unemployment made the new poverty all the more worrisome, it 
also made the solution appear rather simple. To many, it seemed as if these problems could be 
resolved with a simple wage subsidy. With a subsidy workers could maintain a tolerable 
standard of life, industry would have a flexible supply of labor, and people would be 
encouraged to remain in their villages whenever possible. The demands of protection, industry, 
and tradition could be satisfied at the same time. This was the solution put in place by the 
                                                   




Speenhamland system in 1795.176 The most profound shock came, then, after these apparently 
obvious reforms failed. It was after the spectacular failure of Speenhamland’s paternalism that 
a context was created in which the legalistic naturalism of Townsend became palatable as a 
ruling creed and generalized theodicy. 
 The Speenhamland reform program failed because it attempted to apply a blanket wage 
subsidy inside an industrializing and highly marketized economy in which other regulations 
were minimal and older mutual support structures had disappeared.177 (Immanuel Wallerstein 
also points out that the Anti-Combination Laws were enacted at roughly the same time; this 
prevented the working classes from attempting to push for higher wages through collective 
action.)178 Because it ran counter to the market rationale that dominated other sectors of the 
economy, the wage subsidy only exacerbated the underlying problems that were causing 
pauperism to increase.179  
We can better observe some of these problems by comparing Speenhamland to the 
policies it replaced. Prior to the enactment of Speenhamland, under Elizabethan era Poor Law, 
workers had been tied to one local parish which in turn distributed poor relief. “The poor,” 
says Polanyi, “were forced to work at whatever wages they could get and only those who could 
not obtain work were entitled to relief.”180 Workers were thus bound to a location, which 
impeded the growth of industry. On the other hand, within that location, workers had an 
incentive to obtain the highest paying employment possible because no generalized subsidy 
was in place that would supplement low wages. The new Speenhamland system reversed these 
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longstanding policies. Under it, labor was freed from legal ties to any particular parish so that 
urban factories could receive an influx of labor when it was required, and all individuals were 
to be guaranteed a “right to live,” i.e., a minimum income sufficient to sustain life. If a worker 
had no employment at all, he would receive the entire subsidy. Workers with employment 
whose wages fell below the legal minimum would be brought up to scale. All of this was to be 
paid for by local parish taxes. 
Unfortunately, in the context of an industrial economy that was increasingly dominated 
by markets, Speenhamland created a multitude of what we would today call “perverse 
incentives.” Employers were encouraged to pay their workers as little as possible because the 
subsidy would make up the difference. Wages therefore began to constitute a drain on the 
public funds, which in turn generated two kinds of resentment, first on the side of the taxpayers, 
most of whom had to pay for benefits that they did not receive, and, second, on the part of the 
workers, whose dignity was degraded by charity forced from an increasingly unwilling hand.181 
For their part, the lower classes were encouraged to work as little as possible because the 
subsidy offered an assurance that they no longer needed to tolerate the toil of labor.182 
Productivity plummeted.183 The lives of workers stagnated in meaningless indolence. Skills 
degraded. Family life was shattered.184  
Dickens would later capture the sense of helplessness and confusion that surrounded 
pauperism in a classic line from Bleak House: “What the poor are to the poor is little known, 
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excepting to themselves and God.”185 From Speenhamland onward there emerges the idea of 
a class of individuals who represent a sort of zero-level of economic life. Whereas earlier 
conceptions tended to view the poor as a class of unfortunates – deserving of charity or perhaps 
contempt – now they are presented as the frightening mirror image of the normal, rational 
economic agent. Or rather, because this event occurs before the systematization of economic 
theory proper, one wonders if it should not be said that this new class is the problem for which 
the rational economic agent is the answer. They contribute nothing, but drain the public coffers; 
they shirk responsibility; they are irrational and unpredictable, and therefore represent the ever 
present threat of the total disruption of the economic organ.  
Speenhamland was a tragedy in the classical (as opposed to the Freudian) Oedipal 
sense: an inept attempt to avoid the proletarianization of the lower classes had made the 
problem infinitely more severe. Tragedy was compounded by cruel irony because the 
mismanagement of wage subsidies created a moment in time during which many of the worst 
accusations actually did appear to be realized in the poor. As long as the subsidy was in effect 
they actually did resemble an unruly mass, lazily draining the wealth of the nation. As with 
Townsend’s theorem, however, the importance lies not so much in the truth of the situation – 
whether workers as such are “really” lazy and dangerous – but the manner in which the story 
is taken up as the basis of a theory that is then reapplied to the whole social order.  
On Polanyi’s reading, the truth of the matter is that fear of the poor, lack of experience, 
a rationalistic understanding of impersonal markets, and a harsh theory of naturalism led some 
of the brightest thinkers of the era to misrecognize the source of the failed reforms: instead of 
realizing the power of markets to cause social dislocation, and the need for more nuanced 
                                                   




collective responses, thinkers such as Townsend drew the conclusion that the devastation had 
resulted exclusively from the flawed structure of the labor market. “In general,” he observed, 
“it is only hunger which can spur and goad them [the poor] on to labor; yet our laws have said 
they shall never hunger.”186 The labor market just had not been free enough. Logically 
speaking, one might just as plausibly have read the expansion of volatile markets in other 
economic sectors as the cause of the general disruption of labor, but instead the interpretive 
weight was put on labor regulation as the area of government intervention that was preventing 
the entire economy from operating inexorably as the natural system that it was supposed to be. 
This misrecognition meant that the tragic structure of the events surrounding Speenhamland 
would be repeated: reforms would continually fail and markets would always seem not quite 
free enough, always as if some elusive obstacle continued to impede their proper function.  
The new interpretations of poverty (dangerous, a social terror) and nature (mechanical, 
law bound, necessary) were fitted into available schemes of philosophy and theology. The 
result was an understanding of political economy imbued with an acute sense of desperation 
and a theoretical framework capable of justifying dramatic political action.  
Subsequently, economic attitudes would cluster around the two poles that 
conventionally appear in Western theodicy: submission to transcendent Law or the need for 
millennial activism.187 Polanyi calls these two poles, respectively, “limitless despair” and 
“unbounded hope.”188 Hope: that the economy can be made to function smoothly in perfect 
accordance with the Law. Despair: the prospect that poverty was eternal, or that it could only 
be eradicated by the total reorganization and control of society. The desperation of the question 
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and the peculiar coordinates of the response left little room for anything other than an 
economics that continually threatened to morph into a utopian political crusade. Jeremy 
Bentham’s plans for social-engineering, from the Panopticon prison to his Industry-Houses, 
are the offshoots of the poor law debates.189 But the full legacy of Speenhamland runs deeper. 
“Syndicalism, capitalism, socialism, and anarchism were indeed almost indistinguishable in 
their plans for the poor,” Polanyi observes. All of the economic thinking that comes out of this 
period adopts some variant of Townsend’s mechanistic naturalism and tends to move towards 
utopian politics in the form of massive programs for social restructuring.  
Thus, what Polanyi calls utopian liberalism is one species of this broader genus of 
modern economic radicalism. Unbounded hope and limitless despair motivate much of the 
economic and political thought that surfaces in the late 18th and 19th centuries. “The Poor Law 
discussion,” he writes, “formed the minds of Bentham and Burke, Godwin and Malthus, 
Ricardo and Marx, Robert Owen and John Stuart Mill, Darwin and Spencer, who shared…the 
spiritual parentage of nineteenth century civilization.”190 The existential sensibility we first 
observed in Townsend’s Dissertation is enmeshed in the sediment of the entire economic 
project as such, permeating its phrases and concepts. Of course, no one will argue that every 
economist or economic theory manifests utopian zeal. Academic economics is generally a 
rather dry and sedate discipline. The point is that in moments of crisis the utopian impulse 
emerges as a temptation, always floating through the ambient discourse about the economy, 
waiting for someone with the tools to give it form and substance. In asking “Where do the poor 
come from?” the real, unuttered issue at stake is what Peter Berger calls the ancient core of 
theodicy: “Why do we suffer?...Why does God permit some men to eat and others to go 
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hungry?”191 Hope, despair, and utopia are recurrent possibilities for economic thought because 
it remains tied to these foundational questions. 
The full breath of Polanyi’s response to the utopian economic projects of the 20th 
century is not simply to point out that they are, theoretically speaking, impossible endeavors, 
for the reason that a purely theoretical response is inadequate to address the heart of the issue. 
Rather, Polanyi seeks to come to terms with the relationship between economics and suffering 
by offering a different series of ethical coordinates that enable more constructive modes of 
engagement.  
7. Hamlet as a Guide to the Critique of Political Economy 
Although Polanyi’s ethical concerns are evident in much of his work, they are nowhere 
better illustrated than in his short essay on Hamlet. Should we find it curious that he is drawn 
to this tragedy? As  Derrida reminds us, Polanyi was not the first to unite an interest in the 
critique of economics with a fixation on Hamlet.192 Karl Marx also read the play deeply. It is 
well known that the Communist Manifesto bears traces of its influence.193 Whether Polanyi 
was aware that he shared a passion with Marx is not clear. Nevertheless, Hamlet is a sort of 
unexpected meeting place between the two economic thinkers; the divergent themes they draw 
from Shakespeare can highlight some distinctive aspects of Polanyi’s ethical thought.  
According to Derrida, Marx deploys themes from Hamlet through his imagery of spirits 
and ghosts.194 A ghost stalks the pages of Hamlet, like a certain specter haunting Europe circa 
1848 in the form of a dimly sensed possibility for political reformation. Marx’s rhetorical 
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affinity for the paranormal is not just a stylistic gesture, nor does it contradict his philosophical 
materialism. Instead, as Slavoj Žižek points out, Marx’s vision of capitalism turns on the way 
that it simultaneously destroys and creates specters.195 On the one hand, capitalism entails the 
radical materialization of social life, making profane all that was once holy. At the same time, 
capitalism continually reproduces another kind of spectrality as commodities become 
fetishized and circulate through the economy, making it appear as if value and even a sort of 
agency were a “natural” attribute of commodities.196 This reconstructed spectrality obscures 
the basic dependence of the commodity form on the social relations of production.197  
It is the task of the proletariat – the “grave-diggers”198 of the bourgeoisie – to lay these 
ghosts to rest and to rid the world of the specter of commodification once and for all. Marx 
takes up the supernatural imagery of Hamlet and uses it to embody the task of communism 
itself, thereby implying that the coming revolution will be akin to a kind of exorcism in which 
the ideological apparitions of the commodity will be forever banished.  As Derrida observes: 
Marx continues to want to ground his critique or his exorcism of the spectral 
simulacrum in an ontology. It is a critical…ontology of presence as actual 
reality and as objectivity. This critical ontology means to deploy the 
possibility of dissipating the phantom...and of bringing this representation 
back to the world of labor, production, and exchange, so as to reduce it to 
its conditions.199  
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Derrida rather obliquely suggests that this ontology “has political consequences which are 
perhaps not negligible,” although he remains characteristically circumspect about spelling 
them out. Simon Critchley helps us to better see what is at stake here when, in a commentary 
on Specters of Marx, he observes that the tradition of Marxist thought has been haunted by an 
authoritarian temptation that stems, in no small part, from the “phantasy of a completed and 
transparent social order” in which knowledge has overcome ideology.200 While both Derrida 
and Critchley want to retain aspects of Marx’s revolutionary project, it seems to me that they 
are nevertheless correct to point to the political dangers posed by its occasional inducements 
to reductionism.  
The ghostly mise-en-scène of the Communist Manifesto also suggests a special 
relationship between communism and time, especially the future.201 Hamlet’s ghost brings 
news of the disjuncture: time is out of joint, and action is required to set the world to rights in 
the future. Similarly, communism as a movement points toward the future as the yet-to-arrive 
redemption of the present. The true meaning of history, for Marx, is that of a promise that will 
only be fulfilled at a later date.202 The past has been merely the “prehistory of human 
society.”203 “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living.”204 Literary critic Martin Harries notes that in both Hamlet and the Manifesto, “the 
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Ghost already registers the emergent future.”205 In short, the spectral possibilities given shape 
by the figure of the ghost allow us to read past as prologue. In this area, at least, Marxism is 
similar to utopian liberalism: the anticipation of the future goal, yet another ghost that haunts 
the present, is common to both.  
 By contrast, Polanyi reads the play in order to discover its essential humanism, that is, 
he seeks to better understand the conditions of finitude and fragility that characterize human 
existence. “Hamlet is about the human condition,” he says bluntly.206 The ghost features hardly 
at all in his analysis, replaced instead by the image of Hamlet as a suffering human being pitted 
against powers that exceed his comprehension. Hamlet is forced by the world to act – called 
upon by fate to murder an uncle who also happens to be usurper of the throne – but is unable 
to embrace his responsibility. Yet Polanyi claims that through Hamlet’s unusual dilemma 
“utmost universality is reached.”207 Why this unexpected shift from particularity to 
universality? 
 Tragedy discloses universal components of the human predicament, according to 
Polanyi, because it presents the audience with a “twin secret” that forces one to search for a 
key that “fit[s] both locks.”208 The secret is only this: the dispute between the formal and the 
substantive, between fate and freedom, is shifted onto new ground because the very essence of 
the tragic is that “the inner and outer scene of action run parallel and are coordinated.”209 On 
the one hand, the formal course of outward necessity already seems predetermined: “As in 
‘Lear,’ ‘Othello,’ or ‘Macbeth,’ by the end of the first act the tragedy is set…the opening act 
                                                   
205 Harries, Martin, Scare Quotes from Shakespeare: Marx, Keynes, and the Language of Reenchantment, 
Stanford, 2000, 98.  
206 Polanyi, Karl, "Hamlet," The Yale Review 43.March (1954): 350. 
207 Ibid., 350. 
208 Ibid, 337. 




contains the tragedy in nuce.”210 Hamlet is fated to suffer and die, this much we know, and 
already we perhaps vaguely suspect the manner. Nevertheless, Hamlet remains somehow a 
free actor; it is his suffering and his (in)decision that drive the action forward. “The hero’s 
innermost conflict…is translated into external events”211 Thus even Hamlet’s apparent failure 
contains a moment of freedom.212 Polanyi’s reading of Hamlet displays the existential 
sensibility that he carries into economic thought, an ethical stance premised on the acceptance 
that no full reconciliation of individual and society, freedom and history, or agency and 
structure is achievable for humankind. His tragic vision of possibility lies somewhere between 
the utopian demand for fullness and the fatalistic acceptance of the existing world.  
In his inability to embrace the contradictory demands that freedom and fate have placed 
upon him, Hamlet shows us that “Life is man’s missed opportunity.”213 Polanyi insists that, 
after witnessing the torments of Hamlet’s indecision, we spectators are left “with an 
unaccountable sense of gratitude towards him, as if his sufferings had been not quite in 
vain.”214 His sufferings are not in vain because in some uncertain way Hamlet suffers for us, 
revealing the tragic element of social life for all to see. A dim allusion to Christ, the 
transcendent figure who suffers for others, seems unmistakable here, and would not be out of 
keeping with Polanyi’s interest in Christian themes.215 
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I take Polanyi to be arguing that a constructive attitude toward the human predicament, 
with all its contradictions and undeserved suffering, cannot be achieved if we insist at the outset 
that political and economic programs can justify and/or remedy all forms of worldly 
misfortune, or reconcile all tensions between the individual and society.216 The inevitable 
failure of economic theory to fulfill the metaphysical demands of theodicy leads toward the 
false hope of utopian politics (Hayek, Marx) or into resigned despair (Rousseau). As Nietzsche 
understood, extreme hope and despair meet as two forms of nihilism, active and passive: both 
sensibilities devalue the existing world too much and find it difficult to locate sites for 
engagement and affirmation.217 Polanyi’s turn to tragedy is an attempt to break the vacillation 
between hope and despair. 
In his essay on Hamlet, Polanyi shows that humans require a framework that can help 
make sense of the ubiquitous suffering in life, as well as stories that integrate inner experience 
with the outward stage of apparent necessity. Traditionally this task has fallen to religion, 
which is perhaps one reason why Polanyi believes that a religious sensibility can be an 
important supplement of a reformist political stance.218 Gareth Dale nicely sums up Polanyi’s 
position on the political role of religion: “The importance of religion lies not in its supernatural 
cosmology but in the broaching of eschatological questions and above all in the creation of 
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spiritual connectedness and ethical community.”219 Accordingly, the themes that emerge from 
Polanyi’s meditations on Hamlet turn out to be the crystallization of the ethos that informs his 
work. 
Given the language that Polanyi uses, it is surprising that these religious-cum-ethical 
themes are seldom remarked upon in discussions of The Great Transformation. His depiction 
of the “satanic mills” is easy to dismiss, but the decision to call liberalism a “creed” rather than 
a theory or an ideology suggests that deeper existential drives are inseparable from the 
emergence of market fundamentalism.220 Polanyi calls the Vienna of Hayek and Schumpeter 
“the Mecca…of liberal economists.”221 When liberalism finally triumphed in the nineteenth 
century, he says that the effect was “comparable in effectiveness only to the most violent 
outbursts of religious fervor in history.”222 The spiritual imperatives of crusading monotheism 
and of market fundamentalism are intimately linked in a relationship that is more than 
metaphorical because the two manifest similar longings and aspirations. Hamlet is important 
to Polanyi because his hope is that a tragic vision can engender another sensibility and a less 
destructive response.  
8. Between Autonomy and Heteronomy: Polanyi’s Tragic Ethics 
The final paragraph in The Great Transformation is so strange, filled with such quiet 
pathos, that it is worth quoting in full. Polanyi concludes his tome of economic history with 
the following ruminations:  
Resignation was ever the fount of man’s strength and new hope. Man accepted 
the reality of death and built the meaning of his bodily life upon it. He resigned 
himself to the truth that he had a soul to lose and that there was worse than 
death, and founded his freedom upon it. He resigns himself, in our time, to the 
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reality of society which means the end of that freedom. But, again, life springs 
from ultimate resignation. Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society 
gives man indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice 
and unfreedom. As long as he is true to his task of creating more abundant 
freedom for all, he need not fear that either power or planning will turn against 
him and destroy the freedom he is building by their instrumentality. This is the 
meaning of freedom in a complex society; it gives us all the certainty that we 
need.223  
 
What are we to take from this statement? Why is the “reality of death” so important for 
Polanyi? And – most crucially of all from a strictly political perspective – why does a book 
that is usually read as a call to political activism conclude with the idea that strength must have 
a basis in resignation? These are difficult questions with no obvious answers. My suggestion 
is that the passage contains Polanyi’s most concise attempt to explicate a tragic sensibility, a 
way of relating to the world that remains hopeful about future possibilities while 
simultaneously avoiding a providential vision, resignation, and predatory cynicism.  
One way to approach Polanyi’s argument is to contrast his characterization of mortality 
with Hayek’s. Recall Hayek’s declaration that “life has no purpose but itself” and that 
population increase under capitalism is, in some sense, a sufficient justification of a society 
based on supposedly self-regulating markets.224 In Chapter 3, I argued that this sentiment – the 
idea that mere life is the foundation of all value – is woven into the fabric of neoliberalism. 
The inconsistencies of this stance render the political imagination of neoliberalism deeply 
contradictory. On the one hand, the idea that life has no purpose but itself can function as a 
cynical justification of the status quo because it suggests that there is no way to speak of the 
quality or nobility of life once bare existence (or, in more fortunate circumstances, material 
prosperity) has been secured. On the other hand, it raises the specter of resentment at the pain 
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and shortness of life while exacerbating the longing for immortality. Hayek’s vision of 
impersonal processes is destructive because it precludes normal political aspirations even as it 
aggravates utopian longings. Once again, we can detect a dynamic that links utopian liberalism, 
fascism, and communism: the vacillation between an impossible conception of freedom and 
its utter foreclosure.   
Now contrast Hayek’s conception with Polanyi’s insistence that humans must accept 
“the reality of death” and come to terms with the fact that they “have a soul to lose and that 
there [are fates] worse than death.” My claim is that, at the deepest level, the differences 
between Hayek and Polanyi stem, not from their alternative political and economic theories, 
but from fundamentally opposed conceptions of the meaning of life. Ultimately, this difference 
is founded in a pre-theoretical sense of the human predicament that cannot be adjudicated 
through the empirical methods of social science.   
For Polanyi, an acceptance of mortality and the limits of life, as well as the idea that 
there are other – one is tempted to say “higher” – values than mere life, is central to a viable 
notion of political freedom, i.e, a freedom that encourages engagement with the world without 
spilling over into utopian fantasy. Such an acceptance is tragic because it affirms from the 
beginning the necessity and giveness of suffering, even as it requires us to have the “courage 
and strength to remove all removable injustice.” It says that we should seek to remove injustice, 
even though we already know that some injustice is not removable. This attitude, which 
Polanyi ultimately traces to the Bible, requires the courage to pursue justice despite likely 
failures and setbacks.225 Indeed, it is hard not to hear in Polanyi’s work echoes of one of the 
                                                   
225 “We have invoked what we believed to be the three constitutive facts in the consciousness of Western man: 
knowledge of death, knowledge of freedom, knowledge of society. The first, according to Jewish legend, was 




central paradoxes of the Gospel: “Whoever tries to keep their life will lose it, and whoever 
loses their life will preserve it.”226  
A fuller explanation of tragedy as a concept will, I believe, make Polanyi’s position 
somewhat more intelligible. Simon Critchley asserts that the modern concept of the tragic that 
has played a prominent role in German and French thought for the past two centuries is a 
response to an impasse in Kant’s critical philosophy.227 The problem is how to cope with a 
series of oppositions that the Kantian synthesis leaves in a precarious balance: 
freedom/autonomy and necessity/heteronomy. How can humankind be both free ethical agents 
and determined by natural causes? Kant’s successors were not persuaded by the solution 
presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, a sharp distinction between noumenal and 
phenomenal such that the opposite forces of freedom and natural causality could each be given 
separate regions of operation. By 1796 Schelling had already pointed to tragedy as the aesthetic 
model best suited for the reconciliation of two ideas that remained opposed in Kant, observing 
that “The essence of tragedy is thus an objective conflict between the freedom of the 
subject…and necessity…such that both are manifested in perfect indifference as 
simultaneously victorious and vanquished.”228 
 Chritchley illustrates Schelling’s conception of tragedy with a short gloss on 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. Oedipus at first misrecognises his true condition. He overestimates 
his own powers and takes himself to be a free and autonomous agent. After all, he is the king. 
When the blind seer Tiresias suggests during a search for the murderer of Laius, the previous 
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king and Oedipus’s father, that Oedipus himself is the guilty party, he angrily rejects the 
accusation. Only later does Oedipus realize the significance of a battle that he once fought at 
the spot where Laius was killed. Tiresias was right. Oedipus has murdered his father. His wife 
and queen, Jocasta, is in fact his mother and his children are also his siblings. After the terrible 
moment of recognition takes place, Oedipus gouges out his eyes and leaves the polis. Yet, 
according to Critchley, Oedipus ends the play as something of a free agent, at least partly 
reconciled to his suffering by having freely affirmed the causality of fate.229 He too is now a 
blind seer of sorts.   
Polanyi makes virtually the same observation about Hamlet:  
Hamlet parts willingly from life; he commits suicide not in despair, but in 
fulfillment. His readiness to die is readiness to accept life in its true meaning. 
He is murdered and the certainty of his own death releases him...The inner stage 
and the outward stage reflect each other to the end.230 
 
Polanyi’s thought revolves around the problem of reconciling freedom, necessity, and 
suffering. One might say that, for him, the major flaw of the political visions that emerge from 
the 19th century’s naturalistic understanding of economics is that they demand a reconciliation 
of freedom and necessity that is fundamentally confused. On the one hand, economics tends to 
promote an image of the economic agent as a free/autonomous actor making choices in the 
market. But in other contexts this very same agent is understood to be determined by the larger 
historical pattern of impersonal markets, economic growth, or economic law.  
As we have seen, a common result is a struggle or vacillation between the extreme 
polarities of a nearly absolute freedom or an enforced necessity. Many plans to remedy 
economic suffering are thereby drawn toward “pure” solutions, demanding a space of 
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expansive individual rights without any recognition of the mutual obligations entailed by social 
life, or insisting that our difficulties would be solved if only individuals could be made to 
conform to the dictates of history, of the nation, or of economic law itself. “The victory of 
fascism,” Polanyi believes,  
was made practically unavoidable by the liberals’ obstruction of any reform 
involving planning, regulation, or control. Freedom’s utter frustration in 
fascism is, indeed, the inevitable result of the liberal philosophy, which claims 
that power and compulsion are evil, that freedom demands their absence from 
a human community. No such thing is possible; in a complex society this 
becomes apparent. This leaves no alternative but either to remain faithful to an 
illusionary idea of freedom and deny the reality of society, or to accept that 
reality and reject the idea of freedom. The first is the liberal’s conclusion; the 
latter the fascist’s.231 
 
Polanyi goes on to champion “resignation” not because he advocates passivity, but because 
only an affirmation of necessity – those aspects of injustice, power, and suffering for which no 
remedy is yet visible – makes it possible to halt the swing between utopia and reaction. Power 
is inherent in society, just as freedom is entangled in fate and choice is restrained by history. 
Only a public acceptance of these facts breaks the false dichotomy of autonomy and 
heteronomy. We exist somewhere in-between.   
Resignation entails the acknowledgment of individual finitude, but at the same time it 
implies recognition of the importance of community, because fragile, finite individuals depend 
on others. Paradoxically, then, the affirmation of finitude opens a space in which we may seek 
solace through social projects and democratic politics. Polanyi sometimes refers to this idea as 
“the Christian discovery of the uniqueness of the individual and of the oneness of mankind.”232 
It is important that Polanyi never drops his attachment to Christianity. But neither does he rely 
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on its religious doctrine as a foundation for political ethics. After the industrial revolution, he 
claims, “the Gospels did not any more suffice, and yet remained the basis of our civilization” 
because the relation of the individual to the community remains an enduring issue.233 His 
Christianity is thus tempered by his reading of tragedy.  
However, Polanyi is also aware that tragic conceptions of politics have their own 
pitfalls.234 First, resignation should not be identified with passivity. Second, the brute fact of 
suffering cannot be allowed to acquire a pathos that suggests meaning or inherent dignity, as 
if poverty were itself commendable. Thus Polanyi rebukes Edmund Burke for creating a halo 
of nobility around the pointless struggle of the industrial poor.235 Burke fails to appreciate that 
renewed action is always called for in the midst of change. Pushing against the boundaries of 
removable injustice is the only way to discover those boundaries in the first place. The “twin 
secret” of Hamlet is that fate and necessity do exist, but that meaning comes only through 
striving that tests the limits of possibility by pushing against them.  
  Tragic action differentiates itself through an activist yet cautious relationship with the 
temporality of political change. Burke’s version of conservatism too often tries to limit social 
change to the necessary minimum, while radical projects such as Hayekian liberalism and 
Marxism desire that some particular version of the “truth” be put into practice fully, with the 
consequence that the present is often seen through the prism of the future. This demand can 
lead to dramatic changes in which the sheer speed of transition can be as damaging as the 
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transition itself. As we saw in the discussion of Speenhamland, the pace of change under 
capitalism is often its most destructive and inscrutable feature. Polanyi understands that:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The rate of change is often of no less importance than the direction of 
change itself; but while the latter frequently does not depend upon our volition, 
it is the rate at which we allow change to take place that may depend on us.236 
 
Speed and timing make all the difference to the meaning of a situation. If Hamlet had not 
struggled with his fate, his death would lack meaning and value; it would fail to lay the 
groundwork for future understanding. Similarly, for a tragic political sensibility of the possible, 
there is value in the intervening moments of resistance that forestall or deflect destructive 
trends, preserving resources for the future, helping to make rampant social change livable.  
9. Afterthoughts, Affirmations, and Reservations  
Economic ideologies sometimes assume that, if change is necessary, then the rate at 
which it arrives does not much matter; better to get the future started now. Nor does it seem to 
matter whether change is consensual and democratic, or undertaken by faceless institutions or 
an unaccountable cognoscenti. Whatever its origins, Truth remains just as true; that is its 
beauty. But, as Rousseau knew, politics is messier and more complicated, not only because the 
habits and institutions that underpin society take time to adjust, but also because human 
experience itself can be uneven and volatile. Emotional ties, contested identities, and historical 
legacies of grievance and resentment subvert tidy theories of impersonal order.237 From 
Speenhamland to the “shock therapy” administered to post-Soviet states in the 1990s to the 
austerity policies that followed the 2008 financial crisis, programs of utopian neoliberalism 
have failed to appreciate that rapid bursts of social dislocation, when older patterns are 
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disrupted and expectations are upended, can lead to a crisis as identities and institutions 
crumble.238  
Polanyi understood this problem well because, like Aristotle and Rousseau, he 
suspected that a social order in which moral bonds and expectations of mutual obligation were 
disintegrating could not be held together solely through the impersonal mechanism of the 
market. As a result, he argued, there are values and rights so important – he mentions civil 
liberty, personal freedom, a modicum of solidarity, and the right of each person to a job – that 
they “must be upheld at all costs; even at the cost of efficiency in production, economy in 
consumption or rationality in administration.”239 After the experiences of the past few decades, 
it seems to me that Polanyi is heading in the right direction. This is not to say that his thought 
is free of its own problems and contradictions. There are moments, for instance, when I doubt 
whether each of his proposed rights is fully compatible with the others. Is it not the case, as 
liberals have long argued, that a government capable of guaranteeing each person a job would 
pose certain dilemmas for civil liberty? But perhaps these are disagreements that can be 
negotiated later. His insistence that the moral aspect of society is irreducible to impersonal 
economic processes remains vital. Neither Adam Smith, nor Friedrich Hayek, nor their many 
imitators, fully grasp the magnitude of the volatility that markets sometimes generate, or 
appreciate the way such dislocations provoke cycles of populist reaction.  
Of course, (neo)liberalism is not the only ideology prone to utopian temptations. 
Indeed, I think Polanyi tends to underestimate the degree to which liberalism’s rhetoric of 
rights and its support for the rule of law have operated as moderating influences. It is difficult 
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(but, sadly, not impossible) for a liberal to say that you have to break a few eggs to make a 
trade pact. This is not a trivial fact because it can open liberalism up to an ethical critique on 
terms that are widely accepted, not just throughout society, but also within major political 
institutions. And, if Polanyi is correct to claim that liberalism sometimes steps over the brink, 
it has also stepped back on more than one occasion (the Reform Acts in 19th century Britain 
and FDR’s response to the Great Depression come to mind). Alternatively, a Weltanschauung 
that openly calls for revolution and rupture, of which fascism and communism are the main 
but not the only examples, is often even more destructive because it undermines the very terms 
and concepts through which political change can be understood and contested. As Polanyi 
knew, it is easier to pursue the future goal at all costs once widespread moral notions and 
conceptions of democratic legitimacy have been hollowed out. Utopian ideologies of the 
revolutionary stripe often degenerate into regimes of discipline and control, or else they 
subside into resentment and passive nihilism after an initial bout of enthusiasm. The first path 
leads to amoral authoritarianism; the second does too.  
My own hope is that a renewed liberalism, if it were able to attenuate its attachment  to 
certain aspects of free-market theory, might manage to avoid these pitfalls, but this is hardly a 
given, and it requires liberalism to be open to the sort of foundational critique that Polanyi 
undertakes. Of course, the reader is entitled to ask, what might such a reconstructed liberalism 
entail? What doctrines would it espouse? But perhaps we should delay this question 
momentarily. For it seems to me that one of the lessons of The Great Transformation is that 
how a political creed is believed is sometimes as important as the doctrine of the creed itself. 
Beliefs differ in intensity, in their relationship to conceptions of past and future, in their 




the sake of prudence, and in the way they cope with surprises and momentary failures. A 
refashioned, more moderate liberalism might still retain a place for markets, individual rights, 
and a desire to constrain the power of the state, but the modality of these beliefs would have to 
change. Markets would have to be tempered with some sense of justice or mutual obligation, 
individualism would at times need to be restrained, and mistrust of the state kept to a low boil.   
At the very least, neoliberal fantasies of impersonal economic order exemplified in the 
works of Friedrich Hayek would have to be abandoned. But I believe that significant steps in 
this direction might be made by recapturing some of the dissident strains in the writings of 
Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, and Alexis de Tocqueville. It is sometimes forgotten today just 
how critical and ambivalent these thinkers are with respect to what I feel compelled to call (for 
lack of a better term) liberal modernity, and this is true whether we want to speak about 
markets, individualism, or universal equality under the law. In part, this selective memory 
regarding their ideas is a testament to the success that Hayek and likeminded interpreters 
enjoyed during the past century. But nowhere, to my knowledge, does Hayek address Burke’s 
worries about unregulated finance and the corrupting influence of the “monied interest”240 or 
Smith’s related anxieties about monopolies, easy profits, and overspecialization.241 Unlike 
today’s utopian neoliberals, Tocqueville was haunted by the possibility that America’s myopic 
obsession with property would engender a timid and reactionary society, afraid of adventure 
and novelty. 242  
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Again, contrary to much popular opinion, a sustained engagement with the problems 
posed by unequal degrees of political power, especially as it operates in the international arena, 
is at the center of this older liberalism. Indeed, Polanyi, who is often quite sympathetic to Smith 
on particular points, goes so far as to declare that “Anti-imperialism was initiated by Adam 
Smith” in his writings against colonial monopolies.243 Similarly, Burke devoted nearly a 
decade to, and staked much of his reputation on, a failed attempt to impeach Warren Hastings, 
the powerful Governor-General of the East India Company.244 These moments of ambiguity 
are essential to their distinct but complimentary notions of modern politics and economics. 
Likewise, a reconstructed liberalism, whatever its positive vision, would have to renew its 
appreciation for doubt, ambiguity, and the realization that all ideologies, itself included, have 
blind spots and limitations.  
However, it is at this point that I begin to depart from what I take to be Polanyi’s 
diagnosis of the current political scene. He appears to think that, because of its links to free-
market utopianism and conceptions of impersonal order, liberalism is incapable of a 
reformation. To put it differently, Polanyi suggests that a moderate liberalism of the type that 
I am advocating will invariably slide into a utopian neoliberalsim that views the world through 
the prism of the market. Moreover, he sometimes writes as if the liberal era had come to a 
definitive close sometime in the 1940s.245 In these moments, he implies that the only 
satisfactory outcome of the violent upheavals of the last century would be one in which 
liberalism is superseded by a new phase of social democracy that combines respect for the 
individual with a more active pursuit of social justice and communal solidarity.246  
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But it seems to me that these occasional provocations to “go beyond” liberalism – to 
sublate its concerns within a social democracy that would be at once more communal and more 
activist – are not fully consistent with a tragic ethos that is wary of permanent solutions and 
expects tension between citizens and society to endure. This strikes me as an important moment 
of ambiguity in Polanyi’s thought: should the acceptance of life’s tragic character give us the 
courage to press against the limits of the possible; or, conversely, does tragedy teach us to 
embrace the world, flawed as it is? The Great Transformation evinces aspects of both attitudes, 
even as Polanyi seems to favor the activist stance. 
For my own part, I remain apprehensive about rousing calls to move resolutely into the 
future. My concern is that the desire to supersede problems entirely, to separate the wheat from 
the chaff, sometimes fosters exaggerated conceptions of human agency and minimizes the 
difficulty of separating good from evil in a complex world. However, one must be careful at 
this point: the allure of the future appears to be bound up with the contemporary human 
predicament; and our expectation of future possibilities can take on various shades and tones 
without which political reform would not appear possible. At the same time, it seems to me 
that an orientation toward futurity becomes pernicious when it is suffused with that peculiar 
mood which seems to prize novelty, change, youth, and rupture above all else. This disposition 
is something less than an articulated doctrine and has little to do with normal political or 
economic positions as we usually conceive them; I have argued that we can catch glimpses of 
it in the Rousseau of the Social Contract and in Hayek’s later writings. In certain critical 
passages, Polanyi also seems to be moving in this direction. “Out of the ruins of the Old 




governments and the liberty to organize national life at will.”247 To my ears, such 
proclamations sound cavalier and insensitive to the problems associated with state power when 
it is deployed on a massive scale. Moreover, the eager anticipation of the ruins of the Old 
World tells us little about what we might want to preserve or improve. Even ruins can be 
instructive.    
Thus I retain a degree of fidelity to something loosely called liberalism, not only 
because I continue to see value in the work of thinkers such as Adam Smith, or because I rate 
somewhat higher than Polanyi the achievements of markets, but also because I believe that 
speaking about liberalism is a way of invoking a certain continuity with the past that might 
exert a moderating influence on political change. The fact that liberalism is a somewhat 
ambiguous and, some might say, overused concept does not hurt and may even help in this 
regard. What I want to preserve from the ruins is not limited to any particular doctrine or 
thinker, but instead includes a set of attitudes, questions, and concerns that have often been 
called liberal: a meliorist faith in change, a guarded view of state power, an attempt to draw 
some distinction between public and private, recognition of the importance of the rule of law, 
and a qualified respect for markets.  
 Like many theorists, Polanyi tends to underestimate the potential dangers of political 
views and programs with which he sympathizes. This sometimes has the result of making 
liberalism look shabby in his estimation, when a more complete picture of liberalism and its 
alternatives would probably result in a more balanced evaluation. For example, although he 
often champions the communal ethos of Owenite socialism, nowhere does Polanyi mention the 
                                                   




draconian discipline associated with Robert Owen’s programs at New Lanark. James Fulcher 
provides a description that is far from attractive: 
Robert Owen introduced “silent monitors” at his New Lanark Mills. Each 
worker had a piece of wood, with its sides painted black for bad work, blue 
for indifferent, yellow for good, and white for excellent. The side turned to 
the front provided a constant reminder, visible to all, of the quality of the 
previous day’s work. Each department had a “book of character” recording 
the daily color for each worker. Discipline was not only a factory matter, 
for Owen also controlled the community. He sent round street patrols to 
report drunkenness and fined the drunks the next morning. He insisted on 
cleanliness and established detailed rules for the cleaning of streets and 
houses. There was even a curfew that required everyone to be indoors after 
10:30 p.m. in the winter.248 
 
Is such discipline the price that must be paid for breaking free from the tyranny of self-
regulating markets? Perhaps it is not; but either way we need a fuller account from Polanyi to 
arrive at an accurate picture of the costs associated with his preferred version of social 
democracy. Even more problematic is the way he underplays the horrors of Bolshevism. He 
separates the Russian Revolution and its aftermath into two phases, one that runs from 1917 to 
1924 and another that includes the years from 1930 to WWII. He then implies that the second 
phase – the Stalinist period that undertook collectivization – had more to do with the 
consequences of the Russian Civil War and the general upheaval of the 1930s than it did with 
communism.249 He laconically observes that “The collectivization of the farms meant the 
suppression of the market economy by cooperative methods in regard to the decisive factor of 
land.”250 But collectivization meant a good deal more than that, and I am relatively certain that 
many peasants raised questions at the time as to how cooperative the ordeal really was. One 
could read The Great Transformation closely without realizing the enormous human cost of 
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Soviet economic policies. In a way, his soft treatment of collectivization is surprising, since 
Polanyi was not a Marxist and found the materialistic orthodoxy of Soviet communism 
distasteful.251 And, in fairness, writing from abroad in the 1930s and 40s, Polanyi may have 
lacked full knowledge of what was going on inside the USSR. But even if this is granted, it 
remains true that his discussions of socialism lack the clear-eyed skepticism that makes his 
critique of liberalism so compelling. This constitutes a problem in his work.  
 Nonetheless, against my preference for a more cautious and skeptical style of 
liberalism, it must be said that there is no obvious way to demarcate a false and dangerous 
utopianism from a viable desire for change. (Indeed, Polanyi tacitly accuses neoliberalism of 
failing to understand this very point when it relies on an impersonal theory of markets to 
delegitimate plans for social reform). The utopian temptation to seek a single social order in 
which all good things are possible, although it can become destructive when carried beyond 
some uncertain point, seems to be intertwined with a healthy faith in the future that motivates 
change and guards against nihilism. There are several reasons for this. First, programs and 
desires that appear impossibly utopian during one era often become viable at a later date. Plato 
and Aristotle, for example, might have been shocked to find a flourishing society without 
slaves. Second, because, as Francis Fukuyama notes, humans tend to entrench customs and 
institutions by attributing to them transcendent meanings and values, it is sometimes the case 
that change requires a touch of utopian zeal to shake up existing practices and mobilize 
dissent.252 Perhaps the abolition of slavery in America could not have happened when it did 
without the millennial radicalism of some abolitionists. Who is to say? For these reasons, the 
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version of liberalism that I am advocating would need to be careful about casting aspersions 
on the political aspirations of others, even as it attempts to temper certain political desires and 
goals.  
Polanyi is at his best when he attempts to conceive social change from a perspective of 
moderation and cautious faith in the future. Although he advocates social democracy and 
political reformation, he usually tries to balance these goals with a skeptical stance that refuses 
to allow a single theory or a conception of impersonal order to overwhelm his vision. Unlike 
utopians, who sometimes seek to embrace the future as rapidly as possible, Polanyi asks what 
is perhaps the central question of the tragic stance: “Why should the ultimate victory of a trend 
be taken as proof of the ineffectiveness of the efforts to slow down its progress?”253 This 
question reminds us that political projects can produce enduring value in the short and near-
term, and this remains the case even if long-term trends eventually overwhelm the projects we 
champion today. Moderating change, creating spaces of stability within flux, upholding value 
where it exists within the current political order, these are not trivial goals.  
This reminder to seek constructive zones of engagement is especially important at the 
present moment, when politics seems once again to be taking on an apocalyptic tone. Indeed, 
the current milieu bears an uncanny resemblance to Polanyi’s description of the years prior to 
the eruption of fascism, a time characterized, he says, by “irrationalistic philosophies, racialist 
aesthetics, anticapitalist demagogy, heterodox currency views, criticism of the party system, 
[and] widespread disparagement of the…existing democratic setup.”254 My own sense is that, 
at present, no single group or political ideology has a monopoly on these tendencies and beliefs, 
which seem to be meted out across the political spectrum with distressing consistency.  
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We seem to be entering another period in which politics is vulnerable to that oscillation 
between radicalism and reaction that Polanyi tried to forestall. His tragic vision attempts to 
short-circuit this cycle by altering our conception of temporality and the powers of human 
action, that is, by shifting the experiences and expectations we bring to politics. Too short a 
perspective leads to a disinterested myopia; too long a perspective devalues the present and 
engenders infatuation with simplistic impersonal theories. But engagement can take place 
somewhere in-between these two horizons. For example, Polanyi observes that the policies of 
the Tudor and Stuart monarchies that worked to slow the spread of the enclosures in early 
modern England made the transition to capitalism bearable, even though they were ultimately 
incompatible with the larger trajectory on which England was embarking.255 Similarly, perhaps 
we should look back with gratitude on the considerable achievements of the 20th century 
welfare state, even if we come to suspect its essential incompatibility – at least in its present 
form – with long-term economic and demographic trends.  A tragic ethos is willing to affirm 
the value of political projects that succeed only in part and for a time. It may also be the case 
that political freedom only assumes meaning against a background of larger forces that render 
its full realization imperfect, and that we must therefore live in the interim. The desire to ask 
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